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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The Impact of Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital Payment on the Provision of 
Hospital Uncompensated Care and Quality of Care 
by Hui-Min Hsieh, Ph.D. 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctoral of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.  
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond Virginia, May 2010 
Director: Gloria J. Bazzoli, Ph.D.  
Bon Secours Professor, Department of Health Administration 
 
 
 Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment is one of the major 
funds supporting health care providers as they treat low-income patients. However, 
Medicaid DSH payments have been targeted for major budget cuts in many health policy 
reforms. This study examines the association between the changes in Medicaid DSH 
payments resulting from the BBA policy changes and hospital outcomes, in terms of 
hospital provision of uncompensated care and quality of care. 
 Economic theory of non-profit hospital behavior is used as a conceptual 
framework, and longitudinal data for California short-term, non-federal general acute 
care hospitals for 1996-2003 are examined. California was especially affected by DSH 
changes because it is one of the states with highly concentrated DSH payments and high 
uninsured rate. Economic theory suggests that hospitals would change their 
uncompensated care provision as well as quality of care when confronted with a 
 
 
 
 
 
reduction in public payments. Hospital uncompensated care costs and percent of 
operating costs devoted to uncompensated care are used to measure the provision of 
hospital uncompensated care. Six AHRQ’s Patient safety indicators (PSIs) and one 
composite measure are selected to measure hospital quality of care provided for Medicaid 
and uninsured patients as well as privately insured patients. The key independent variable 
is Medicaid DSH payments received by individual hospitals. This study also includes 
control variables such as other governmental financial subsidies, market characteristics, 
and hospital characteristics.  
 The primary data sources include the detailed hospital annual financial data and 
Medicaid annual report data at the county level from California Office of Statewide 
Health Planning and Development, Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) state 
inpatient data (SID), American Hospital Association Annual Survey, Area Resource File, 
Interstudy HMO Data and Medicare cost report data. 
 After controlling for different factors, the study findings suggest that not-for-
profit hospitals may reduce their provision of uncompensated care in response to 
reductions of Medicaid DSH payments. The results, however, do not support the 
hypotheses that for-profit hospitals may reduce uncompensated care by a smaller degree 
than not-for-profit hospitals for a comparable DSH decline. With respect to quality of 
care model, the overall study findings do not strongly support there is an association 
between net Medicaid DSH payments and patient adverse events for both 
Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Specific Aims 
A growing number of individuals in the U.S. do not have health insurance. Census 
Bureau data indicate the number of uninsured increased dramatically from 31 million in 
1987 to 45.7 million in 2007. In the U.S. health system, the uninsured often rely on 
hospitals to provide charity care, or more broadly defined uncompensated care (Bazzoli, 
Lindrooth, Kang, & Hasnain-Wynia, 2006; Davidoff, LoSasso, Bazzoli, & Zuckerman, 
2000; Lo Sasso & Seamster, 2007; Mann, Melnick, Bamezai, & Zwanziger, 1997). One 
study estimated the overall amount of hospital uncompensated care costs was about 23.6 
billion in 2001 (Hadley & Holahan, 2003). In order to offset the burden from this type of 
care, hospitals need to get various types of public and private financial support from 
federal, state, local governments or private philanthropy (Fishman & Bentley, 1997; 
Hadley, Cravens, Coughlin, & Holahan, 2005; Hadley & Holahan, 2003).  
The Federal and State Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment 
is one of the major funding sources for uncompensated care, accounting for 
approximately 7.8% of total Medicaid expenditures in 1997.
1
 It supported about 36% 
                                                          
 
1
 The percentage of inpatient hospital Medicaid DSH to total Medicaid expenditures decreased 
after 1997 Balanced Budget Act. In 1997, the percentage was about 7.8%. In 2000, it became 5.9%. In 
2005, it was about 4.5%. In the Obama health reform plan, from 2010 to 2019, cutting Medicare and 
Medicaid DSH budget is one of the major ways planned from financing health reform. 
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/healthreform_tri_full.pdf   
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of total uncompensated care costs for hospitals in 2001 (Fagnani, Tolbert, & Fund, 1999; 
Fishman & Bentley, 1997; Hadley et al., 2005; Hadley & Holahan, 2003; Lo Sasso & 
Seamster, 2007). In the early 1990s, Medicaid DSH payments expanded rapidly. 
Medicaid DSH spending grew from less than $1 billion in 1990 to more than $ 17 billion 
in 1992. In order to limit this dramatic growth, Congress implemented two major reforms 
to cap the amount of DSH spending by limiting the source of state matching funds and 
also by limiting DSH payments for individual hospitals, requiring hospitals that received 
Medicaid DSH have at least one percent of their patients covered by Medicaid (Wynn, 
Coughlin, Bondarenko, & Bruen, 2002). One reform bill was the Medicaid Voluntary 
Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of 1991, which became effective in 
federal Fiscal Year 1993 and the other was Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 
(OBRA`93), which became effective in 1995.  
In 1997, the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) further limited Medicaid DSH payments 
by reducing state specific federal allotments
2
 by $10.4 billion over the 1998 and 2002 
period (CBO, 1997). These substantial DSH reductions constituted the major sources of 
federal Medicaid savings, specifically accounting for 61 percent of total Medicaid gross 
savings over five years. After the BBA, Congress passed the Balanced Budget 
Refinement Act (BBRA) in 1999. This law eliminated the BBA DSH cuts for Federal 
Fiscal Year (FFY) 2001 and FFY 2002 and also provided relief by setting 2001 state-
specific allotments at 2000 levels adjusted for inflation and setting 2002 allotments at 
                                                          
 
2
 State specific DSH allotment, also called DSH payment limit or DSH funding cap, is a specified 
amount of DSH payment adjustment for each state for each Federal fiscal year (FFY) (Federal Register, 
62(178), pp.2). 
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2001 levels adjusted for inflation. However, the Benefit and Improvement Protection Act 
(BIPA) of 2000 let the full BBA DSH reductions become effective in FFY 2003 
(Mechanic, 2004).  
In the U.S. health care reform debates of 2009 and 2010, one of the approaches 
that Congress and the Obama administration proposed for financing expanded health care 
coverage was to redirect of funds currently used to support safety net hospitals so that 
subsidies could be provided for individual’s purchasing health insurance. Medicaid DSH 
payment is one of the major sources of funds that would be redirected for these purposes.  
Most existing empirical studies have examined the effects of Medicaid DSH 
payments, which increased dramatically during the 1990s, on hospital uncompensted care 
provisions as well as patient quality of care. Very few studies examined the impact the 
reduction of Medicaid DSH payment resulting from the BBA policy at the hospital level. 
This study examines the association between the changes in Medicaid DSH payments 
resulting from the BBA policy changes and hospital outcomes, in terms of hospital 
provision of uncompensated care and quality of care. Through this study, we will gain a 
better understanding of past health policies as well as a better ability to anticipate the 
impact of future policies. 
Conceptual Framework 
 A primary concern of this study is whether the reduction of Medicaid 
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment affected the provision of hospital 
uncompensated care and quality of care for Medicaid and uninsured patients. The 
underlying conceptual framework in this study derives from the Newhouse (1970) 
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economic theory of not-for-profit hospital behavior and theoretical extensions from 
Hoerger (1991), Frank and Salkever (1991) and other researchers. Specifically, this study 
focuses on theoretical discussions of how hospitals, in particular not-for-profit hospitals, 
respond when confronted with changes in governmental policy or other exogenous 
factors (i.e., the reduction of public payments). This study primarily examines the 
associations between Medicaid DSH payments and hospital provision of uncompensated 
care. For the quality of care analysis, this study investigates whether the reductions in 
Medicaid DSH payments affected the quality of care for Medicaid/uninsured. This study 
also examines changes in the quality of care for privately insured patients, given the 
public good /private good theoretical perspectives of quality of care.  
 In order to control for other potential factors that may also affect the provision of 
hospital uncompensated care and quality of care, this study includes other governmental 
financial subsidies, market characteristics and hospital-specific characteristics as control 
variables. The graphical depiction in Figure 1 presents the conceptual framework of the 
effect of Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital payment on the provision of hospital 
uncompensated care and quality of care. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1.  Brief Schematic of the Conceptual Framework of the Effects of Medicaid 
Disproportionate Share Hospital Payment on the Provision of Hospital 
Uncompensated Care and Quality of Care.   
 
Key Independent Variable 
 Medicaid DSH payment  
Hospital Outcomes 
 Uncompensated Care  
 Quality of Care  
 
Control Variables 
 Other Governmental Financial Subsidies  
 Market Characteristics  
 Hospital-Specific Characteristics 
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Research Questions 
 Medicaid DSH payment is a major funding source from Federal and State 
governments that offsets costs for those hospitals providing large amounts of care to 
Medicaid and uninsured patients. Budget cuts in Medicaid DSH payment after the BBA 
reduced hospital net revenue. Hospitals that depend most on Medicaid DSH payments 
were most affected in this regard. Economic theory generally predicts that reductions in 
the subsidies for the uninsured may lead to reductions in the provision of uncompensated 
care and quality of care provided to the uninsured (Davidoff, LoSasso, Bazzoli, & 
Zuckerman, 2000; Frank & Salkever, 1991; Hoerger, 1991; Newhouse, 1970). This study 
addresses these concerns and will answer the following research questions:  
 Research Question I: What impact did the reductions of Medicaid DSH payments 
have on hospital provision of uncompensated care, in particular for not-for-profit 
hospitals? 
 Research Question II: How do the reduced Medicaid DSH payments affect hospitals’ 
patient quality of care for both Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients?  
 Research Question III: Is quality of care a private good or a public good? 
 A set of testable hypotheses discussed in the Chapter 3 are developed based on the 
economic theory to answer these research questions. 
Scope and Approach 
 A longitudinal panel study is developed using unbalanced annual panel data for 
short-term, non-federal general acute care hospitals in California from 1996 to 2003, 
which is a study period that includes observations from both before and after the passage 
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of the BBA. There are several reasons for examing this state: first, California has a higher 
uninsured rate than the nation as a whole. Second, California receives a high proportion 
of Medicaid DSH payments each year (Hearne, 2004). Third, the audited financial report 
data contain relatively complete information regarding the Medicaid DSH payments 
hospitals received and the uncompensated care hospitals provided.  
Study data are drawn from several databases, including (1) annual hospital 
financial data from the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) 
in California; (2) Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) state inpatient data 
(SID); (3) the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey; (4) the Area 
Resource File (ARF); (5) the Health Leader-Interstudy HMO enrollment data; (6) Medi-
Cal annual statistical reports; (7) Medi-Cal Managed Care Annual Statistical Reports; (8) 
Medicare Cost Reports; and (9) Hospital case-mix index data from OSHPD.  
 Several analytical approaches are applied in this study. For the uncompensated 
care models, this study primarily uses fixed effects modeling, adjusting for 
heteroskedasticity-robust and intra-cluster standard errors. For the quality of care models, 
this study stratifies patients into two groups by insurance status when examining patient 
safety outcome measures: one group consists of the privately insured and the other those 
insured by Medicaid or uninsured. Risk-adjusted patient safety indicator (PSI) measures 
for both Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients are constructed separately at 
the hospital provider level. Random effects modeling with heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard error adjustment is used to take account of unobserved hospital specific factors. 
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Significance of the Study 
 The study contributes to the body of knowledge in several ways. For the 
uncompensated care model, this study uses audited hospital financial data from OSHPD 
to assess the extent to which hospital uncompensated care provision was affected by 
declining Medicaid DSH payments during the period 1996 to 2003. The advantage of 
using audited hospital financial data is that Medicaid DSH payment and other state and 
local governmental financial subsidies are measured explicitly by the dollar amounts that 
hospitals recive. As such, this study provides information on how additional Medicaid 
DSH payments are associated with the provision of hospital uncompensated care, holding 
other governmental subsidies, market and hospital characteristics constant. This study 
also explores the effects of other federal and state policies, in addition to Medicaid DSH 
payments, on hospital uncompensated care provision, such as Medicare DSH payments.  
 With respect to the quality of care model, this study uses hospital inpatient 
discharge data from Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) State Inpatient Data 
(SID) and audited hospital financial data to assess the extent to which hospital quality of 
care was affected by reductions in Medicaid DSH payments during the period 1996 to 
2003. This study examines hospital quality of care for both Medicaid/uninsured and 
privately insured patients between the ages 18 and 64. This study also investigates the 
public or private good nature of quality of care from the theoretical perspectives.  
Summary of Remaining Chapters 
 This chapter briefly summarizes the purpose of this study as well as the 
conceptual framework, scope and analytical approach that are used in this study. More 
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detailed information is discussed and elaborated on in subsequent chapters. Chapter 2 
reviews the background of the changes of Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital 
payment policy and prior empirical studies, particularly the effect of public payment on 
hospital uncompensated care provision and the effect of public payment on quality of 
care. This review highlights gaps in the existing empirical literature.  
 Chapter 3 establishes a conceptual framework based on the organizational 
economic theory, and discusses a set of testable hypotheses. Chapter 4 discusses research 
methodologies used in this study, including research design, data sources, variable 
measurements, econometric issues encountered, and analytical approaches. Chapter 5 
presents study findings, including descriptive analysis, regression models and sensitivity 
analysis. Chapter 6 summarizes the results based on the hypotheses and discusses the 
implications and limitation of this study. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
This chapter includes three major sections. In the first section, the study provides 
an overview regarding the background of the changes of Medicaid Disproportionate 
Share Hospital (DSH) payment policy, which is the key independent variable in this 
study. In the second section, the study reviews how previous studies measured several 
key dependent variables, including uncompensated care provision, and quality of care. 
The third section discusses two general issues that have been examined empirically: the 
effect of public payment on hospital uncompensated care provision and the effect of 
public payment on quality of care. This study will also include summary tables for 
uncompensated care and quality of care measurements and empirical evidence from 
existing literature. In general, this chapter provides information on the current body of 
knowledge from prior studies that is related to this research. Through literature review, 
this study identifies the gaps among current studies and will identify a proceeding plan 
for this study.  
Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital Payment Policy 
The Federal and State Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment 
is one of the major funding sources for uncompensated care, accounting for 36% of total 
funds for hospitals care of the uninsured (Fagnani et al., 1999; Fishman & Bentley, 1997; 
Hadley et al., 2005; Hadley & Holahan, 2003; Lo Sasso & Seamster, 2007). Medicaid
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DSH payment was enacted after Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981. 
At that time, Congress required states to “take into account the situation of hospitals 
which serve a disproportionate number of low income patients with special needs” 
(Fishman & Bentley, 1997). Then, in the Budget Reconciliation Legislation of 1987, 
Congress established minimum criteria for designing and paying DSH hospitals so that 
individual states could have more generous criteria in calculating DSH payment for 
hospitals in that states, either using Medicare existing formula or making an adjustment 
to hospitals with a high proportion of Medicaid utilization rate (Fagnani et al., 1999; 
Fishman & Bentley, 1997; Hearne, 2004; Schwartz, Genshan, Weil, & Lam, 2006; Wynn 
et al., 2002).  
In the early 1990s, Medicaid DSH payment expanded quickly. The Medicaid 
DSH spending grew from less than $1 billion in 1990 to more than $ 17 billion in 1992. 
As a result of this dramatic expansion, Congress implemented two major reforms to cap 
the amount of DSH spending in order to limit the growth of the Medicaid DSH 
expenditure. One was the Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax 
Amendments of 1991and another was the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 
(OBRA`93). These reforms limited the source of state matching funds, limited DSH 
payments for individual hospitals, and required hospitals to have a Medicaid utilization 
rate of at least one percent in order to qualify for Medicaid DSH payments need (Wynn et 
al., 2002).  
The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 further limited Medicaid DSH payment 
by reducing state specific federal allotments by $10.4 billion over the 1998 to 2002 
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period (CBO, 1997). These substantial DSH reductions constituted the major sources of 
federal Medicaid projected savings, specifically accounting for 61 percent of total 
Medicaid gross savings over five years. 
3
 After the BBA, Congress passed the Balanced 
Budget Refinement Act (BBRA) in 1999. The laws eliminated the BBA’s DSH cuts for 
Federal Fiscal Year (FFY) 2001 and FFY 2002 and also provided relief by setting 2001 
state-specific allotments at 2000 levels adjusted for inflation and setting 2002 allotments 
at 2001 levels adjusted for inflation. However, the Benefit and Improvement Protection 
Act (BIPA) of 2000 let the full BBA DSH reductions become effective in FFY 2003 
(Mechanic, 2004).   
Figure 2 reflects the historical national and California trends of Federal and State 
inpatient hospital Medicaid DSH expenditures for the years 1996 through 2003. The 
trend lines of the combined federal and state share of Medicaid DSH expenditure reflect 
the association of DSH expenditures and policy changes.  
Measurement of Key Study Variables 
Uncompensated Care Provision 
 Uncompensated care provision is often used to measure hospital charitable care 
provided to uninsured or underinsured individuals. It is normally defined as “…the sum 
of charity care (for patients who are qualified for charity care and are deemed unable to 
pay after meeting certain criteria) and bad debts (for patients who presumably can afford 
to pay, but do not)” (Weissman, 1996). Although one may argue that charity care is a 
precise measure, many researchers found that variations do exist across hospitals in 
                                                          
 
3
 See Schneider, A. (1997), Overview of Medicaid Provisions in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 
P.L.105-33, from http://www.cbpp.org/908mcaid.htm (Access Date: Feb 20, 2008). 
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hospital accounting for charity care and bad debt (Bazzoli, Kang, Hasnain-Wynia, & 
Lindrooth, 2005; Bazzoli, Lindrooth, Kang, & Hasnain-Wynia, 2006; Davidoff et al., 
2000; Gaskin, 1997; Kane & Wubbenhorst, 2000; Rundall, Sofaer, & Lambert, 1988; 
Sanders, 1993; Sutton & Stensland, 2004; S. Zuckerman, Bazzoli, Davidoff, & LoSasso, 
2001). Rundall et al. (1988) commented that hospitals may report their indigent care 
service as charity care or bad debt, depending on their ownership status. Because of tax 
consideration, for-profit hospitals tend to report their indigent care as bad debt whereas 
not-for-profit hospitals prefer to report as charity care. Kane and Wubbenhorst (2000), on 
the other hand, indicated that if hospitals are able to identify the relevant information 
Note:  
1. The data primarily reflects inpatient hospital Medicaid DSH payments. These data have been 
adjusted by the consumer price index to 1996 dollars. 
2. Data Source: Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) Form 64 annual reports; Fagnani 
and Tolbert. (1999).  
 
Figure 2.  1996-2003 Trends of Federal and State Inpatient Hospital Medicaid DSH 
expenditures for California and National total (in millions, adjusted by CPI to 
1996 dollar) 
 
 
13 
 
 
about the patient’s financial information, some of what is classified as bad debt might be 
re-classified as charity care. Given the reporting inconsistencies, many empirical studies 
have combined charity care and bad debt into the measure of uncompensated care 
generally. 
There are three common ways to calculate uncompensated care provision 
operationally in the literature. One is to measure in total dollar amounts. The second is to 
measure it as a ratio. The third is to measure in volume. These are described below with 
detail shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Measurements of the Provision of Hospital Uncompensated Care  
Author Data source 
/year(s) 
Unit of 
Analysis 
Definitions and Measurements Notes 
Measure in Total Amounts (Expenses/Costs)  
Sheingold 
and 
Buchberge
r (1986) 
AHA survey 
data/ 1980-
1981 
Hospital 
level/ all 
national 
hospitals 
The sum of bad debt and 
charity charges  
Adjusted by the ratio of 
gross charges to expenses 
Thorpe 
and Phelps 
(1991) 
Audited cost 
reports from 
the New 
York State 
Department 
of Health 
State data/ 
hospital 
level 
Natural logarithm of the sum 
of (inpatient and outpatient ) 
uncompensated care costs per 
bed 
 
Sanders 
(1993) 
AHA survey 
data/1987 
National 
data/ 
hospital 
level 
The sum of the costs of pure 
charity care and bad debts.  
 
Campbell 
and Ahern 
(1993) 
California 
Health 
Facilities 
Commission/ 
1983 and 
1987 
 
State data/ 
hospital 
Charity care expenditures plus 
bad debt expenditures less 
designated subsidies 
 
 
Adjusted total UC charges 
by using hospital mark up 
Mann et 
al. (1995) 
California 
OSHPD/ 
1980-1989 
State data/ 
hospital 
level 
Natural logarithm of the sum 
of charity care plus bad debt 
costs minus any gifts and 
subsidies for indigent care. 
 
  
Adjusted charity care 
charges by using cost to 
charge ratio 
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Table 1 (continued)  
Author Data source 
/year(s) 
Unit of 
Analysis 
Definitions and Measurements Notes 
Davidoff 
et al. 
(2000) 
AHA survey 
data/ 1990-
1995 
National 
data/ 
hospital 
level 
Natural logarithm of the sum 
of charity care plus bad debt 
cost  
 Charity care and bad 
debt are reported as 
hospital revenue in 
AHA survey 
 Adjusted revenue by 
using cost to charge 
ratio (total cost-bad debt 
cost)/(gross patient 
revenue+ other 
operating revenues) 
 
Zuckerma
n et al. 
(2001) 
AHA survey 
data/ 1990 
National 
data/ 
hospital 
level 
The sum of charity care and 
bad-debt expenses 
 Charity care and bad 
debt are reported as 
hospital revenue in 
AHA survey 
 Adjusted revenue by 
using cost to charge 
ratio (total cost-bad debt 
cost)/(gross patient 
revenue+ other 
operating revenues) 
 
Blewett et 
al. (2003) 
Minnesota 
cost report/ 
1992-1996 
State data/ 
Aggregate 
to county 
level 
The sum of bad debt and 
charity care expenses on a per 
capita  
 
Garmon 
(2006) 
Florida and 
Texas 
inpatient 
discharge and 
hospital 
financial 
data/ 1999 
and 2002 
State data/ 
hospital 
level 
 Inpatient charity care and 
bad debt costs  
 Outpatient charity care and 
bad debt costs 
 
Adjusted charity care and 
bad debt charges by using 
cost to charge ratio 
Bazzoli et 
al. (2006) 
AHA survey 
data/ 1996-
2000 
National 
data/ 
hospital 
level 
Natural logarithm of the sum 
of charity care plus bad debt 
costs 
Adjusted charity care and 
bad debt charges by using 
institutional cost to charge 
ratio 
Lo Sasso 
and 
Seamster 
(2007) 
AHA survey 
data/ 1990-
2000 
National 
data/ 
Aggregate 
to State 
level 
The sum of bad debt and 
charity care costs per capita 
 
Adjusted charity care and 
bad debt charges by using 
cost to charge ratio 
Measure in Total Amounts (Charges) 
Dunn and 
Chen 
(1994) 
New Jersey 
data/ 1979-
1987 
State data/ 
hospital 
level 
Total inpatient and outpatient 
hospital charity and bad debt 
charges 
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Table 1 (continued)  
Author Data source 
/year(s) 
Unit of 
Analysis 
Definitions and Measurements Notes 
Sheingold 
and 
Buchberge
r (1986) 
AHA survey 
data/ 1980-
1981 
Hospital 
level/ all 
national 
hospitals 
The sum of bad debt and 
charity charges 
 
Measure in Portion of Expenses/Costs   
Campbell 
and Ahern 
(1993) 
California 
Health 
Facilities 
Commission/ 
1983 and 
1987 
State data/ 
hospital 
The percentage of charity care 
expenditures plus bad debt 
expenditures less designated 
subsidies, divided by total 
expenses 
 
 
Adjusted total UC charges 
by using hospital mark up 
Rosko 
(2001) 
Pennsylvania 
cost report 
data/ one 
year 1995 
State data/ 
hospital 
level 
The percentage charity care 
and bad debt expense subtract 
Medicare and Medicaid DSH 
payments, divided by total 
operating expenses other than 
uncompensated expenses 
 [(adjusted 
uncompensated care 
expenses)/(total 
operating expense-
adjusted uncompensated 
care expense)*100] 
 Adjusted 
uncompensated care 
equal to bad debt plus 
charity care charges 
adjusted by cost to 
charge ratio, then minus 
DSH payments 
Thorpe et 
al. (2001) 
AHA survey 
data/1991-
1997 
National 
data/hospital 
level 
The sum of charity care and 
bad debt charges divided by 
total expenses 
Adjusted by cost to charge 
ratio 
Clement et 
al. (2002) 
California 
OSHPD/ one 
year 1995-
1996 
State data/ 
hospital 
level 
Natural logarithm of the 
percentage of charity care and 
bad debt costs to operating 
expenses  
 
 
Adjusted total UC charges 
by using cost to charge 
ratio 
Bazzoli et 
al. (2006) 
AHA survey 
data/ 1996-
2000 
National 
data/ 
hospital 
level 
The percentage of hospital 
expenses that are 
uncompensated 
 
McKay 
and Meng 
(2007) 
Florida 
financial 
reports/ 
1998-2002 
State 
data/hospital 
level 
The percentage of charity care 
and bad debt costs to 
operating expenses 
 
Adjusted total UC charges 
by using the ratio of 
operating expense to gross 
patient-care revenue 
 
Measure in Portion of Charges  
Buczko 
(1994) 
Washington 
financial 
report/ 1987 
State data/ 
hospital 
level 
The sum of charity care and 
bad debt charges, divided by 
total revenue 
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Table 1 (continued)  
Author Data source 
/year(s) 
Unit of 
Analysis 
Definitions and Measurements Notes 
Atkinson 
et al. 
(1997) 
Seven state 
financial 
data/ 1994-
1996 
 
State data/ 
hospital 
level 
The sum of bad debt and 
charity care charges, divided 
by total charges 
 
Needlema
n et al 
(1999) 
Florida 
financial 
reports/ 1981-
1996 
 
State data/ 
hospital 
level 
The sum of bad debt and 
charity charges, divided by 
total charges 
 
Magnus et 
al. (2004) 
Merritt 
Research 
LLC 
data/1997 
National 
data/ 
hospital 
level 
 
The sum of charity care 
charges and bad-debt, divided 
by total operating revenue 
 
Measure in Volume 
Frank and 
Salkever 
(1991) 
Maryland 
financial 
hospital 
data/1980-
1984 
State data/ 
hospital 
level 
 Natural logarithm of 
equivalent uncompensated 
care admissions 
 Natural logarithm of 
equivalent uncompensated 
care admissions adjusted 
hospital case mix index  
 
Uncompensated care 
admissions is divided the 
dollar amount of 
uncompensated care (bad 
debts and charity care 
expenses) by the hospital’s 
gross inpatient revenue per 
admission. 
 
 
Gaskin 
(1997) 
New Jersey 
audited 
hospital 
financial 
data/ 1986-
1990 
State data/ 
hospital 
level 
Natural logarithm of adjusted 
uncompensated care 
admissions 
Adjusted uncompensated 
care admissions equal total 
uncompensated care charges 
divided by the hospital’s 
average charge per 
admission 
 
 
Banks et 
al. (1997) 
California 
OSHPD/ 
1981-1989 
State data/ 
hospital 
level 
The sum of charity care and 
bad debt charges, divided by 
inpatient days, then divided by 
hospital bed size 
 
 
 
Rosko 
(2004) 
Pennsylvania 
cost data/ 
1995-1998 
State data/ 
hospital 
level 
Adjusted uncompensated care 
admissions 
Adjusted uncompensated 
care admissions equal total 
uncompensated care charges 
(bad debt plus charity care) 
divided by the hospital’s 
average charge per adjusted 
admissions. 
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Total Uncompensated Care Dollar Amounts 
 Several studies have examined the total amount of charity care and bad debts. One 
study calculated uncompensated care measured in charges (Dunn and Chen, 1994). 
However, many researchers have argued that uncompensated care should be measured in 
other ways because hospitals have different markups (Sanders, 1993; Campell and Ahern, 
1993). Many researchers have used cost-based measures as a solution for this problem. 
Most studies converted uncompensated care charges to costs using a hospital cost-to-
charge ratio (RCC) (Bazzoli et al., 2006; Campbell & Ahern, 1993; Davidoff et al., 2000; 
Garmon, 2006; Lo Sasso & Seamster, 2007; Mann, Melnick, Bamezai, & Zwanziger, 
1995; Sanders, 1993; S. Zuckerman et al., 2001).  
 There are some advantages and disadvantages of measuring total amounts of 
charity care and bad debts. One advantage is that this type of measure allows for more 
flexibility in functional form. Since the distribution of the amount of hospital 
uncompensated care provision across hospitals is often skewed, it is helpful to use a 
natural log transformation of total uncompensated care dollar amounts. Many researchers, 
such as Mann et al. (1995), Davidoff et al. (2000) and Bazzoli et al. (2006), employed 
Natural logarithm of the sum of charity care and bad debt costs as the measure of 
uncompensated care provision at a hospital level. In addition, it also allows for 
aggregating to a higher level of unit of analysis. For example, Blewett et al. (2003) used 
aggregated uncompensated care data at a county level and Lo Sasso and Seamster (2007) 
aggregated uncompensated care data to a state level.  
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 However, this measure does not capture or adjust for hospital size or scale if 
doing simple descriptive comparisons across hospitals. Many studies have shown that 
uncompensated care is unevenly distributed across hospitals and much of the burden is 
concentrated within public, teaching or some not-profit hospitals (Bazzoli et al., 2006; 
Cunningham & Tu, 1997; Mann et al., 1995; Mann, Melnick, Bamezai, & Zwanziger, 
1997; Weissman, 1996; S. Zuckerman et al., 2001). The use of hospital-specific data may 
result in heteroskedasticity (Thorpe & Phelps, 1991). For example, assume that there is a 
hospital A and hospital B. Hospital A has 1,000 dollars of total revenue and provides free 
care of 100 dollars from its total revenue. Hospital B has 200 dollars of total revenue and 
provides free care of 50 dollars from its total revenue. So, hospital A contributes 0.1 
dollars (=100/1000) to charity care from its total revenue; for hospital B, on the other 
hand, it contributes 0.25 (=50/200) dollars to charity care from its total revenue. In this 
case, hospital B is more burdened by charity care than hospital A. Empirically, Thorpe 
and Phelps (1991) used the approach by using uncompensated care costs divided by the 
number of hospital beds. Because they were still concerned that the distribution of the 
variable remained skewed, they further used natural log transformation in advance 
analyzing regression model. 
Uncompensated Care Measured as a Ratio 
 Given the disadvantage of the measures based on the total dollar amount of 
uncompensated care, many researchers defined an alternative uncompensated care 
measure as a proportion of total expenses or total revenue. This type of measure allows 
for controlling the differences in the scale if doing single descriptive comparisons across 
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hospitals. Moreover, the use of this measure controls for year-to-year changes and does 
not require adjustment for price inflation when doing research longitudinally (Atkinson, 
Helms, & Needleman, 1997). As Table 1 presents, Rosko (2001), Thorpe et al. (2001), 
Clement et al. (2002), Bazzoli et al. (2006) and McKay and Meng (2007) examined 
measures of uncompensated care as a proportion of total expenses. They first adjusted the 
sum of charity care and bad debt charges to costs by using hospital cost-to-charge ratios, 
and then divided this sum by either total expenses or total operating expenses.   
Magnus et al. (2004) argued that it is preferable to use charge-based ratio 
measures than cost-based ratio measures because charity care and bad debt are often 
measured as forgone charges and also biases may result if one uses an overall 
institutional cost-to-charge ratio to measure individual charges from different service 
lines and departments. Researchers such as Buczko (1994), Atkinson et al. (1997), 
Needleman et al. (1999) and Magnus et al. (2004) used the sum of charity care and bad 
debt charges, divided by total revenue or total operating revenue when they measured 
uncompensated care provision. 
Uncompensated Care Measured in Volume 
 The third approach that researchers often used to measure hospital uncompensated 
care provision is volume of care delivered (Banks, Paterson, & Wendel, 1997; Frank & 
Salkever, 1991; Gaskin, 1997; Rosko, 2004). Usually, it equals the sum of charity care 
and bad debts charges, divided by the hospital’s average charge per admission. Some 
researchers considered patient severity across hospitals and thus adjust hospital admission 
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by the hospital’s case-mix index (Frank & Salkever, 1991; Rosko, 2004). Banks et al. 
(1997), on the other hand, measured as uncompensated care days per bed.  
There are several advantages and disadvantages using this approach. Similar to 
uncompensated care ratio measures, this approach allows year-to-year comparisons 
without having to adjust for inflation when doing longitudinal research. The disadvantage 
of this type of measure is that it is also an approximation. Specifically, this measure has 
been calculated from charges to admission by using a hospital’s average charges per 
admissions.  
Overall, three approaches are commonly used in the literature to measure hospital 
uncompensated care provision and each approach has its advantages and disadvantages. 
Another point regarding the measurement of uncompensated care is the data sources for 
constructing these measures. Looking at the Table 1, some studies used national data 
sources and some used state data. Most studies in the literature employ the information 
from individual state audited financing data (Atkinson et al., 1997; Banks et al., 1997; 
Blewett et al., 2003; Buczko, 1994; Campbell & Ahern, 1993; Clement et al., 2002; Dunn 
& Chen, 1994; Frank & Salkever, 1991; Garmon, 2006; Gaskin, 1997; Mann et al., 1995; 
McKay & Meng, 2007; Needleman et al., 1999; Rosko, 2001, 2004). As Kane and 
Magnus (2001) noted, there are at least fifteen states with audited financial data that 
allow researchers to measure charity care and bad debt. National sources are mostly from 
AHA survey data (Bazzoli et al., 2006; Davidoff et al., 2000; Lo Sasso & Seamster, 
2007; Sanders, 1993; Thorpe et al., 2001; S. Zuckerman et al., 2001). However, the AHA 
survey information for hospital charity care and bad debt are considered confidential and 
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not widely available to researchers outside of the AHA. Another source of national data 
is the Medicare Cost Reports, but these data are only available after fiscal year 2004.
4
  
Quality of Care 
 Quality of care has been widely discussed in the health care literature since 1970s 
(Stiles and Mick, 1994). The most common and authoritative definition of quality of care 
comes from IOM (Institute of Medicine, 1990) : “The degree to which health services for 
individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are 
consistent with current professional knowledge”. There are various ways to capture this 
conceptual definition in the existing literature. In general, health service researchers 
frequently use patient outcomes to quantify quality of care (Donabedian, 2005; Hearld, 
Alexander, Fraser, & Jiang, 2008; Mitchell & Shortell, 1997; Sari, 2002; Stiles & Mick, 
1994).  
Patient outcome measures represent the result of medical interventions in terms of 
patient survival and recovery of functional status (Donabedian, 2005; Stiles & Mick, 
1994). The outcome indicators used in the existing literature include: mortality 
(Alexander, Weiner, Shortell, & Baker, 2007; Cutler, 1995; Encinosa & Bernard, 2005; 
Kahn, Keeler et al., 1990; Mark, Harless, & McCue, 2005; Mark, Harless, McCue, & Xu, 
2004; McCue, Mark, & Harless, 2003; Mukamel, Zwanziger, & Tomaszewski, 2001; 
Mutter, Wong, & Goldfarb, 2008; Rogers et al., 1990; Ross et al., 2007; Sari, 2002; 
Seshamani, Schwartz, & Volpp, 2006; Seshamani, Zhu, & Volpp, 2006; Shen, 2003; 
                                                          
 
4
 The Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 established the requirement that short-term, acute 
care hospitals report uncompensated care costs as part of their Medicare cost reports beginning with periods 
ending on or after April 30, 2003. The uncompensated care related information is in CMS-S10 form. 
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Volpp, Ketcham, Epstein, & Williams, 2005; Volpp, Konetzka, Zhu, Parsons, & 
Peterson, 2005; Volpp et al., 2003); patient adverse events (Bazzoli, Chen, Zhao, & 
Lindrooth, 2008; Burstin, Lipsitz, Udvarhelyi, & Brennan, 1993; Clement, Lindrooth, 
Chukmaitov, & Chen, 2007; Encinosa & Bernard, 2005; Mark et al., 2004; Mutter et al., 
2008; Sari, 2002); length of stay (Kahn, Rogers et al., 1990; Mark et al., 2005); or 
hospital readmission (Cutler, 1995; Kahn, Rogers et al., 1990). Table 2 includes several 
empirical studies that generally examine the impact hospital external and internal 
characteristics on quality outcomes. Overall, mortality and patient adverse events are 
most prevalently used to measure quality of care. In the following section, relevant 
literature for these two outcome measures will be reviewed. 
Table 2. Measurements of Quality of Care 
Quality 
Measures 
Examples 
Authors Data Source /year(s) Measures and Definitions 
Outcome Measures of Quality 
Mortality Kahn et al. 
(1990) 
Medical records/ Health Care 
Financing Administration claim 
file/ 1981-1982 and 1985-1986 
 In-hospital mortality 
 30-day postadmission mortality  
 180-day postadmission mortality 
 Langa and 
Sussman 
(1993) 
CA hospital discharge abstracts 
from OSHPD/ 1983, 1995, 1988 
 Inpatient mortality 
 Cutler (1995) Medicare and Social Security 
death records in six New 
England states /1981-1988 
 In-hospital mortality rate 
 Post hospitalization mortality rate 
(30, 180, 365 days) 
 Duggan(2000) CA hospital discharge abstracts 
from OSHPD/ 1990 and 1995 
 Infant mortality rates at zipcode 
level 
 Baicker and 
Staiger(2005) 
Area Resource File with 
National Center for Health 
Workforce Analysis and 
Medicare Claim data/ 1988-1990 
and 1998-2000 
 28-day Infant mortality at county 
level 
 90-day Post hospitalization heart 
attack mortality at county level 
 Mukamel et al. 
(2001) 
Medicare Hospital Information 
Reports/ 1990 
 Risk-adjusted 30 days post-
admission mortality (considering 6 
conditions: observed and expected 
mortality rates) 
 Sari (2002) HCUP-NIS/1992-1997  HCUP QIs: In-hospital mortality 
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Table 2 (continued)  
Quality 
Measures 
Examples 
Authors Data Source /year(s) Measures and Definitions 
 McCue et al. 
(2003) 
HCUP and Medstat / 1990-1995  Risk-adjusted in-hospital mortality 
(considering all cases observed and 
expected mortality rates ) 
 Shen (2003) Medicare Claim data and Social 
Security death records/ 1985-
1994 
 Post-admission AMI mortality rates 
(7 days, 30 days, 90 days, 1yr, 
15months, 2 yrs) 
 
 Volpp et al. 
(2003) 
New Jersey and New York 
hospital discharge data/ 1990-
1996 
 Risk-adjusted AMI patient in-
hospital mortality rate  
 Mark et al. 
(2004) 
HCUP and Medstat/1990-1995  Risk-adjusted in-hospital mortality 
(considering all cases observed and 
expected mortality rates ) 
 Mark et al. 
(2005) 
HCUP and Medstat / 1990-1995  Risk-adjusted in-hospital mortality 
(considering all cases observed and 
expected mortality rates ) 
 Encinosa and 
Bernard (2005) 
HCUP-SID for Florida/ 1996-
2000 
 Risk-adjusted In-hospital mortality 
during surgery (IQIs)  
 Volpp et al. 
(2005a) 
National Registry of Myocardial 
Infarction(NAMI)/1996-2001 
 Risk-adjusted AMI patient in-
hospital mortality rate  
  
 Volpp et al. 
(2005b) 
New Jersey and New York 
hospital discharge data/ 1990-
1996 
 Risk-adjusted In-hospital mortality 
(IQIs) for several conditions: AMI, 
hip fracture, stroke, gastrointestinal 
bleeding, congestive heart failure 
and pneumonia  
  
 Seshamani et 
al. (2006a) 
Pennsylvania State discharge 
data and death certificate records 
from Pennsylvania department 
of Health/ 1997-2001 
 Risk-adjusted Patients Mortality rate 
within 30 days of hospital 
admissions, including Hip fracture, 
stroke, AMI, gastrointestinal 
bleeding  
 Seshamani et 
al. (2006b) 
Pennsylvania State discharge 
data and death certificate records 
from Pennsylvania department 
of Health/ 1997-2001 
 Surgical patients Mortality rate 
within 30 days of hospital 
admissions  
 Alexander et 
al. (2007) 
Medicare Inpatient Database/ 
1997 and 1998 
 Risk-adjusted Inpatient hospital 
mortality for CABG, AMI, CHF, 
stroke and pneumonia  
 Ross et al. 
(2007) 
MEDPAR/ CMS-Quality 
Alliance/ 2002-2003 
 AMI patients 
hospitalization:hospital-specific risk-
standardized 30-day all-cause 
mortality rates (RSMRs) 
 Mutter et al. 
(2008) 
 HCUP-SID for 22 states/1997  18 Risk-adjusted in-hospital 
mortality rates (IQIs)  
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Table 2 (continued)  
Quality 
Measures 
Examples 
Authors Data Source /year(s) Measures and Definitions 
Adverse 
Events 
Burstin et al. 
(1993)  
Medical record review-New 
York/ 1984 
 
 Negligence adverse events  
 Sari (2002) HCUP-NIS/1992-1997  Obstetrical complications 
 Adverse/iatrogenic complications 
 Wound Infections 
 Major Surgery Complications  
 
 Mark et al. 
(2004) 
HCUP and Medstat /1990-1995  Complication ratio for decubitus 
ulcers, pneumonia and urinary tract 
infections 
 
 Encinosa and 
Bernard (2005) 
HCUP-SID for Florida/ 1996-
2000 
 Nursing-related PSIs 
 Surgery-related PSIs 
 All likely patient safety events 
 
 Bazzoli et al. 
(2008) 
HCUP-SID for 11 states/1995-
2000 
 Death in low mortality DRGs 
 Nursing-related PSIs 
 Surgical-related PSIs 
 Clement et al. 
(2007) 
HCUP-SID for 11 states/1995-
2000 
 Risked-adjusted PSIs  (PSI3- 
decubitus ulcer, PSI7-infection 
resulting from medical care, PSI9-
postoperative hemorrhage or 
hematoma, PSI12-postoperative 
pulmonary embolism or deep vein 
thrombosis) 
 
 Mutter et al. 
(2008) 
 HCUP-SID for 22 states/1997  20 PSIs 
Length of 
Stay 
Kahn et al. 
(1990) 
Medical records/ Health Care 
Financing Administration mater 
file/ 1981-1982 and 1985-1986 
 Length of stay  
 Mark et al. 
(2005) 
HCUP and Medstat / 1990-1995  Risked adjusted ratio of observed 
and expected length of stay 
 
Readmission Kahn et al. 
(1990) 
Medical records/ Health Care 
Financing Administration mater 
file/ 1981-1982 and 1985-1986 
 180-day postadmission mortality or 
readmission 
 365-day postadmission readmission 
 
 Cutler (1995) Medicare and Social Security 
records in six New England 
states /1981-1988 
 Post hospitalization readmission rate 
(30, 180, 365 days) 
 
Others: 
Service 
intensity 
Dranove and 
White (1998) 
CA OSHPD/ 1983 and 1992  Service intensity 
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Table 2 (continued)  
Note: 
         n/a: not available 
         HCUP-SID: Hospital Cost and Utilization Project-State Inpatient Data 
         HCUP-NIS: Hospital Cost and Utilization Project-Nationwide Inpatient Sample 
         OSHPD: the office of Statewide Health Planning and Development in California 
         MEDPAR: Medicare Provider Analysis and Review File 
         CMS: Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
         JACHO: the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization 
         AHA: American Hospital Association 
         IQIs: Inpatient Quality Indicators, which is a product of Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality  
         PSIs: Patient Quality Indicators, which is a product of Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality 
         DRGs: Diagnostic-Related-Groups 
         AMI: Acute Myocardiac Infarction 
         CABG: Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery  
         CHF: Congestive Heart Failure 
 
Mortality Measures 
Mortality is often defined as deaths that occurred during patient hospitalization, 
which is denoted as short-term mortality, or deaths after patient hospitalization, which is 
denoted as medium-term or long-term mortality (Kahn, Keeler et al., 1990). The majority 
of literature use in-hospital mortality (Alexander et al., 2007; Encinosa & Bernard, 2005; 
Mark et al., 2005; Mark et al., 2004; McCue et al., 2003; Mutter et al., 2008; Sari, 2002; 
Volpp, Ketcham et al., 2005; Volpp, Konetzka et al., 2005; Volpp et al., 2003). 
Alternatively, some researchers use mortality within 30 days after admission. The latter 
one may eliminate any potential bias due to length of stay differences across hospitals 
and over time (Mechanic, 2004; Ross et al., 2007; Seshamani, Schwartz et al., 2006; 
Seshamani, Zhu et al., 2006). As to medium-term or long-term mortality measures, some 
studies use post hospitalization mortality for a certain range of days (i.e., 30 days, 180 
days) (Cutler, 1995; Kahn, Keeler et al., 1990; Shen, 2003).   
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Data resources for constructing mortality measures typically derive from 
administrative data sets (i.e., inpatient discharge data), medical chart review, or other data 
(i.e., death certificates). Administrative data, such as inpatient discharge data from 
individual states, are most frequently used. 
5
 One of disadvantages of using 
administrative data to measure patient outcomes, as researchers argued, is that it does not 
capture all patients’ risk characteristics, which are available in a medical chart and could 
be obtained through review (Romano, Chan, Schembri, & Rainwater, 2002). However, 
use of existing administrative data is less expensive than data extraction from medical 
charts. Also, due to high costs, researchers are usually limited to only a few hospitals 
when using medical chart data rather than more representative hospital samples in 
administrative data.   
Nevertheless, researchers use multiple data sources (i.e., administrative data sets 
or medical chart records) based on the availability of data for their research purpose. For 
example, Kane et al. (1990) linked medical records to Medicare Part B files of physician 
bills and constructed post-admission mortality for almost 2,800 people with congestive 
heart failure (CHF), acute myocardiac infarction (AMI), pneumonia, cerebrovascular 
accident, and hip fracture diseases. Culter (1995) and Shen (2003) matched Medicare 
claim data with death records to construct patient post-admission mortality in their 
research. Seshamani et al. (2006) and Seshamani et al. (2006) used Pennsylvania State 
inpatient discharge data and also death certificate records from Pennsylvania Department 
of Health to identify patients who died within 30 days of hospital admissions.   
                                                          
 
5
 In U.S., the not-for-profit institution, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), 
have generated Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) state inpatient date from many states. 
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There are several issues that researchers confront when they study mortality 
across hospitals (Mukamel et al., 2001; Romano & Mutter, 2004; Sari, 2002). First, 
patient severity of illness varies widely across providers. To overcome this issue, risk 
adjustment methods are often used in the literature when constructing mortality indicators 
(Alexander et al., 2007; Encinosa & Bernard, 2005; Mark et al., 2005; Mark et al., 2004; 
McCue et al., 2003; Mukamel et al., 2001; Mutter et al., 2008; Volpp, Ketcham et al., 
2005; Volpp, Konetzka et al., 2005; Volpp et al., 2003)
6
. The most common approach to 
account for patient risk factors is to calculate excess mortality, which is the deviation 
between expected and observed mortality (Mark et al., 2005; Mark et al., 2004; McCue et 
al., 2003; Mukamel et al., 2001). Expected mortality is essentially based on individual 
patient-level risk-adjusted models that predict the probability of death conditional on 
individual risk factors.  
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) has developed 
approaches to measure excess mortality and has developed a set of inpatient quality 
indicators (IQIs), which uses patient age, gender, severity score calculated by 3M’s all 
patient refined diagnosis related group (APR-DRG) as patient risk factors. Not only 
adjusting patient risk factors, AHRQ IQIs also adjusted for the trend over time and 
adjusted for within-provider correlation (AHRQ, 2007).  AHRQ’s IQIs softward have 
been frequently used in many recent studies (Alexander et al., 2007; Encinosa & Bernard, 
2005; Mutter et al., 2008; Seshamani, Schwartz et al., 2006; Seshamani, Zhu et al., 2006; 
                                                          
 
6
 AHRQ (2007) also calculated risk-adjusted rate at the provider-level is further adjusted by the 
observed National Average rate to compare mortality across hospitals. See AHRQ Quality Indicators 
Guideline http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/downloads/iqi/iqi_guide_v31.pdf and 
http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/listserv_archive_2006.htm#Oct13 (Access Date: May 24, 2009).  
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Volpp, Ketcham et al., 2005; Volpp et al., 2003). Others agencies, such as the Health 
Care Financing Administration (HCFA)’s risk-adjusted mortality measures (Mukamel et 
al., 2001) and  Medstat’s Disease Staging Methodology (Mark et al., 2005; Mark et al., 
2004; McCue et al., 2003), are also used and reported in the literature.  
  A second issue that researchers confront is that mortality is only a relevant 
outcome for certain severe patient conditions (Sari, 2002). Therefore, instead of 
monitoring overall hospital mortality, many researchers have focused on certain types of 
diseases or procedures to examine the effect of various factors on patient outcomes (Sari, 
2002). For example, some articles study AMI patient mortality rates (Alexander et al., 
2007; Mutter et al., 2008; Seshamani, Schwartz et al., 2006; Shen, 2003; Volpp, Ketcham 
et al., 2005; Volpp, Konetzka et al., 2005; Volpp et al., 2003). Two articles focus on 
mortality among surgical patients (Encinosa & Bernard, 2005; Seshamani, Zhu et al., 
2006). Some study other conditions, such as hip fracture, stroke, gastrointestinal 
bleeding, congestive heart failure, pneumonia (Alexander et al., 2007; Mutter et al., 2008; 
Seshamani, Zhu et al., 2006; Volpp, Konetzka et al., 2005). The AHRQ IQIs allow 
researchers to study several in-hospital mortality measures for certain types of diseases, 
such as AMI, CHF, stroke, GI hemorrhage, hip fracture, and pneumonia.  
In addition, mortality is not a sensitive quality indicator, in particular to outpatient 
treatments and hospitalization involving younger patients because of low number of 
deaths (Sari, 2002; Silber & Rosenbaum, 1997). Alternatively, researchers suggest using 
adverse event measures (i.e., complication rates, failure-to-rescue or patient safety 
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indicators) as a solution to solve this concern (Silber & Rosenbaum, 1997; Silber, 
Rosenbaum, Schwartz, Ross, & Williams, 1995).   
Adverse Event Measures 
 Adverse events refer to serious complications and other iatrogenic events 
resulting from medical management (Burstin et al., 1993; Clement et al., 2007; Silber et 
al., 1995). The examples of adverse event measures used in the literature that examine the 
relationship between organizational factors and outcomes include negligent adverse 
events (Burstin et al., 1993), complications for certain conditions (Mark et al., 2004; Sari, 
2002), and AHRQ’s patient safety indicators (PSIs) (Bazzoli et al., 2008; Clement et al., 
2007; Encinosa & Bernard, 2005; Mutter et al., 2008). Among the diversity of adverse 
event measures, AHRQ’s PSIs are commonly applied in the literature. The PSIs of 
AHRQ are a set of indicators derived from administrative data.
7
  The PSI algorithms 
were developed by the University of California, San Francisco-Stanford Evidence-Base 
Practice Center (EPC), with collaboration from the University of California at Davis, 
under funding from AHRQ. The algorithm flags patients safety events based on the 
International Classification of Disease, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes found in 
the diagnosis and procedure variables from each discharge (Encinosa & Bernard, 2005). 
The method for calculating risk-adjusted PSIs measures is conceptually similar to those 
used in other studies that examined excess mortality (Bazzoli et al., 2008; Mark et al., 
2005; Mark et al., 2004; McCue et al., 2003; Mukamel et al., 2001). However, patient 
                                                          
 
7
 Patient Safety Indicators Overview. AHRQ Quality Indicators. February 2006. Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD. http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/psi_overview.htm 
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risk adjusted factors in PSIs are slightly different from those used in AHRQ-IQIs, 
including patient age, gender, modified DRG categories, co-morbidities, and interactions 
of age and gender.
8
  
 AHRQ’s PSIs module contains 20 types of adverse event measures, including 
death in low-mortality DRG, the occurrence of decubitus ulcer, selected infections due to 
medical care, post-operative hip fracture, anesthesia complications, foreign body left in 
patient during procedure, post-operative hemorrhage or hematomy, hip fracture, 
physiologic and metabolic derangement, pulmonary embolism or deep vein thrombosis, 
respiratory failure, sepsis, or wound dehiscence, accidental puncture or laceration during 
procedure, birth trauma, and obstetric trauma.
9
 
With respect to the applications of PSIs, some studies select several individual 
PSIs to capture potential signals of the occurrence of patient adverse events in their 
studies, while some researchers examine the composite measures. For example, Clement 
et al.(2007) selected 4 individual PSIs (PSI3, PSI7, PSI9 and PSI12) in their study 
because these individual PSIs provided information on the higher incidence of population 
at risk in a hospital. With respect to the composite measures, Encinosa and Bernard 
(2005) and Bazzoli et al.(2008) sought to capture the underlying construct of quality from 
multiple PSIs and thus classified into two broader composite measures (nursing-related 
                                                          
 
8
 Specific information on the covariates used in risk adjustment for each PSI can be found as 
follows: http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/downloads/psi/psi_covariates_v31.pdf (Access date: May 
26, 2009). 
 
9
 More detailed about the definition of individual PSI can be found as follows: Version 4.1 
technical documentation AHRQ Quality Indicators. December, 2009. Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality, Rockville, MD. http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/TechnicalSpecs41.htm (Access Date: Feb 
13, 2010). 
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PSIs and surgical-related PSIs). Alternatively, AHRQ released a new version of 
composite measures in March 2008, which reflects the most common patient safety 
adverse events occurring in a hospital. To the best of the knowledge, there is no existing 
empirical study using the new version of AHRQ-PSIs composite measure as a quality 
outcome.  
 To summarize, mortality and adverse events are frequently used to measure 
patient outcomes in the literature. This section reviewed these two quality measures from 
different perspectives. There are various quality measures that can be used in health 
services research studies. Researchers may need to consider multiple quality indicators 
when conducting their analyses (Hearld et al., 2008; Mitchell & Shortell, 1997; Sari, 
2002; Silber & Rosenbaum, 1997).  
Empirical Research 
 This study is interested in the research question: whether the reductions of 
Medicaid DSH payment affected hospitals’ behaviors, in terms of the provision of 
hospital uncompensated care and quality of care? This section summarizes the existing 
literature examining the ways and extent to which hospitals respond to changes in public 
payment. This review will help to identify the insights provided by existing research that 
could inform the research questions of this study and the gaps this study could address. 
Two subsections of empirical studies will be presented: the effect of public payment 
policy changes on hospital uncompensated care and the effect of public payment policy 
changes on quality of care. Tables that summarize existing empirical studies will follow 
each subsection.  
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The Effect of Public Payment Changes on Uncompensated Care Provision 
 Several studies have examined the effect of changes in public payment policy on 
hospital uncompensated care provision. As Table 3 shows, some studies have focused on 
Medicare payment changes. For example, Sheingold and Buchberger (1986) examined 
the changes of hospital uncompensated care provision in response to the direct effect of 
the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) in terms of hospital financial margins. 
They estimated ordinary least square (OLS) models using cross-sectional data from 
national hospital sample in 1981 and controlled for the baseline level of individual 
hospital uncompensated care (i.e., UC1980) and hospital supply and demand factors. This 
study found that the Medicare’s prospective payment system (PPS) may affect hospitals’ 
financial resources for providing uncompensated care. Campell and Ahern (1993) studied 
the cost containment efforts that resulted from the Medicare prospective payment system 
(PPS) in California. Campell and Ahern primarily used ordinary least square (OLS) 
models and examined separate regressions for hospital uncompensated care costs and the 
percent of uncompensated costs to total expense between 1983 and 1987. They found 
cost containment pressure may adversely affect the provision of hospital uncompensated 
care. Mann et al. (1995) examined California hospitals data using ten-years of panel data 
(from 1980 to 1989) with random effect specification and found that hospitals with 
greater fiscal pressure from Medicare PPS provided a greater level of uncompensated 
care than less pressured hospitals.  
Focusing on state policy reforms, Thorpe and Phelps (1991) examined the 
changes of hospital uncompensated care between pre-reform period (1981-1982) and
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Table 3: Empirical Studies of the Effect of Public Payment Changes on Hospital Uncompensated Care Provision 
Authors Data 
Sources/year
(s) 
Unit of analysis/ Study 
Sample/Statistical 
technique 
Public Payment policy/ 
policy effects  
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Payment 
change 
measures 
Uncompensated 
Care Measures 
Results 
Medicaid DSH payment on Uncompensated Care Related Studies 
Lo Sasso 
and 
Seamster 
(2007) 
AHA survey 
data and 
HCFA-Form 
64/ 1990-
2000 
State level/ all national 
short-term general 
hospitals/ Fixed effect 
model 
Medicaid DSH payment 
Spending/ no specific 
Economic 
theory of 
organizational 
behavior
 
Real Medicaid 
DSH payment 
per capita 
(monetary 
units) 
The sum of bad 
debt and charity 
care expenses per 
capita 
 
NS 
Davidoff et 
al. (2000) 
AHA survey 
data/ 1990-
1995 
Hospital level/all national 
short-term general 
hospitals/ Fixed effect 
linear regression with one 
error component 
Medicaid payment 
generosity (including 
Medicaid DSH)/ 
increasing incentives to 
hospitals 
Economic 
theory of 
organizational 
behavior 
Hospital-
specific ratio 
of Medicaid 
payment to 
costs 
Natural logarithm 
of the sum of 
charity care plus 
bad debt costs 
S(+) 
Bazzoli et 
al. (2006) 
AHA survey 
data/ 1996-
2000 
Hospital level/ national 
hospitals/ fixed effect 
model 
1997 The Balance Budge 
Act/ reducing Medicaid 
DSH reimbursement 
effect  
Economic 
theory of 
organizational 
behavior 
Medicaid 
Fiscal pressure 
index 
 The percentage of 
hospital expenses 
that are 
uncompensated 
 Natural logarithm 
of the sum of 
charity care plus 
bad debt costs 
S(-) 
Changes of Public Payment or Subsidies on Uncompensated Care Studies 
Sheingold 
and 
Buchberger 
(1986) 
AHA survey 
data/ 1980-
1981 
Hospital level/ all national 
hospitals/ Cross-sectional 
Ordinary Least Square 
regression 
Medicare PPS/ cost 
containment effort 
n/a Changes in 
Hospital 
financial 
margin 
Change in 
uncompensated 
care 
S(-) 
Thorpe and 
Phelps 
(1991) 
Audited cost 
reports from 
the New 
York State 
Department 
of Health 
Hospital level/ New York 
state hospitals/ First-
differenced models 
1983 New York 
Prospective Hospital 
Reimbursement policy/ 
assist hospitals providing 
charity care 
Economic 
theory of 
organizational 
behavior 
Pre-post design 
with time trend 
in regression 
model 
Natural logarithm 
of the sum of 
(inpatient and 
outpatient ) 
uncompensated 
care costs per bed  
S(+) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Authors Data 
Sources/year
(s) 
Unit of analysis/ Study 
Sample/Statistical 
technique 
Public Payment policy/ 
policy effects  
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Payment 
change 
measures 
Uncompensated 
Care Measures 
Results 
Campbell 
and Ahern 
(1993) 
California 
Health 
Facilities 
Commission/ 
1983 and 
1987 
Hospital level/ CA state 
hospitals/ Cross-sectional 
Ordinal Least Square 
regression 
1983 CA Medicare PPS and 
Medi-Cal reform in 1982/ 
cost containment effort  
Economic 
theory of 
organizational 
behavior 
 The 
proportion of 
revenue to 
contractual 
adjustments 
 Medicare 
share 
 
Natural logarithm 
of the sum of bad 
debt and charity 
care expenses 
minus designated 
subsidies 
S(-) 
Dunn and 
Chen 
(1994) 
Audited 
financial 
report from 
State of New 
Jersey 
Department 
of Health/ 
1979-1987 
Hospital level/ New 
Jersey hospitals/ 
Multivariate Ordinal Least 
Square Regression/ Fixed 
effect/ Random effect 
1980 New Jersey DRG-
Based Reimbursement 
reform/ increase hospital 
incentives to provide 
indigent care 
n/a Pre-post design 
with a binary 
variable to 
indicate policy 
effective 
Total inpatient and 
outpatient hospital 
charity and bad 
debt charges 
Ns 
Mann et al. 
(1995) 
California 
OSHPD/ 
1980-1989, 
10 years data 
State data/ hospital level/ 
Random effect model with 
one random error 
component estimation 
1983 CA Medicare PPS 
and Medi-Cal reform/ cost 
containment effort 
Economic 
theory of 
organizational 
behavior 
 Pre-post 
research 
design 
 Medicare 
pressure index 
 Medi-Cal 
pressure 
 
Natural logarithm 
of the sum of 
charity care plus 
bad debt costs 
minus any gifts and 
subsidies for 
indigent care 
S(+) 
Gaskin 
(1997) 
New Jersey 
audited 
hospital 
financial 
data/ 1986-
1990 
Hospital level/ New 
Jersey hospitals/ Random 
effects models 
1987 New Jersey 
Uncompensated care trust 
fund/increase hospital 
incentives to provide 
indigent care 
Economic 
theory of 
organizational 
behavior 
Pre-post design 
with a binary 
variable and 
time trends to 
indicate policy 
effective 
Natural logarithm 
of equivalent 
uncompensated 
care admissions 
S(+) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Note:  
 S(-): Significant negative relationship between public payment changes on 
uncompensated care provision 
 S(+): Significant negative relationship between public payment changes on 
uncompensated care provision 
 Ns: No significant relationship between public payment changes on 
uncompensated care provision 
 Mixed: Mixed relationship between payment changes on uncompensated 
care provision 
 n/a: not available 
 
 CHSPR: the Center for Health Services and Policy Research of 
Northwestern University 
 DRGs: Diagnostic-Related-Groups 
 DSH: Disproportionate Share Hospital Payment 
 PPS: Prospective Payment System 
 HCFA: Health Care Financing Administration 
 BBA: The Balance Budget Act 
 DSH: Disproportionate Share Hospital Payment 
 AHA: American Hospital Association 
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post-reform period (1983-1984) when New York state implemented a reimbursement 
program to assist hospitals providing charity care. They found the uncompensated care 
payment rates (i.e., price effect) was positively associated with the provisions of hospital 
uncompensated care, but did not find evidence showing a relationship between funding 
supports from state uncompensated care pool (i.e., income effect) and the provisions of 
uncompensated care. Dunn and Chen (1994) studied whether New Jersey DRG-based 
reimbursement reform in 1980 provided hospitals with an incentive to provide more 
indigent care. They used a pre and post design and fixed effect model to assess the impact 
of the introduction of uncompensated care payment between 1979 and 1987. They did not 
find evidence of a relationship between policy intervention and the provision of 
uncompensated care. Gaskin (1997) used a random effect panel model with study year 
from 1986 to 1990 to examine how the initiation of the New Jersey Uncompensated Care 
Trust Fund in 1987 affected hospital provision of indigent care and found that hospital 
provision of uncompensated care increased.   
In relation to Medicaid DSH programs, an article by Lo Sasso and Seamster 
(2007) used a fixed effect model to examine the effect of changes in state Medicaid DSH 
spending on uncompensated care provision between 1990 and 2000 while controlling for 
other policy effects. They used real Medicaid DSH payment per capita as a direct 
measure of Medicaid DSH payment change; and used uncompensated care expenses per 
capita to measure uncompensated care provision. This article did not find an association 
between Medicaid DSH payments and hospital uncompensated care. Two additional 
articles related to Medicaid DSH payments are by Davidoff et al. (2000) and Bazzoli et 
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al. (2006). Davidoff et al. (2000) used a fixed effect model to examine the effect of 
changing state policy (i.e., payment generosity) on provision of hospital uncompensated 
care for the period 1990 to 1995 at the hospital level. They found a positive association 
between Medicaid payment generosity and uncompensated care provision among NFP 
hospitals during a period when Medicaid DSH increased incentives for hospitals to 
provide indigent care during the early 1990s. Bazzoli et al. (2006) studied how the level 
of hospital uncompensated care provision was affected by the Medicaid pressure 
resulting from the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) budget cuts. They found core safety net 
hospitals reduced their uncompensated care in response to Medicaid financial pressure.  
There are several gaps in existing research relevant to the study questions. First, 
among these DSH related studies, only Bazzoli et al. (2006) specifically examined the 
BBA impact regarding the reduction of Medicaid DSH payment. Second, the unit of 
analysis in Lo Sasso and Seamster (2007) is the state. It is unclear from aggregated state 
level information to know how individual hospitals responded to the change in payment. 
Third, Davidoff et al. (2000) used a hospital-specific ratio of Medicaid payments to costs 
to measure Medicaid payment generosity, which includes DSH payments. Bazzoli et al. 
(2006) used a Medicaid Financial Pressure Index
10
 to measure financial pressure induced 
when the BBA was first implemented in 1998. However, Medicaid DSH payment was 
not explicitly measured in these two studies. It is unclear the specific effect of changing 
                                                          
 
10
 Medicaid financial pressure index used in Bazzoli et al. (2006)  was measured as: in year t by 
using Medicaid costs per adjusted admission in year (t-1) minus Medicaid revenues per adjusted admission 
in year t, then multiple by an estimate of Medicaid adjusted admissions in year (t-1), and then divided by 
total hospital expenses in year (t-1). 
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Medicaid DSH payments on the provision of hospital uncompensated care from these two 
articles. 
The Effect of Public Payment Changes on Quality of Care 
Several empirical studies have investigated the effect of public payment change 
on quality of care. Table 4 presents a summary of the empirical studies related to the 
effect of public payment changes on quality of care. Many studies focus on Medicare 
payment changes. For example, Culter (1995) and Shen (2003) both examined the impact 
of the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) on quality of care. For example, 
Culter (1995) assessed a logistic regression model, analyzing Medicare claim data and 
social security records in six New England states from 1981 to 1988; and Shen (2003) 
used long-difference regressions with instrumental variables to analyze all short-term, 
acute care urban hospitals that have AMI patients between 1985 and 1994.They 
employed different measures for quality of care and PPS pressures and also used different 
samples to study the research question, but both reached similar results that the price 
reduction resulting from the PPS adversely affected health outcomes.  
Volpp, Konetzka, Zhu, Parsons, and Peterson (2005) constructed a BBA impact 
index
11
 to evaluate the impact of payment reduction after the BBA on acute myocardial 
infarction (AMI) in-hospital outcome measures, but did not find an association between 
the BBA cost-saving efforts and AMI outcomes. Seshamani, Schwartz, and Volpp (2006) 
used linear probability methods similar to Volpp et al. (2005) to study patient mortality  
                                                          
 
11
 BBA impact index is a simulator which is created by Volpp et al. (2005b) and Seshamani et al. 
(2006) to calculate the financial impact of the BBA using actual Medicare revenue. The index is equal to 
the difference between the estimated reimbursement under BBA/BBRA and the estimated reimbursement 
without BBA, and then multiplied by the percentage of net patient revenue from Medicare reimbursement 
in the baseline of 1997.  
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Table 4: Empirical Studies of the Effect of Public Payment Changes on Quality of Care 
Authors Data Sources/year(s) 
Unit of analysis/ 
Study 
Sample/Statistical 
technique 
Public Payment 
policy/ policy 
effects  
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Payment change 
measures 
Quality 
Measures 
Result
s 
Medicaid DSH payment on Quality of Care Related Studies 
Duggan 
(2000) 
CA hospital discharge 
abstracts from OSHPD/ 
1990 and 1995 
Zip code level 
/Medicaid New 
born infants/ 
Ordinary least 
square regression  
1990 California 
Medicaid DSH 
program/ increasing 
incentives to treat 
indigent patients 
Economic 
theory of 
organizationa
l behavior
 
DSH per Medicaid 
newborn within 
each zip code 
(monetary units) 
Infant mortality 
rates at zipcode 
level 
Ns
 
Baicker 
and Staiger 
(2005) 
Area Resource File with 
National Center for 
Health Workforce 
Analysis and Medicare 
Claim data/ 1988-1990 
and 1998-2000 
County level /not 
specific/ Ordinary 
least square 
regression and 
control for state 
fixed effects  
Effectiveness of 
Intergovernmental 
matching grants 
mechanism in States 
/ No specific 
Economic 
theory of 
state 
government 
behavior  
DSH per capita at 
county level 
(monetary units) 
 28-day Infant 
mortality at 
county level 
 90-day 
Postheart attack 
mortality at 
county level 
S(-)
 
Changes of Public Payment or Subsidies on Quality of Care Studies 
Langa and 
Sussman 
(1993) 
CA hospital discharge 
abstracts from OSHPD/ 
1983, 1995, 1988 
Patient level /Age 
35 through 64 
Medicaid patients 
with specific 
diagnostic codes/ 
Logistic regression 
1983 State Medicaid 
cost-containment 
policy/ reducing 
reimbursement level 
n/a n/a Inpatient 
mortality  
S(-)
 
Culter 
(1995) 
Medicare Claim data 
and Social Security 
records in six New 
England states /1981-
1988 
Patient level/ 
elderly population 
(+65)/  
Logistic regression 
1983 Medicare 
Prospective 
Payment System 
policy/ reducing  
reimbursement level 
Economic 
theory  
DRGs price 
change  to 
measure marginal 
and average 
reimbursement 
effects (monetary 
units) 
 In-hospital 
mortality rate 
 Post 
hospitalization 
mortality rate 
 Readmission 
post-discharge 
 
S(-) 
        
        
 
 
 
 
 
4
0
 
Table 4 (continued) 
Authors Data Sources/year(s) 
Unit of analysis/ 
Study 
Sample/Statistical 
technique 
Public Payment 
policy/ policy 
effects  
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Payment change 
measures 
Quality 
Measures 
Result
s 
Shen 
(2003) 
Medicare Claim data 
and Social Security 
death records/ 1985-
1990, 1990-1994 
Hospital level/ 
Medicare AMI 
patients/ Long-
difference 
regressions with 
instrumental 
variable 
1983 Medicare 
Prospective 
Payment System 
policy/ reducing 
reimbursement level 
Economic 
theory of 
organizationa
l behavior  
PPS pressure 
(monetary units) 
AMI mortality 
rates  
S(-) 
Volpp et al. 
(2003) 
New Jersey and New 
York hospital discharge 
data/ 1990-1996 
Patient level/ AMI 
patients/ 
Difference-in-
differences linear 
probability panel 
model 
1993 New Jersey 
Health Care Reform 
Act/ reducing 
hospital subsidies 
for the uninsured 
n/a No specific 
variable measures 
of policy changes ; 
use interaction 
terms 
AMI in-hospital 
mortality during 
the initial 
hospitalization 
provided LOS 
<=30 with risk 
adjustment. 
S(-) 
Volpp et al. 
(2005a) 
New Jersey and New 
York hospital discharge 
data/ 1990-1996 
Patient level/ For 
specific diagnosis 
and under age 65 
non-Medicare 
patients/Linear 
probability models 
with fixed effect 
1993 New Jersey 
Health Care Reform 
Act/ reducing 
hospital subsidies 
for the uninsured   
Economic 
theory of 
organizationa
l behavior 
No specific 
variable measures 
of policy changes ; 
use interaction 
terms   
Risk-adjusted 
In-hospital 
mortality for 
AMI, CHF, 
stroke 
S(-) 
Volpp et al. 
(2005b) 
National Registry of 
Myocardial 
Infarction(NAMI)/1996
-2001 
Patient level/ AMI 
patients for all 
patients/ Logistic 
regression 
1997 The Balance 
Budget Act/ 
reducing payment 
level 
n/a BBA impact 
factor 
AMI in-hospital 
mortality and 
process 
outcomes 
NS 
Seshamani 
et 
al.(2006a) 
Pennsylvania State 
discharge data and 
death certificate records 
from Pennsylvania 
department of Health/ 
1997-2001 
Patient level/ all 
patients and 
uninsured patient 
under 65/ probit 
regression 
1997 The Balance 
Budget Act/ 
reducing payment 
level 
Economic 
theory of 
organizationa
l behavior 
BBA impact 
factor and time 
trend 
Patients 
Mortality rate 
within 30 days of 
hospital 
admissions  
NS 
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Note:  
 S(-):  Significant negative relationship between public payment changes on quality (Worse) 
 NS:    No significant relationship between public payment changes on quality of care 
 Mixed: Mixed relationship between payment changes on quality of care 
 n/a: not available 
 BBA: The Balance Budget Act 
 PPS: Prospective Payment System 
 DSH: Disproportionate share hospital payment 
 HCUP-SID: Health Cost and Utilization Project-State Inpatient Data 
 OSHPD: the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development in California 
 AHA: American Hospital Association 
 AMI: Acute Myocardial Infraction 
  
Table 4 (continued) 
Authors Data Sources/year(s) Unit of analysis/ 
Study 
Sample/Statistical 
technique 
Public Payment 
policy/ policy 
effects  
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Payment change 
measures 
Quality 
Measures 
Result
s 
Seshamani 
et 
al.(2006b) 
Pennsylvania State 
discharge data and 
death certificate records 
from Pennsylvania 
department of Health/ 
1997-2001 
Patient level/ 
surgical patients/ 
probit regression 
1997 The Balance 
Budget Act/ 
reducing payment 
level 
n/a BBA impact 
factor and time 
trend 
Surgical patients 
Mortality rate  
S(-) 
Clement et 
al.(2007) 
HCUP-SID for 11 
states/1995-2000 
Hospital level/ all 
types of patients/ 
fixed effect linear 
regression  
1997 The Balance 
Budget Act/ 
reducing payment 
level  
n/a Time trend and 
post-BBA dummy  
Risked-adjusted 
PSIs   
Mixed 
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within 30-days of hospital admission and reached similar conclusions about the lack of an 
effect of the BBA on health outcomes for privately insured and uninsured patients. 
Another study also by Seshamani, Zhu, & Volpp (2006) used BBA impact index to study 
the BBA effect on surgical patients in Pennsylvania state between 1997 and 2001, and 
found surgical patient in-hospital mortality rate increased particularly in the high-impact 
hospitals. Clement et al. (2007) also studied the impact of BBA and utilized fixed effect 
model to analyze 11 states between 1995 and 2000. They found that effect of the BBA 
affected Medicare patient outcomes adversely for some patient safety indicators (PSIs) 
but not others. In addition, they did not find an effect of the BBA on uninsured patient 
safety outcomes.  
Focusing on the Medicaid program and state policy reforms, Langa and Sussman 
(1993) and Dranove and White (1998) studied the effect of California’s Medi-Cal cost-
containment policies in 1983 on patient outcomes. Dranove and White (1998) found a 
reduction in service intensity after Medicaid reimbursement cutbacks, in particular for 
Medicaid patients in hospitals with a large Medicaid patient caseload. Langa and 
Sussman (1993) found the utilization of cardiac revascularization for Medicaid patients 
decreased as Medicaid payment declined. Volpp et al. (2003) and Volpp, Ketcham, 
Epstein, and Williams (2005) examined the effect of the New Jersey Health Care Reform 
Act in 1993, which substantially reduced subsidies for hospital care for the uninsured. 
These two studies reached similar conclusions that reductions in subsidies were 
associated with adverse health outcomes, especially for uninsured patients. 
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Few existing studies examine Medicaid DSH programs. Duggan (2000) examined 
the extent to which increasing hospital financial payments from California’s Medi-Cal 
DSH program affected infant mortality, but did not find that the incentives improved 
health outcome for low-income patients. Baicker and Staiger (2004) studied the impact of 
Medicaid DSH spending on 28-day infant mortality and 90-day post-heart attack 
mortality between the periods of 1988-1990 and 1998-2000. Their unit of analysis was 
the county and they found that an additional $100 per capita in DSH payment reduced the 
infant mortality rate by 0.062 percentage points and reduced post-heart attack mortality 
rate by 1.17 percentage points. 
There are several gaps in the existing literature in relation to the research 
questions of this study. First of all, the unit of analysis in Duggan (2000) is at the zip 
code level while it is at county level in Baicker and Staiger (2004). As such, the measures 
of DSH payments in Duggan (2000) and Baicker and Staiger (2004) are both aggregated 
to either zip code level or county level. From these studies, it is unclear how individual 
hospitals responded to the change in Medicaid DSH payments. The data are too 
aggregated to provide clear insights. Second, these two studies only examined quality 
outcomes that affect a limited group of patients (i.e., elderly or young children). For 
example, the data for constructing the AMI mortality rate that Baicker and Staiger (2004) 
examined was focused on Medicare beneficiaries. In addition, Duggan (2000) and 
Baicker and Staiger (2004) focused on infant mortality. To the best of our knowledge, 
since 1997, low-income newborn and children under 18 years old are likely covered 
under Medicaid or State Children Health Insurance Program (SCHIP); and patients who 
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are over age 65 are eligible for Medicare since 1965. It is still unclear from these two 
studies how Medicaid DSH payment changes affect the health outcomes for low-income 
patients between the ages 18 and 64. 
Summary  
 In Chapter 2, this study reviews the background of Medicaid DSH payment 
program, how previous studies measured key dependent variables and also discussed 
existing literature that is related to the effect of public payment on the provision of 
hospital uncompensated care and quality of care. Through this review, this study 
identifies the gaps among current studies that are still unfolded for answering study 
questions specifically. This review process helps to recognize the proceeding plan for the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
A primary concern in this study is whether the reduction in Medicaid 
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments affected the provision of hospital 
uncompensated care and the quality of care for Medicaid and uninsured patients. The 
underlying conceptual framework in this study derives from Newhouse (1970) economic 
theory of not-for-profit hospital behavior and from theoretical extensions by Hoerger 
(1991), Frank and Salkever (1991), and other researchers. The theoretical framework 
developed by Newhouse (1970) and other researchers has been applied to study hospital 
responses to governmental payment policy changes (Sloan, 2000). This study will start 
with an overview of organizational economic theory and then derive the hypotheses from 
this theoretical perspective. Following that, a discussion related to other control variables 
that might affect the provision of uncompensated care and the quality of care will be 
presented. Finally, a graphical depiction of the conceptual framework will be presented. 
The main effect of interest is the association between the changes in Medicaid DSH 
payments and the provision of hospital uncompensated care and quality of care. 
Ownership Types and Hospital Behavior 
 There has been a long debate among health economists about the differences in 
organizational missions and behaviors of for-profit (FP) and private not-for-profit (NFP) 
health care providers. FP hospitals are legally allowed to distribute some proportion of
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profits to their stakeholders and they can issue stock, which is another source of capital 
that enables them to meet financial needs. In simple microeconomic models, FP hospitals 
are assumed to maximize profits and set their outputs at the level where marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost. Specifically, as Friedman (1984) described, a FP hospital considers 
“…all production alternatives and chooses the one which will maximize its profits, 
subject to the constraints of factor prices and the demand for its output”.  
NFP hospitals, on the other hand, are expected to meet a broader set of needs by 
providing charity care services, community benefits, or teaching as part of their 
organizational missions (Friedman, 1984; Gray, 1986; Hansmann, 1987; Marsteller, 
Bovbjerg, & Nichols, 1998; Sutton & Stensland, 2004; Yoder, 1986). NFP hospitals are 
not legally allowed to distribute surplus to those who control the organization, but they 
can retain earnings for internal reinvestment (Friedman, 1984). This type of hospital does 
not maximize profit but maximizes utility in terms of the quantity and quality of services 
produced subject to break-even constraints (Newhouse, 1970). Under financial constraint 
due to public payment policy changes, NFP hospitals may alter hospital resources used to 
produce the quantity and quality of outputs.  
Public hospitals often play an important role as the “last resort” for people who 
cannot pay for their care and these institutions typically receive financial subsidies from 
government sources to support their activities (Chen, Bazzoli, & Hsieh, 2009; Friedman, 
1984; Mann et al., 1995; Shen, 2002). Public hospitals are thought to be substantially 
different from private FP and NFP hospitals (Duggan, 2000; Kornai, 1986; Mann et al., 
1995; Niskanen, 1971). Public hospitals are typically owned by the government and they 
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are expected to continue to operate even if they consistently face financial deficits 
because government sponsors will prevent them from going out of business. On the other 
hand, they are not allowed to retain earnings if they have surplus because government 
may use divert or expropriate the surplus for other uses (Kornai, 1986; Shen & Eggleston, 
2008). Public hospitals are expected to provide the levels of output production so as to 
exhaust their budgets. So they are typically modeled as budget maximizers (Friedman, 
1984). Therefore, if governmental budgets to public hospitals decline, one can expect that 
public hospitals to reduce the provision of hospital care. Since the organizational 
objectives and behaviors of public hospitals are distinct from private hospitals (namely 
private FP and NFP hospitals), this study will focus on theoretical discussions of 
differential FP and NFP hospital response when confronted by changes in government 
policy or other exogenous factors (i.e., the reduction of public payments). 
How do NFP and FP hospitals respond if there is an exogenous reduction in 
payments given their distinct ownership types? Hoerger (1991) expanded upon 
Newhouse model and predicted that NFP hospitals may reduce the quality or the 
provision of free care and act more like FP hospitals when their net revenues decline. 
Hoerger’s model suggests that, when an exogenous factor becomes unfavorable, a NFP 
hospital “cushions the impact on profits by reducing outputs and acting more like a 
profit-maximizing hospital”. A FP hospital, on the other hand, will “choose the output 
that takes it to the peak of the profit function” and may have less variability than NFP 
hospitals in its quality/quantity response to the external changes (Hoerger, 1991). Many 
existing studies have applied the Hoerger theoretical framework to assess the effects of 
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payment change on hospital provision of uncompensated care and hospital quality of 
care. These studies are reviewed in the next two subsections.  
Theoretical Relationship of Public Payment Changes to Uncompensated Care Provision 
In relation to the provision of uncompensated care specifically, many researchers 
suggest that NFP and FP hospitals should be considered separately given their distinct 
organizational motivations (Banks et al., 1997; Davidoff et al., 2000; Frank & Salkever, 
1991; Frank, Salkever, & Mitchell, 1990; Gray, 1991; Gruber, 1994; Mann et al., 1995). 
Frank and Salkever (1991) modeled NFP hospital decision-making regarding the delivery 
of uncompensated care. A NFP hospital’s utility is a function of net revenues and the 
level of unmet need in the community for indigent care. As the Frank and Salkever 
(1991) model predicted, the reduction in hospital net revenues because of exogenous 
price reductions (holding total needs for indigent care constant) may lead NFP hospitals 
to reduce uncompensated care for indigent patients, depending on the relative magnitudes 
of substitution and income effects (Davidoff et al., 2000; Frank & Salkever, 1991). 
Specifically, the substitution effect suggests that, when the payment rate increases (i.e., 
Medicare payment rate), hospitals have more incentives to provide care for Medicare 
patients and thus may reduce the volume of care for other types of patients, including 
Medicaid patients and the uninsured. On the other hand, a countervailing income effect 
exists, when payments increase for one payer, hospitals may have more financial 
resources to subsidize the costs of providing uncompensated care. Thus, the provision of 
uncompensated care may increase due to this income effect (Davidoff et al., 2000). 
Alternatively, if Medicaid DSH payments for low-income people increase, the income 
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and substitution effect operate in the same direction providing hospitals with more 
resources to treat Medicaid and uninsured patients.  
With respect to FP hospitals, Gray (1991) and Banks et al. (1997) indicated that 
the supply of uncompensated care for these institutions is one of the costs of doing 
business. FP hospitals may suffer a loss of business if they do not meet community 
expectations of providing at least some indigent care. FP hospitals may offset the costs of 
this care from the net revenues generated by insured patients (Banks et al., 1997; Gray, 
1991). Therefore, as the theory predicts, even when confronted with the fiscal pressures, 
FP hospitals may not substantially change their provision of uncompensated care because 
community expectations of their role in providing indigent care may be unaffected by 
changes in payment policies (Banks et al., 1997; Davidoff et al., 2000). 
Many empirical studies have applied these theoretical frameworks to examine the 
effect of public payment changes on uncompensated care for hospitals with different 
ownership types. For example, Campbell and Ahern (1993) applied the Newhouse model 
and suggested that changes in Medicare and Medi-Cal reimbursement policy adversely 
affected hospital uncompensated care. By including the interaction terms for ownership 
type and profit level in the study, they found that public and NFP hospitals were more 
likely to increase their indigent care when their profits increased, relative to FP hospitals. 
Thorpe and Phelps (1991) also applied the Newhouse model and found that hospitals 
increased charity care by approximately 1.7 percent for each 10 percent increase in 
payment from the uncompensated care pool in New York State. Consistent with the 
theoretical predictions by Frank and Salkever (1991) and Banks et al. (1997), Davidoff et 
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al. (2000) found NFP and public hospitals increased the provision of uncompensated care 
in response to increased Medicaid payment generosity. Bazzoli et al. (2006) found that 
core safety net hospitals, which were mostly public or NFP hospitals, reduced their 
provision of uncompensated care in response to Medicaid financial pressures while non-
safety net hospitals, mostly FP hospitals, did not have similar responses. Likewise, Mann 
et al. (1995) found Medi-Cal fiscal pressure caused the most pressured hospitals to alter 
their provision of uncompensated care relative to the least pressured hospitals. Given our 
research questions, this study will use the theoretical perspectives of  Newhouse (1970), 
Hoerger (1991)and other researchers as the primary conceptual framework to study the 
impact of Medicaid DSH payment reduction on the provision of hospital uncompensated 
care. 
Theoretical Relationship of Public Payment Changes to Quality of Care 
 There is still no theoretical or empirical consensus on the perceived quality 
differentials between NFP and FP hospitals (Glaeser & Shleifer, 1998; Hansmann, 1987; 
Hoerger, 1991; Marsteller et al., 1998; Mitchell & Shortell, 1997; Newhouse, 1970; Shen, 
2002; Shortell & Hughes, 1988; Sloan, Picone, Taylor, & Chou, 2001). Some health 
economists suggest that NFP hospitals would produce a high level of quality because the 
hospital utility functions contain quality as a primary objective (Hoerger, 1991; 
Newhouse, 1970). Consistently, Hansmann (1996) and Glaeser and Shleifer (1998) also 
suggest that due to an information asymmetry, consumers would choose NFP hospitals 
because of anticipated superior quality. As to FP hospitals, quality is not so much as a 
goal as it is a constraint. These theoretical perspectives suggest that a NFP hospital may 
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produce a higher level of quality than a FP hospital. However, Marsteller et al. (1998) 
argued that, because of the greater number of NFP hospitals in a market, quality “norms” 
are usually set by NFP hospitals and thus FP hospitals must provide quality of care at the 
same level as NFP hospitals in order to compete with them. From an empirical 
standpoint, some existing studies found that NFP hospitals provide better health 
outcomes than FP hospitals (Shen, 2002; Sloan et al., 2001), while others found no 
significant difference in quality among different ownership types (Mitchell & Shortell, 
1997; Shortell & Hughes, 1988).  
 However, when confronted with a reduction in public payments, not only the 
Newhouse (1970) and Hoerger (1991) models, but also Spence (1975) predicted that 
hospitals would reduce the quality of care regardless of ownership types. Spence (1975) 
suggested that hospitals would select a particular level of quality to produce based on the 
value that consumers are willing to pay and the costs of producing quality. That is, when 
price to cost margins are high, as Dranove and White (1998) noted, “…firms prosper by 
increasing sales. Thus, it pays hospitals with high margins to boost quality”. Conversely, 
if any exogenous factors cause the profit margin to decline, hospitals will reduce the 
quality of care. Dranove and White (1998) and many other researchers have discussed 
that the effect of cutbacks on quality may also depend on whether quality is a public good 
or private good (Dranove & White, 1998; Glazer & McGuire, 2002; Spence, 1975).
12
 If 
quality is a private good, a payment decline for one payer (i.e., Medicaid) may cause a 
                                                          
 
12
 If quality is a private good, hospitals are able to adjust quality to provide different levels of 
quality for different patients. If quality is a public good, however, hospital cannot make such patient-
specific adjustments and thus provide the same quality of care to all patients. 
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hospital to reduce quality for Medicaid patients, but maintain or increase quality for 
privately insured patients (Dranove & White, 1998; Gertler, 1989). On the other hand, if 
quality is a public good, as many researchers have argued because there are substantial 
commonalities (i.e., the same health staff, equipment, surgical and lab facilities) in a 
hospital, quality produced may be similar for different payer patients (Dranove & White, 
1998; Glazer & McGuire, 2002). Therefore, when a payment decline for one payer (i.e., 
Medicaid payment), it may affect hospital quality of care for both Medicaid patients and 
patients with other payers.  
Several empirical studies have applied these theoretical frameworks to examine 
the effect of public payment changes on hospital quality of care. For example, Dranove 
and White (1998) applied the Spence (1975) model and observed a reduction in service 
intensity for Medicaid patients, in particular for patients of Medicaid-dependent hospitals, 
in the face of substantial Medicaid reimbursement cutbacks in the early 1990s. Similarly, 
Bazzoli et al. (2008) used Spence (1975) and Newhouse (1970) theoretical frameworks to 
study the effects of declining hospital financial condition on patient quality and suggested 
that a hospital with profound financial problems may provide lower quality of care to its 
patients. Shen (2003) also applied the Newhouse (1970) model in her study and found 
hospital financial pressures resulting from the Medicare Prospective Payment System 
policy had adverse effects on short-term health outcomes. Likewise, Volpp et al. (2005) 
used this theoretical framework, and found results that the reduction in hospital subsidies 
through the New Jersey Health Care Reform Act in 1993 resulted in lower quality of 
care. Given our research questions, this study will rely on Newhouse (1970), Hoerger 
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(1991), Spence (1975) and other researchers’ theoretical frameworks as the primary 
conceptual framework to study the impact of Medicaid DSH payment reduction on 
hospital quality of care. 
Hypotheses 
 Medicaid DSH payment is a major funding source from both Federal and State 
government to offset costs for those hospitals providing greater amounts of care to 
Medicaid and uninsured patients. As hospital net revenue decline from the budget cuts of 
Medicaid DSH payment after the BBA, hospitals that depended on Medicaid DSH 
support may be especially affected. Economic theory generally predicts that reductions in 
the subsidies for the uninsured may lead to reductions in the provision of uncompensated 
care provided to the uninsured (Davidoff et al., 2000; Frank & Salkever, 1991; Hoerger, 
1991; Newhouse, 1970). In this case, both the substitution and income effects of a 
payment change operate in the same direction. Specifically, if Medicaid DSH subsidies 
for the low-income patients decline, hospitals may substitute care for other types of 
patients and thus reduce care for low-income patients (i.e., the substitution effect). 
Additionally, due to the reduction in DSH subsidies, hospitals may receive less financial 
resources to offset costs of care for low-income patients (i.e., the income effect). Given 
that both income and substitution effects work the same way, this study hypothesizes that 
the decline in DSH may lead to a reduction in the provision of hospital uncompensated 
care.  
H1: Reductions in Medicaid DSH payment will be negatively associated with the 
provision of hospital uncompensated care in NFP hospitals, all other things 
being equal. 
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Given the theoretical models of Hoerger (1991), Frank and Salkever (1991), Gray 
(1991) and Banks et al. (1997), NFP and FP hospitals may have different motivations for 
providing uncompensated care in response to a reduction in Medicaid DSH payments. 
Besides, FP hospitals may provide less care for low-income patients and thus receive 
smaller DSH subsidies than NFP hospitals. In that case, the decline in Medicaid DSH 
may have a larger financial impact on NFP hospitals than FP hospitals. As such, NFP 
hospitals tend to reduce their provision of uncompensated care to indigent patients while 
FP hospitals may have comparatively smaller changes. Therefore, this study hypothesizes 
that:    
H2: Compared to NFP hospitals, FP hospitals will make smaller cuts in 
uncompensated care in response to Medicaid DSH payment reductions, all 
other things being equal. 
With respect to quality of care, there is still no theoretical or empirical consensus on 
the perceived quality differentials between NFP and FP hospitals (Glaeser & Shleifer, 
1998; Hansmann, 1987; Hoerger, 1991; Marsteller et al., 1998; Mitchell & Shortell, 
1997; Newhouse, 1970; Shen, 2002; Shortell & Hughes, 1988; Sloan et al., 2001). 
However, when confronted with a reduction in public payments, not only the Newhouse 
(1970) and Hoerger (1991) model but also Spence (1975) predicted that hospitals would 
change the quality of care they produced. Dranove and White (1998) suggested that if 
quality were a private good, hospitals may reduce quality for Medicaid and uninsured 
patients while maintaining or increasing quality for patients with other insurance status if 
DSH payments fall. On the other hand, if quality is a public good, hospitals may reduce 
 
 
55 
 
 
 
their quality of care for all patients regardless of their insurance status. Given these 
theoretical predictions, this study hypothesizes that: 
H3a: If quality of care is primarily a public good, reduced Medicaid DSH payments 
will have a negative association with hospital quality of care for both 
Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients, all other things being 
equal. 
H3b: If quality of care is primarily a private good, reduced Medicaid DSH 
payments will have a negative association with hospital quality of care for their 
Medicaid/uninsured patients, while having no or a positive association with 
quality of care for privately insured patients, all other things being equal. 
Control Variables 
 In addition to the changes in Medicaid DSH payments, several other factors may 
be associated with the provision of hospital uncompensated care and with the quality of 
care provided to Medicaid and uninsured patients and thus should be incorporated in the 
model as control variables. These variables include other governmental financial 
subsidies (Zit), market characteristics (Mit), and hospital-specific characteristics (Hit). 
Other Governmental Financial Subsidies (Zit) 
In addition to Medicaid DSH payments, several funding sources are important for 
hospitals that treat a large share of low-income patients, including Medicare DSH and 
State and local governmental financial subsidies (Fishman & Bentley, 1997; Hadley et 
al., 2005; Hadley & Holahan, 2003). The primary consideration for including other 
funding sources as control variable is to hold hospitals’ subsidies from other major 
sources constant while the amount of Medicaid DSH payment they received declines.  
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Medicare DSH payment is under the Medicare Prospective Payment System 
(PPS) program. Medicare DSH payments were enacted in 1986 and were expected to 
compensate hospitals for higher operating costs as they treated disproportionately large 
number of low-income patients. The BBA cut Medicare DSH payments by an estimated 
total of $0.6 billion between 1998 and 2003 (Wynn et al., 2002).  
State and local governmental financial subsidies are also important  in that they 
help hospitals to cover the revenue shortfalls arising from the costs of Medicaid below-
market payments and to make up the deficits for caring uninsured patients (Baxter & 
Mechanic, 1997; Fishman & Bentley, 1997; Hadley et al., 2005; Hadley & Holahan, 
2003; Lo Sasso & Seamster, 2007; Meyer, Legnini, Fatula, & Stepnick, 1999; Thorpe & 
Phelps, 1991; Stephen Zuckerman, Coughlin, Len Nichols, & Ormond, 1998). These 
state or local financing sources include state or county tax appropriations, district 
assessment revenue, and restricted donations or subsidies for indigent care (Hadley & 
Holahan, 2003; Lo Sasso & Seamster, 2007). State or county tax appropriations are 
payments that hospitals receive from state and local governments and often treated as an 
offset to uncompensated care expenses by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
(MedPAC) (Hadley & Holahan, 2003). Local governmental subsidies (i.e., restricted 
donations for indigent care or district assessment revenue) are allocated by county 
governments from tobacco or property taxes and provide non-operating revenue to 
hospitals to compensate for revenue lost when providing indigent care. 
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Market Characteristics (Mit) 
Some market characteristics may affect hospitals’ ability to continue providing 
care to low-income populations. For example, expansions of public insurance coverage 
(i.e., expanded Medicaid eligibility) in a market will reduce the number of uninsured 
people and thus the provision of hospital uncompensated care will be expected to decline 
(Blewett et al., 2003; Davidoff et al., 2000; Dubay, Norton, & Moon, 1995; Lo Sasso & 
Seamster, 2007). With respect to the association between hospital quality of care for low-
income individuals and Medicaid expansion, Currie and Gruber (2001) suggested that 
medical utilization and quality of care may improve for low-income individuals who are 
uninsured prior to becoming Medicaid-eligible because this group of people may be 
expected to access medical service at an early stage. However, there may be a 
countervailing effect on the individuals who had private insurance before becoming 
Medicaid-eligible (Busch & Duchovny, 2005; Currie & Gruber, 2001). 
Medicaid managed care penetration and private HMO penetration in a market also 
may affect hospital provision of uncompensated care and quality of care to low-income 
individuals (Banks et al., 1997; Davidoff et al., 2000; Lo Sasso & Seamster, 2007; Meyer 
et al., 1999; Norton & Lipson, 1998; Stephen Zuckerman et al., 1998). Managed care 
may heighten competition and create financial pressures for hospitals for their Medicaid 
and privately insured patients. Under managed care, hospitals need to control costs given 
the discounted prices they negotiate with health plans. They may also need to deal with 
lower rates of patient utilization as managed care organizations steer patients to other 
settings (Frank et al., 1990; Gruber, 1994; Mann et al., 1995; Rosko, 1999; Davidoff et al, 
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2001; McKay and Meng, 2007; Thorpe et al., 2001; Lo Sasso and Seamster, 2007; 
Bazzoli et al., 2006; Shen, 2003).  
Lower hospital market concentration among providers may also increase price 
competition and lead to fewer excess revenues to support uncompensated care provision 
(Gaskin, 1997; Gruber, 1994; Thorpe et al., 2001; Weissman, Gaskin, & Reuter, 2003). 
In relation to hospital quality of care, some prior studies argued that competition among 
hospitals might mitigate the effect of financial pressures on hospital quality (Kessler & 
McClellan, 2000; Pope, 1989). Gaynor (2006) and Chen (2008), on the other hand, 
suggested that the effect of hospital competition on quality of care is dependent on how 
price is set. Specifically, when price is set by public payers (i.e., Medicare), hospitals 
have to focus on improving quality of care to attract patients in a highly competitive 
market. Alternatively, increases in competitive pressures in the private insurance market 
may have a negative effect on hospital quality of care because managed care 
organizations (MCOs) focus more on price than on quality of care. In this circumstance, 
one would expect that market competition may decrease quality of care for privately 
insured individuals. However, since prior research studied the effects of regulated price 
on quality of care primarily for Medicare patients (Chen, 2008; Gaynor, 2006; 
Gowrisankaran & Town, 2003), it is still unclear what implications these studies have for 
Medicaid and uninsured patients.  
Other market factors may affect the provision of hospital uncompensated care and 
hospital quality of care provided to low-income patients. For example, prior studies 
suggested that the presence of many FP hospitals in a market may affect the behavior of 
 
 
59 
 
 
 
private NFP hospitals and that NFP hospitals may mimic FP behavior when confronted 
by financial constraints under these circumstances (Cutler & Horwitz, 1998; Duggan, 
2002). Therefore, if a NFP hospital is located in a market with a high portion of FP 
hospitals, that NFP hospital may reduce its uncompensated care or quality of care more 
than NFP hospitals located in markets with fewer FP hospitals. In addition, the existence 
of public and teaching hospitals in a market area are associated with lower 
uncompensated care provision at other hospitals in that market (Bazzoli et al., 2006; 
Campbell & Ahern, 1993; Davidoff et al., 2000; Hsieh, Clement, & Bazzoli, 2010; 
Thorpe & Phelps, 1991). Traditionally, public and teaching hospitals provide large 
amounts of care for the uninsured or low-income populations, and this may reduce the 
demand for indigent care at other institutions (Campbell & Ahern, 1993; Davidoff et al., 
2000; Duggan, 2002; Gaskin, 1997; Hsieh et al., 2010). Some market factors related to 
the demand for indigent care are also included, such as median household income, 
unemployment rate, and percent of poverty at the county level. As the number of 
uninsured increases, one would expect that hospitals would need to provide care for more 
indigent patients.  
Hospital Characteristics (Hit) 
This study also includes hospital-specific characteristics that may influence 
hospital provision of care to indigent patients. For example, hospital capacity (i.e., bed 
size, labor force) also needs to be considered because hospitals with larger capacity will 
have more ability to serve low-income patients. Also, many studies have shown a 
positive association between registered nurse (RN) staff and quality of care (Lindrooth, 
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Bazzoli, Needleman, & Hasnain-Wynia, 2006; Mark et al., 2005; Mark et al., 2004). 
Therefore, this study will include hospital bed size and the labor force size (i.e., the 
number of RN) in both the uncompensated care and quality of care models.  
Medicare share will also be included in both models as a proxy for Medicare 
fiscal pressure. Medicare typically represents the largest revenue source for a hospital. 
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) was expected to produce $112 billion in 
Medicare savings in the first five years (federal fiscal years 1998 through 2002), by 
reducing the projected annual growth rate in program spending from an 8.8 percent 
baseline in 1995 to 5.6 percent in 2002. This may bring greater financial pressures on a 
hospital if that hospital serves a large share of Medicare patients. With respect to the 
association between Medicare share and the provision of uncompensated care in NFP 
hospitals, if the income effect dominates, hospitals may have less slack financial 
resources to subsidize uncompensated care cost when Medicare payment pressure 
increases. If the substitution effect dominates, the effect of Medicare financial pressure 
on hospital uncompensated care may depend on the relative magnitude between Medicare 
pressure and Medicaid DSH payment reductions. That is, if Medicare financial pressure 
is larger than pressure resulting from the cuts of Medicaid DSH payments, hospitals may 
increase or may not change their provisions of uncompensated care. Regarding the 
association between Medicare share and quality of care, when Medicare fiscal pressure 
increases, hospitals may not have the financial resources to invest in quality 
improvements for their Medicare beneficiaries and the effect may spillover to other 
payers (i.e., Medicaid and uninsured) if quality of care is a public good.   
 
 
61 
 
 
 
In theory, when faced with reductions in Medicaid DSH, NFP hospitals are 
expected to reduce their provision of uncompensated care while FP hospitals may have 
relatively smaller changes. To examine the second hypothesis in this study, a FP dummy 
variable will be included in the uncompensated care model (NFP hospitals are the 
reference group). In addition, this study will also include a county hospital dummy and a 
district hospital dummy variable because these hospitals face different financial 
constraints. 
13
 
Teaching hospitals often receive indirect medical education (IME) payments from 
Medicare and other sources of financial support that may allow them to provide more 
uncompensated care (Rosko, 2004). In addition, teaching hospitals are expected to 
provide teaching, research and clinical services. As a result, these hospitals often adopt 
the latest technologies and have highly specialized staff to provide high quality care. As 
such, this study will include a teaching variable in both models. This study also included 
controls for a hospital’s system status given research by Lee, Alexander, & Bazzoli 
(2003) which suggested that hospital system affiliations could affect hospital involvement 
in meeting community needs. In addition, hospital system affiliations may be associated 
with quality outcomes (Chukmaitov et al., 2009; Cuellar & Gertler, 2005; Ho & 
Hamilton, 2000). 
Given the deliberations from prior studies that hospitals that providing more high-
tech services are able to deliver better quality care, following Bazzoli et al. (1999), this 
                                                          
 
13
 California Health Care Foundation (2007). The Financial Health of California Hospitals.  
http://www.chcf.org/documents/hospitals/HospitalFinancialHealthFullReport.pdf (Access Date: 18 Nov 
2009). 
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study controls for hospitals that provide the numbers of high-tech services above 75
th
  
percentile nationwide in the quality model. Hospital all payer case-mix is also included in 
the quality model because hospitals treating patients with more severe illnesses may 
require resources and health staff (Chukmaitov et al., 2009; Rosko & Carpenter, 1994).    
Conceptual Framework 
 Figure 3 presents a graphical depiction of the conceptual framework drawn from 
economic theory and the literature discussed above. This study examines whether the 
changes in Medicaid DSH payment resulting from the BBA have impacts on the 
provision of hospital uncompensated care and on the quality of care provided to Medicaid 
and uninsured patients. This study first examines the associations between Medicaid DSH 
payments and hospital provision of uncompensated care. Specifically, this study is 
interested in knowing whether, as economic theory predicts, the reductions of Medicaid 
DSH due to the BBA have a negative effect on the provision of hospital uncompensated 
care. In addition, this study examines the association between hospital ownership and the 
provision of uncompensated care. As regards quality of care, this study investigates 
whether the reductions in Medicaid DSH also affect quality of care for 
Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients, given the public good /private good 
theoretical perspectives of quality of care.  
 In order to control potential variables that may affect the provision of hospital 
uncompensated care and quality of care provided to low-income patients, this study 
includes other governmental financial subsidies, market characteristics and hospital-
specific characteristics as control variables in the model.   
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Note:  
 : Variables used in uncompensated care model specifically. 
 : Variables used in quality of care model specifically. 
o : Variables used in both uncompensated care model and quality of care model. 
 
Figure 3.  Conceptual Framework of the Effect of Medicaid Disproportionate Share 
Hospital Payment on the Provision of Hospital Uncompensated Care and 
Quality of Care.   
 
Key Independent Variable 
o Medicaid DSH payment 
(DSHit): Net DSH (DSH-
IGT) 
 
Hospital Outcomes 
 Uncompensated Care (UCit) 
 Quality of Care (QCit) 
 
Control Variables 
Other Governmental Financial 
Subsidies (Zit) 
o Other federal subsidies: 
Medicare DSH payments 
o Other state and local financial 
subsidies  
-State and county tax 
appropriation 
 -Restricted donations and       
subsidies for indigent care 
 -Subsidies for district hospitals 
(district hospital only) 
 
Control Variables 
Market Characteristics at the 
county level (Mit) 
o Ratio of Medicaid eligible 
to total population in a 
county  
o Ratio of Medicaid Managed 
Care enrollees to total 
population in a county  
o Private HMO penetration in 
MSA 
o Admissions-HHI in a 
county 
 % of public beds in a 
county 
 % of teaching beds in a 
county 
o % of for-profit beds in a 
county 
o Median household income 
in a county (in 1000s) 
o Unemployment rate in a 
county 
o Poverty rate in a county 
 
Control Variables 
Hospital-specific 
characteristics (Hit)  
o Number of staffed beds 
o Full time and part time 
RNs to beds 
o Medicare share 
o Ownership 
o Teaching status 
o System Affiliation 
 Number of high-tech 
services 
 Hospital all payer case-
mix Index 
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Summary 
 This chapter developed a conceptual framework and a set of testable hypotheses 
by integrating economic theory to examine the impact of the reductions in Medicaid DSH 
payment on the provision of hospital uncompensated care and on the quality of care 
provided to Medicaid and uninsured patients. Chapter 4 will discuss research methods, 
including research design, data sources, sampling, variable measurements, and the overall 
analytical approach used to test these hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 The research methodologies used in this study to empirically examine the 
research questions and to address the theoretical hypotheses discussed in Chapter 3 will 
be discussed and explained in this chapter. In chapter 4, this study includes research 
design, data sources, variable measurements, econometric issue encountered, and final 
choice of analytical approach. 
Research Design 
The purpose of this study is to examine the association between the BBA induced 
changes in Medicaid DSH payments during the late 1990s and early 2000s and hospital 
outcomes, specifically hospital provision of uncompensated care and quality of care. 
BBA policy provides a natural experimental environment for this study to observe the 
impact of policy implementation on hospital behavior. In addition, not all hospitals 
receive Medicaid DSH payment supports. These two factors provide this study with a 
way to conduct a pre and post quasi-experimental analysis with control and treatment 
groups. This type of design will allow comparisons between control and treatment groups 
and the resulting effects from the BBA policy changes in Medicaid DSH payments.  
Longitudinal unbalanced panel data for California hospitals from 1996 to 2003 
are utilized to implement the reseach design. There are several reasons for examing this 
state: first, California has a higher uninsured rate than the national level. In 2008, the 
uninsured rate in California was 18.6 percent while the national uninsured rate
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was 15.4%. 
14
  Second, California receives a high proportion of federal Medicaid DSH 
payments each year (Hearne, 2004). Third, the audited financial report data contains 
relatively complete information regarding the Medicaid DSH payments hospitals 
received and the uncompensated care hospitals provided. 
15
  
Data Sources 
Study data are drawn from several databases. First, annual hospital financial data 
from the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) in California 
were used. This dataset includes state audited financial statements for all California 
hospitals, such as balance sheets and income statements. Hospital charity care, bad debt 
and Medicaid DSH information are obtained from this dataset. Second, Healthcare Cost 
and Utilization Project (HCUP) state inpatient data (SID) offers clinical (i.e., patient 
primary diagnosis, discharge status) and non-clinical information (i.e., expected 
insurance status) for each hospital admission at the patient level. This study applies 
AHRQ-PSI software to assess the inpatient discharge data to construct patient safety 
indicators for each hospital. Third, the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual 
Survey contains hospital structural data, such as ownership, bed size, hospital services 
and utilization. Fourth, the Area Resource File (ARF), which is compiled by the Bureau 
of Health Professions, has extensive information on hospital market structure, community 
demographics, and socioeconomic attributes at the county level. Fifth, HealthLeader-
                                                          
 
14
 Data information is from Census Bureau. 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/historic/index.html (Access Date: Oct12, 2009) 
 
 
15
 Other states also have high uninsured rate and “high DSH” status, like Florida and New York. 
However, the financial reports from other states were not able to provide sufficient information for this 
study to examine DSH payment impacts.  
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Interstudy provides data on HMO enrollment at the MSA level, which is used to compute 
private HMO market share. Sixth, Medi-Cal annual statistical reports provide statistical 
data on California Medi-Cal program services, expenditures, and eligibles for this study. 
Seventh, Medi-Cal Managed Care Annual Statistical Reports provide public information 
about the managed care programs rendering care to Medi-Cal beneficiaries. Eighth, the 
Medicare Cost Report, also called the CMS-2552-96 report, provides data on the 
Medicare DSH payments that hospitals received. Ninth, the overall hospital case-mix 
index data from OSHPD in California are used. To calculate the overall hospital case-mix 
index, OSHPD applies Medicare Severity-Diagnosis Related Groups (MS-DRG) and 
their associated weights to all patient discharge data by hospitals in California. 
Study Sample 
This study includes only short-term, non-federal general acute care hospitals in 
California. Kaiser hospitals, which constitute 25 hospitals in each study year, are 
excluded because they do not report data to OSPHD. In addition, this study includes only 
hospitals that could be matched across the major databases used in the study. It’s about 
7% of hospitals that had to be excluded as a result of this restriction. There are a total of 
about 2,547 hospital-year observations, representing 376 hospitals that report data in one 
or more years. Since nearly eight percent of hospitals changed or experienced operating 
status (i.e., hospital closure or ownership conversion) during study years, this study will 
do a sensitivity analysis to see if there is any difference including or excluding these 
hospitals from the analysis.  
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Between 1996 and 2003, 145 hospitals received Medicaid DSH payments in one 
or more years, and about 50 percent of DSH hospitals received Medicaid DSH 
continuously for more than six years. Among these DSH hospitals, namely those 
hospitals that received Medicaid DSH payments, about 12% are district hospitals, 22% 
are county hospitals, 36% are not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals and 30% are for-profit (FP) 
hospitals.   
 For patient safety outcome measures, this study draws data from Healthcare Cost 
and Utilization Project (HCUP) State Inpatient Data (SID) for California from 1996 to 
2003. Following Volpp, Ketcham et al.(2005), this study excludes patients who: were 
younger than 18 or older than 64
16
; were enrolled in Medicare
17
; stayed in the hospital 
longer than 30 days
18
; were residents of a state other than California; were discharged 
alive in less than 1 day because these patients either were miscoded or had conditions not 
requiring a hospital stay; or had specific exclusions defined by the Agency of Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ). This study stratifies patients into two groups by insurance 
status: one group represents the privately insured and the other those insured by Medicaid 
or uninsured. Overall, privately insured individuals represent about 55% of the total 
patient sample and Medicaid/uninsured the remaining 45%. Through the algorithm of the 
patient safety indicators (PSIs) software provided by AHRQ, risk-adjusted PSIs measures 
                                                          
 
16
   Many low income children under 18 receive health insurance coverage from Medicaid or State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). Individuals age 65 or above will be covered by Medicare. 
 
 
17
  Patients who are under age 65 with certain disabilities or people of all ages with End-Stage 
Renal Disease (permanent kidney failure requiring dialysis or a kidney transplant) will be eligible for 
Medicare coverage. http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareGenInfo/ (Access Date: 13 Oct, 2009) 
 
 
18
  From the descriptive analysis for the patient length of stay for the patient age between 18 and 
64 in each year, 99 percentile of length of stay is 30 days. 
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for both Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients are constructed separately at 
the hospital provider level.  
Variable Measurements 
Dependent Variables 
Uncompensated Care Provision 
This analysis examines how changes in Medicaid DSH payment affect the 
provision of hospital uncompensated care. Following Campbell and Ahern (1993) and 
Bazzoli et al. (2006), two measures of uncompensated care will be used in this study. The 
first one is the sum of charity care plus bad debt charges adjusted by the hospital specific 
cost-to-charge ratio and then divided by one million for purposes of interpretation. The 
other variable is the percentage of total operating expense devoted to charity care and bad 
debt expense (after adjustment by hospital specific cost-to-charge ratio).  
Quality of Care 
In relation to quality measures, this study aims to examine the effects changes in 
hospital Medicaid DSH payments on hospital quality of care among Medicaid and 
uninsured patients as well as privately insured patients. In terms of quality of care 
measures, this study used PSI software (version 4.0, released on June 2009 by AHRQ) to 
construct individual patient safety indicators and one PSI composite measure.  
The new AHRQ-PSI composite measure includes 11 PSIs as described in Chapter 
2. The composite measure is a weighted average of the scaled and reliability-adjusted 
ratios for the component indicators. The reliability-adjusted ratio is weighted average of 
the risk-adjusted ratio and the reference population ratio. An example of the procedures 
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of how to construct composite measure, which is published by AHRQ on March, 2008, 
shows in Table 5. The reliability-adjusted ratio (column D) considers both provider level 
risk-adjusted rate (column B) and reference population risk-adjusted (column C) rate as 
well as the degree of reliability for the indicator (column A).  After constructing 
reliability-adjusted ratio, a PSI composite measure (column F) is constructed. A PSI 
composite measure is a weighted average of the eleven individual PSI indicators based on 
the reliability-adjusted ratio and component weight for each individual PSI. The 
component weight (column E) is determined based on the purpose of use of the 
composite measure, as AHRQ indicates in its PSI composite measure documentation.  
A denominator weight method is used to measure the component weights. The 
denominator weights are determined by the average number of the frequencies of patients 
at risk for each individual PSI. In general, a denominator weight reflects the amount of 
risk of experiencing the outcome of interest in a given population. If a PSI has higher 
frequency of patients at risk, it will be given a higher weight. Since this study focuses on 
patients who are age between 18 and 64, this study uses data from a nationwide 
comparative data published by AHRQ (2007) to determine the denominator weights 
when constructing the composite PSI measure for both Medicaid/uninsured and privately 
insured patients who are age between 18 and 64. Table 6 presents the frequencies of 
patients at risk for patient aged 18-39 and 40-64 and the specific parameters of 
component weights used in this study. The sum of the component weights among the 11 
PSIs equals one. 
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Table 5. An Example of the Calculation for PSI Composite Measure 
Columns A B C D E F 
 
Reliability 
Weight 
Risk-
adjusted 
Ratio 
Reference 
Population 
Ratio 
 
Reliability-
adjusted 
ratio 
(RAR) 
a
 
 
Component 
weight 
Composite 
Measure 
b 
PSI03 Decubitus Ulcer 
 
0.951 1.190 0.983 1.180 0.076 0.089 
PSI06 Iatrogenic 
Pneumothorax 
 
0.768 2.784 0.963 2.361 0.225 0.530 
PSI07 Selected Infection 
Due to Medical Care 
 
0.903 1.543 0.938 1.484 0.186 0.277 
PSI08 Postop Hip Fracture 
 
0.088 1.868 1.020 1.094 0.047 0.052 
PSI09 Postop Hemorrhage 
or Hematoma 
 
0.742 1.247 1.003 1.184 0.071 0.084 
PSI10 Postop Physio and 
Metabol Derangmts 
 
0.708 0.859 0.910 0.874 0.034 0.030 
PSI11 Postop Respiratory 
Failure 
 
0.960 0.773 0.965 0.781 0.028 0.022 
PSI12 Postop PE or DVT 
 
0.967 1.304 0.982 1.293 0.071 0.092 
PSI13 Postop Sepsis 
 
0.799 1.711 0.936 1.555 0.009 0.013 
PSI14 Postop Wound 
Dehiscence 
 
0.492 0.462 1.004 0.738 0.015 0.011 
PSI15 Accidental Puncture 
or Laceration 
 
0.966 1.348 0.926 1.333 0.238 0.317 
     1.000 1.518 
 
Note:  
 
This data example of constructing composite measure is from page 8 and 9 in the Patient Safety Indicators 
(PSI) Composite Measure Workgroup Final Report, March 2008. Patient Safety Indicators Download. 
AHRQ Quality Indicators. March 2007. http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/psi_download.htm or 
http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/downloads/psi/AHRQ_PSI_Workgroup_Final.pdf 
a 
RAR=[risk-adjusted ratio*reliability weight]+[reference population ratio*(1-reliability weight)] 
b 
Composite Measure=[indicator1 RAR*  component weight1]+ [indicator2 RAR* component 
weight2]+…+[indicator11 RAR*component weight11]. 
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Table 6. The Component Weight Used in This Study. 
 Age18-39 
Denominator 
Age 40-64 
Denominator 
Average 
Denominator  
age 18-64 
 
Component 
weight 
a 
PSI03 Decubitus Ulcer 928,685 2,805,708 1,867,197 0.0593 
PSI06 Iatrogenic 
Pneumothorax 
3,821,116 9,765,963 6,793,540 0.2157 
PSI07 Selected Infection Due 
to Medical Care 
6,444,382 6,585,254 6,514,818 0.2069 
PSI09 Postop Hemorrhage or 
Hematoma 
1,204,216 3,542,177 2,373,197 0.0754 
PSI10 Postop Physio and 
Metabol Derangmts 
569,546 2,094,105 1,331,826 0.0423 
PSI11 Postop Respiratory 
Failure 
544,539 1,747,936 1,146,238 0.0364 
PSI12 Postop PE or DVT 1,206,942 3,531,754 2,369,348 0.0752 
PSI13 Postop Sepsis 94,734 454,161 274,448 0.0087 
PSI14 Postop Wound 
Dehiscence 
323,798 823,265 573,532 0.0182 
PSI15 Accidental Puncture or 
Laceration 
2,970,117 10,309,169 6,639,643 0.2109 
   31,489,470 1.0000 
Note:  
The PSI Comparative Data for provider level was published by AHRQ. The statistical information is 
generated from 2004 nationwide Inpatient Sample. More detailed information about this nationwide 
comparative data can be found at the linkage as 
http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/archives/psi/psi_provider_comparative_v31.pdf (Access date: Feb 
13, 2010). Or see Patient Safety Indicators Archive. AHRQ Quality Indicators. March 2007. Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD. 
http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/psi_archive.htm 
a 
 The component weight presented here is used in this study. 
 
 Following Clement et al. (2007), several criteria are examined for selecting PSIs 
in this study. First, because patient adverse events are rare events, a random occurrence 
for a hospital with a low volume of patients at risk would yield a high rate of incidence 
(Bazzoli et al., 2008; Clement et al., 2007) . Therefore, each indicator is constructed for 
an individual hospital only if it had a population of 30 or more at risk for the event 
associated with the indicator, as recommended by AHRQ. Second, to ensure enough 
observations to achieve generalizability across California hospitals, PSI indicators for 
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both Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured are selected only if 75% or more of 
California hospitals reported having 30 or more patients at risk during hospitalization for 
a given PSI (Clement et al., 2007). Based upon the preliminary results in this study, six 
individual PSIs and one PSI composite score are selected to measure quality of care in 
this study. The six PSIs consist of death in low mortality DRGs (PSI02), iatrogenic 
pneumothorax (PSI06), selected infections due to medical care (PSI07), post-operative 
hemorrhage or hematomy (PSI09), post-operative pulmonary embolism or deep vein 
thrombosis (PSI12), and accidental puncture or laceration during procedure (PSI15). In 
this study, these six individual risk-adjusted PSIs are multiplied by 100 and interpreted as 
percentages, as recommended by AHRQ.  
Key Independent Variable 
Many researchers have noted that the Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital 
Program is essentially a complicated financing system (Coughlin & Liska, 1997; Ku & 
Coughlin, 1994; Mechanic, 2004). It is necessary to know how the financing mechanism 
works in order to construct accurate measures of the Medicaid DSH payments that 
individual hospitals received.  
The majority of state governments used intergovernmental transfers to generate 
matching federal funds for DSH payments. Taking the California State’s Medicaid DSH 
program (also called the SB855 DSH program) as an example, Figure 4 shows that the 
state collects funds through intergovernmental transfers (IGTs) from public entities, 
including counties, local district hospitals, and the University of California. Then, the 
federal government matches the state’s funds at the California federal Medicaid matching 
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Public Hospitals
(counties, local hospitals)
Private Hospitals
State of California
(DSH)
Federal Government State General Fund
2
1
3
44
State collects revenue through inter-
governmental transfers (IGTs) from public
entities, including counties, local hospital
districts, and the University of California.
1
Federal government matches the State s
share at California s federal Medicaid
matching rate: 51.55%
2
State retains a portion of the
combined fund as an
administrative fee .
3
State distributes combined funds
as supplemental payments to
both public and private hospitals.
4
Medicaid DSH Program in California
From William Huen (1999), California s Disproportionate Share Hospital Program:
Background Paper , The Medi-Cal Policy Institute
 
 
 
rate of 51.55%. After that, the state retains a portion of the combined funds in its state 
General Fund and distributes the other portion of the combined funds to both public and 
private hospitals (Coughlin & Liska, 1997; Huen, 1999; Ku & Coughlin, 1994; McCue & 
Draper, 2004; Mechanic, 2004). Knowing how the Medicaid DSH financing mechanism 
works, McCue and Draper (2004) and Baicker and Staiger (2004) have argued that the 
Medicaid DSH payments received by counties, district and public hospitals should take 
into account the part used as intergovernmental transfer to match federal funds. That is, 
the DSH payment in public hospitals will be net of IGTs so that net DSH=DSH-IGTs. 
Figure 4.  The Graphical Depiction of the Mechanism of Intergovernmental Transfer to   
Generate Federal DSH Matching Funds. 
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Alternatively, private hospitals do not pay IGTs. So the net DSH payment for private 
hospitals is simply the DSH amount so that net DSH=DSH.  
 Following McCue and Draper (2004) and Baicker and Staiger’s (2004) 
suggestions, this study uses net Medicaid DSH payments in millions of dollars. Net 
Medicaid DSH in million equals the real amount of gross Medicaid DSH dollar minus the 
amount used to match federal Medicaid DSH funds through intergovernmental transfer to 
counties, district and public hospitals, then divided by one million. This study obtains 
DSH variables from hospital annual audited financial report data published by the Office 
of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) in California. 
An additional item is worth noting regarding the process of distributing Medicaid 
DSH payments to eligible hospitals in California. It may not affect the measurement of 
the DSH variable, but may be subject to some autoregressive process since the Medicaid 
DSH payments for a hospital in year t depend upon the one or two year lagged Medicaid 
and uninsured patient load at that hospital. Taking California as an example, the 
Department of Health Care Services (DHCS) in the California state of Health and Human 
Service Agency first decides which hospitals are eligible to receive DSH funds and then 
distribute the program funds to eligible hospitals. Two criteria are used to decide which 
hospitals are eligible to receive Medicaid DSH payments according to prior two calendar 
year (CY) hospital annual cost report data
19
: 
 (1) the hospital’s number of Medi-Cal 
inpatient days must be at least one standard deviation above the statewide mean; (2) the 
                                                          
 
19
 See “Adjustment in payment for inpatient hospital services furnished by disproportionate share 
hospitals” in Social Security Act, from http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/ssact/title19/1923.htm (Access Date: 
April10, 2008) 
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hospital’s revenues from low-income utilization (including Medi-Cal and uncompensated 
care) must account for 25% or more of its total revenues. Then, an eligible hospital will 
receive DSH funds in year t based on 80% of the prior calendar year (t-1) Medi-Cal 
inpatient days multiplied by a DSH per diem amount.
20
 This study will address this 
autocorrelation issue in the methodology section. 
Control Variables 
Other Governmental Financial Subsides (Zit) 
 To accurately assess the impact of the decline in DSH payments had upon 
uncompensated care and quality of care, it is important to control for any other 
compensation provided to cover Medicaid and uninsured patients. Two measures are 
included. The first one is state and local governmental financial subsidies, which is the 
sum of several state and county funding amounts, including state and county tax 
appropriations, restricted donations and subsidies for indigent care, and subsidies for 
district hospitals. Information on these state and local financial data is provided in the 
hospital annual audited financial report data published by OSHPD in California. The 
second alternative funding measure is Medicare DSH payments, which is the amount that 
hospitals receive from Medicare. The amount of Medicare DSH payments is determined 
by a complex formula and each hospital's DSH percentage. The hospital's DSH 
percentage is derived as the sum of two ratios: the proportion of all Medicare days that 
are attributable to beneficiaries of Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a cash benefit 
                                                          
 
20
 More detailed information about SB855, Medi-Cal Disproportionate Share Hospitals Payment 
Program can be found from accounting manual of Medi-Cal Supplemental Payment at 
http://www.ucop.edu/ucophome/policies/acctman/h-576-57.pdf (Access Date: Jan, 2009).  
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program for aged and disabled people, and the proportion of all patient days for which 
Medicaid is the primary payer. The Medicare DSH payment data are obtained from 
Medicare Hospital Cost Report.  
Market Characteristics (Mit) 
Several market factors are controlled in this study, including ratio of Medicaid 
eligibles to total population, ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to total population, 
private HMO penetration, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of hospital concentration, the 
presence of public hospitals within the county, the presence of teaching hospitals within 
the county, the presence of for-profit hospitals within the county, and demand-related 
factors (i.e., median household income, unemployment rate, and poverty level). In terms 
of Medicaid eligibility, this study uses data from 1996-2003 Medi-Cal Annual Statistical 
Reports to construct the ratio of the number of average monthly Medi-Cal eligible 
individuals to the total population at the county level.
21
 Medicaid managed care is 
measured as the ratio of the number of Medicaid managed care enrollments to the total 
population at the county level. This variable is derived from 1996-2003 Medi-Cal 
Managed Care Annual Statistical Reports. 
22
  
This study uses a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated on the basis of 
hospital admissions to measure market competition at the county level. In calculating 
                                                          
 
21
 County Welfare Departments in California determine eligibility for all Medi-Cal eligible with 
the exception of Supplemental Security Income/State Supplementary Payment (SSI/SSP) eligibles. See 
Table 25 in the Medi-Cal annual statistical reports: 
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/dataandstats/statistics/Pages/AnnualStatisticalReports.aspx(Access Date: Jan13. 
2009)  
 
 
22
 Medi-Cal Managed Care Annual Statistical Reports 
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/dataandstats/statistics/Pages/ManagedCareAnnualStatisticalReports.aspx (Access 
(Access Date: Jan13. 2009) 
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HHI, this study combines hospital admissions for those hospitals in the same system 
within the same county and treats the system as if it were one organization. This study 
uses the percentage of public beds to total hospitals beds within the county to measure the 
presence of public hospitals at the county level. Likewise, the presence of teaching 
hospitals is measured as the percentage of teaching hospital beds to total hospital beds 
within the county and the presence of for-profit hospitals is measured as the percentage of 
for-profit hospital beds to total hospital beds within the county. The hospital bed data are 
from the AHA annual survey data.  
Ideally, it would be best to measure uninsured demand directly by using the 
number of uninsured and low-income individuals in the county. However, there are no 
publicly available data that allow measuring this variable over time.
23
 Hence, this study 
uses median household income, the unemployment rate and the ratio of persons in 
poverty to the total population for each county as proxy variables to capture uninsured 
demand. These demographic data are from the Area Resource File from 1996 to 2003. 
Hospital Characteristics (Hit) 
 Several hospital characteristics are measured in this study, including ownership 
types, hospital system affiliation, teaching status, hospital bed size, hospital nurse labor 
force, whether located in an urban area, hospital Medicare share, provision of high 
technology services, and hospital overall case mix index. Hospital ownership types 
consist of three dummy variables to identify for-profit hospitals, county hospitals, and 
                                                          
 
23
 Existing uninsured estimates by county are only available for the  year 2000 from U.S. Census 
Bureau, Data Integration Division, Small Area Estimates Branch, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/sahie/index.html (Access Date: Dec 2008)  
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district hospitals (not-for-profit hospital is the omitted category). Ownership data are 
from the hospital annual audited financial data published by OSHPD in California. These 
ownership dummy variables are then interacted with DSH variables in the 
uncompensated care model. This study includes a system affiliation variable that 
identifies whether a hospital is a member of a multihospital system. Two dummy 
variables are used to identify hospitals’ teaching status, including major teaching hospital 
if a hospital is the member of the Council of Teaching Hospitals and Health Systems 
(COTH) (majteach=1) and minor teaching hospital if a hospital is not a COTH member 
but has resident/physician training programs (minteach=1). This study includes the 
natural logarithm of the number of hospital staff beds to measure hospital bed size in 
order to diminish heteroskedasticity among different hospital size. Hospital nurse labor 
force is measured as the sum of the number of full time registered nurses and part time 
registered nurses, divided by total hospital staffed beds. A binary variable, urban, is used 
to indicate if a hospital is located in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). This study 
defines Medicare share as Medicare inpatient days divided by total inpatient days.  
 This study uses a binary variable called high-tech to identify whether a hospital’s 
count of tertiary services exceeds the 75
th
 percentile of this count for the national 
distribution of the number of tertiary services owned or provided by the general acute 
care hospitals.
24
 This study follows Bazzoli et al. (1999) to identify the list of services 
included in the high-tech measure. These hospital characteristics are constructed from the 
                                                          
24
 Tertiary services are specialized, highly technical level of health care. Specialized intensive care units, 
advanced diagnostic support services and highly specialized personnel are usually characteristic of tertiary 
health care.  
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AHA annual survey. This study also includes hospital case-mix index for all patients 
published by OSHPD. Additionally, annual dummy variables are included to identify the 
study years, with 1996 being the referent category. Table 7 provides summary 
information on the variable and data sources.  
Table 7. Variables, Definition, and Sources 
Variable Comments Data Source 
and Year 
Dependent Variables 
 Uncompensated care 
provision (UCit) 
1. The sum of charity care plus bad debt costs (adjusted by 
specific hospital cost to charge ratio). This variable is 
measured in millions. 
2. The ratio of charity care and bad debt charges (adjusted by 
specific hospital cost to charge ratio) to total operating 
expenses, and then multiplied by 100 as percent. 
CA OSHPD,  
1996-2003 
 Quality of care (QCit) Patient safety indicators for Medicaid and uninsured patients 
and privately insured patients. This set of variables contains 
six individual PSIs (PSI02, PSI06, PSI07, PSI09, PSI12, and 
PSI15) and also one composite PSI indicator. For more 
detailed information regarding variable construction, please 
refer to in AHRQ QI 
(http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov). Six individual 
PSIs are measured as percentage. The composite PSI is a 
continuous value. 
CA HCUP-SID,  
1996-2003 
Key Independent Variables 
o Net Medicaid DSH 
payment (DSHit – 
IGTit) 
Real dollar amount of Medicaid DSH that a hospital received 
minus the dollar amount of IGTs that a hospital paid to state 
through intergovernmental transfers (in particular for public 
hospitals). This variable is measured in millions. 
CA OSHPD,  
1996-2003 
Control Variables 
o Other governmental 
financial subsidies 
(Zit) 
This study attempts to measure governmental financial 
sources other than Medicaid DSH used to support hospital 
costs for caring Medicaid and uninsured patients. Two 
measures are constructed:  
 
1. State and local governmental financial support included 
state tax appropriations, county tax appropriations, 
district assessment revenue and restricted donations and 
subsidies for indigent care 
CA OSHPD,  
1996-2003 
2. Medicare DSH payments: the amount of Medicare DSH 
payments that hospitals receive from Medicare.  
Medicare 
Hospital Cost 
Report, 1996-
2003 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Variable Comments Data Source 
and Year 
Market Characteristics at the county level (Mit) 
o Ratio of Medicaid 
eligibles to total 
population 
The ratio of the number of average monthly Medi-Cal 
eligible individuals to total population at that county.  
Medi-Cal 
annual 
statistical 
reports, 
1996-2003 
o Ratio of Medicaid 
managed care 
enrollees to total 
population 
The ratio of the number of Medicaid managed care enrollees 
to total population at that county. 
Medi-Cal 
Managed Care 
Annual 
Statistical 
Reports, 
1996-2003 
o Private HMO 
penetration in MSA 
The ratio of population enrolled in HMOs in MSA. HealthLeader-
Interstudy, 
1996-2003 
o Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index 
Sum of squared market share based on hospital admissions. 
In calculating HHI, this study combined hospital admissions 
for those hospitals in the same system within the same 
county and treats the system as if it were one organization. 
 
AHA, 1996-
2003 
 Presence of public 
hospitals in county 
The percentage of total hospital beds that are public hospital 
beds in the county 
AHA, 1996-
2003 
 Presence of teaching 
hospitals in county 
The percentage of total hospital beds that are teaching 
hospital beds in the county 
AHA, 1996-
2003 
 Presence of for-profit 
hospitals in county 
The percentage of total hospital beds that are for-profit 
hospital beds to in the county 
AHA, 1996-
2003 
o Median household 
income  
Median household income in the county (in 1000s) ARF, 1996-
2003 
o Unemployment rate Unemployment rate in the county ARF, 1996-
2003 
o Poverty rate The ratio of persons in poverty to total population at that 
county 
ARF, 1996-
2003 
Hospital Specific Characteristics (Hit) 
o Ownership types Dummy variables identifying FP, county hospital, district 
hospitals. These variables are interacted with DSH variables 
in uncompensated care model. 
CA OSHPD,  
1996-2003 
o System affiliated A dummy variable for identifying hospitals that are affiliated 
with a multi-hospital system. 
AHA, 1996-
2003 
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Table 7 (continued)   
Variable Comments Data Source 
and Year 
o Teaching status  Two dummy variables that identify hospitals teaching status, 
including major teaching hospital if a hospital is COTH 
member (majteach=1) and minor teaching hospital if a 
hospital has resident/physician training program but is not a 
COTH members (minteach=1). 
AHA, 1996-
2003 
o Bed size Natural logarithm of the number of hospital staffed beds AHA, 1996-
2003 
o Full time and part 
time RN to bed 
Ratio of full time and part time registered nurses to staffed 
beds 
AHA, 1996-
2003 
o Medicare Share Medicare inpatient days divided by total hospital inpatient 
days  
AHA, 1996-
2003 
o Medicare Share 
interacted with 
PostBBA dummy 
variable 
The interaction variable of Medicare share with a dummy 
variable indicating post BBA (year 1996 and 1997 are pre 
BBA period). 
AHA, 1996-
2003 
 Urban A Dummy variable to identify whether a hospital is located 
in urban area. 
AHA, 1996-
2003 
 High-tech service A dummy variable to identify whether a hospital’s count of 
tertiary services exceeds the 75
th
 percentile of this count for 
the distribution of the count of tertiary services for hospitals 
nationwide. This study used definitions of Bazzoli et al. 
(1999) to identify high-tech services. 
AHA, 1996-
2003 
 Case-Min Index Case-mix index for all patients in a hospital.  CA OSHPD 
case-mix index, 
1996-2003 
Year dummy variables 
(Yrit) 
Year dummy variables for 1997-2003 (1996 as reference 
group) 
 
Note1:  
 CA-OSHPD: State audited hospital annual financial reports from the Office of Statewide Health 
Planning and Development (OSHPD) 
 CA-OSHPD case-mix index:  
http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/HID/Products/PatDischargeData/CaseMixIndex/default.asp (Accessed: 
Nov10, 2009).  
 Medicare Hospital Cost Report:  
       http://www.cms.hhs.gov/CostReports/02_HospitalCostReport.asp#TopOfPage  (Accessed: Oct 08, 
2007) 
 Medi-Cal annual statistical reports: 
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/dataandstats/statistics/Pages/AnnualStatisticalReports.aspx(Accessed: 
Jan13. 2009) 
 Medi-Cal Managed Care Annual Statistical Reports: 
       http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/dataandstats/statistics/Pages/ManagedCareAnnualStatisticalReports.aspx 
(Accessed: Jan13. 2009) 
 HCUP-SID: Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project-State Inpatient Data 
 AHA: American Hospital Association Annual Survey 
 ARF: Area Resource File 
Note2:  
 : Variables used in the uncompensated care model specifically. 
 : Variables used in the quality of care model specifically. 
o : Variables used in both the uncompensated care model and the quality of care model. 
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Empirical Specification and Methodology  
This study uses longitudinal data from 1996 to 2003 to examine the effects of 
changes in Medicaid DSH payment on the provision of hospital uncompensated care and 
quality of care, controlling for hospital characteristics, other governmental financial 
subsidies, and market characteristics that influence these outcome measures. Since the 
two dependent variables yield some different econometrics considerations, each will be 
discussed separately below.  
Uncompensated Care Model 
 The basic empirical specifications used to examine the first and second sets of 
hypotheses relevant for the hospital uncompensated care model are presented in reduced 
form equations (1) and (2). In addition, the reduced form equation (2) adds a vector of 
interaction terms for ownership status and the net Medicaid DSH payments (NFP as 
reference group) to examine the second set of hypotheses.   
 0 1 2 3 4it it it it it t i itUC netDSH Z M H Yr                                              
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7
( )
         ( ) ( )
it it it it it it it
it it it it t i it
UC netDSH Z M H FP netDSH
CNTY netDSH DISTRIC netDSH Yr
     
    
      
      
       
where i= an individual hospital; t=year; UCit indicates the provision of hospital 
uncompensated care for hospital i in year t; netDSHit represents net Medicaid DSH 
payments, which was measured as gross Medicaid DSH minus the amount of 
intergovernmental transfers from public hospitals; Zit indicates a vector of state or local 
governmental financial support measures for indigent care. Mit indicates a vector of 
market characteristics. Hit represents a vector of hospital characteristics. Yr represents a 
(1) 
(2) 
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vector of year dummy variables. FPit represents a dummy variable for for-profit 
hospitals. CNTYit is a dummy variable for county hospitals. DISTRICit is a dummy 
variable for district hospitals. αi and τi indicate hospital specific error components for the 
uncompensated care model. µ it and υit indicate random error terms for the uncompensated 
care model.  
 The dependent variable in equations (1) and (2) are measured in two ways as 
uncompensated care costs in millions and as the ratio of uncompensated care costs to 
total operating expenses. The coefficient estimations of netDSH from equation (1) (i.e., β1 
in equation (1)) should capture the effect of changes in net DSH payments on hospital 
provision of uncompensated care for study hospitals overall, holding constant other year, 
hospital, and county specific effects. Unlike equation (1), ownership and net Medicaid 
DSH payment are interacted in equation (2) and, as noted, not-for-profit hospitals are the 
reference group. The equation (2) allows this study to test study Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2.  Alternatively, the coefficient estimations of netDSH from equation (2) 
(i.e., δ1 in the equation (2)) should capture the effect of changes in net DSH payments on 
not-for-profit hospital provision of uncompensated care specifically. The coefficient signs 
are expected to be positive and significant because NFP hospitals may reduce the 
provision of uncompensated care provided to low-income patients in response to 
reductions in Medicaid DSH payment. In addition, as proposed in Hypothesis 2, FP 
hospitals may have smaller reductions in uncompensated care provision relative to NFP 
hospitals (Banks et al., 1997; Hoerger, 1991). The total effects of netDSH payment for 
for-profit hospitals are expected to be significantly different from zero but smaller than 
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the coefficient estimates of net DSH payment for not-for-profit hospitals. Specifically, 
this study expects the sum of the coefficient estimates δ1 and δ5 in equation (2) are less 
than δ1, and both are expected to be significantly different from zero.  
 Given the nature of the unobserved effects and the different model assumptions, 
several statistical alternatives for analyzing panel data are considered, including pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS), random effects (RE), fixed effects (FE) and first-difference 
(FD) estimators. Pooled OLS assumes that the explanatory variables affect each hospital 
randomly and that the error structure does not have a hospital-specific component. An 
alternative analytical technique for panel data is a random effect model that has more 
restrictive assumptions than those of a pooled OLS. Random effect models assume the 
error structure has a hospital-specific component and the error components and that the 
explanatory variables are strictly exogenous (Woodridge, 2002). The pooled OLS and 
random effect models can be compard using the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier 
Test. This test tests the null hypothesis that the error structure does not have a random 
hospital-specific component (Woodridge, 2002).  
 A fixed effect (FE) model, on the other hand, allows for arbitrary correlation 
between the unobserved effect and the observed explanatory variables but does not allow 
estimation of the influence of time-invariant regressors. The FE panel technique 
eliminates the unobserved effect (i.e., αi and τi) that may affect parameter estimates 
through within transformation process. To compare the RE and FE models, Hausman 
tests are often utilized to test the null hypotheses whether or not the RE model yields 
consistent estimates of the parameters given the assumption that the hospital-specific 
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error component and regressors are uncorrelated. Additionally, to compare pooled OLS 
and FE model, F-test are often used to test the null hypotheses from restricted and 
unrestricted models to check whether or not the error component has a fixed effect 
hospital specific component.  
 As with the fixed effect (FE) model, the first-differencing model also eliminates 
the unobserved error component, in this case through first-differencing. FE model 
estimators essentially measure the association between individual-specific deviations of 
regressors from their time-demeaned values and individual-specific deviations of the 
dependent variable from its time-demeaned value over time. The first-differences (FD) 
estimators, on the other hand, measure the association between individual-specific one-
period changes in regressors and individual-specific one-period changes in the dependent 
variable (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). To compare FE and FD models, Wooldridge (2006) 
suggested one could test for serial correction in the idiosyncratic errors, uit . Although 
both FE and FD techniques yield unbiased parameter estimates, when the uit in equation 
(1) or υit  in equation (2), for example, are serially uncorrelated with ui,t-1 or υi,t-1, FE 
estimation is more efficient than FD. If the uit or υit follow a positive serial correction, 
then FD will be more efficient (Woodridge, 2006).  
 Table 8 presents the results from the comparisons of several model specification 
tests. Fixed effect method is used in this study because it yields more consistent and 
efficient estimates than other alternatives. This is the case for both versions of the model 
with uncompensated care costs and percentage of uncompensated care to total operating 
expense as dependent variables.  
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Table 8. Results for Comparisons of Model Specification Tests: Identifies Preferred 
Model for Each Test 
Model 
Comparisons 
Specification Tests Uncompensated care 
costs  (in millions) 
Percent of 
uncompensated care 
costs to total operating 
expense (%) 
OLS vs. FE F-test for no fixed effects FE FE 
OLS v.s. RE Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
multiplier test 
RE RE 
FD v.s. FE Serial correlation tests developed by 
Woolridge 
FE FE 
RE v.s. FE Hausman Test FE FE 
 Preferred Model                   FE FE 
Note:  
OLS: Pooled Ordinal Least Square  
FE: Fixed Effect Model  
FD: First Differencing Model  
 RE: Random Effect Model 
  
 The uncompensated care econometric models presented in this study are 
complicated by four factors: individual hospital heterogeneity, county-level clustering of 
observations, an explanatory variable that may be subject to autoregressive issue and the 
fact that hospital ownership was observed changing during the course of the study thus 
impacting the sample. First, the use of hospital-specific data may result in 
heteroskedasticity. The presence of heteroskedasticity, while not affecting bias or 
consistency in coefficient estimates, influences the efficiency of standard errors. To 
account for unequal error variances between individual hospitals in the uncompensated 
care model, this study uses heteroskedasticity-robust standard error adjustment in the 
fixed effect model. Second, because some of our policy variables measure county-level 
variation in Medicaid program characteristics and demand characteristics, there may exist 
intra-county error correlation that could bias downward the estimated standard errors 
(Davidoff et al., 2000). As such, the estimated covariance matrices of the fixed effect 
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models are also adjusted with the Huber-White correlation to account for the specific 
intra-county effect. Third, the uncompensated care model may take on some 
characteristics of an autoregressive process since the Medicaid DSH payments that a 
hospital received in time t depend upon low-income patient utilizations lagged one or two 
years. The issue of autocorrelation in the models may cause bias in standard errors and 
reduce efficiency (Drukker, 2003; Thorpe & Phelps, 1991; Woodridge, 2002). To 
account for this issue, this study conducted a test for serial correlation in the panel models 
using methods discussed by Wooldridge (2002).
25
  These test results indicate that a 
potential serial correlation issue existed in the model.  
 To the best of our knowledge, there is an alternative model to deal with the 
autocorrelation problem in the fixed effect model. The first step of this approach is to 
estimate the degree of autocorrelation (rho) between the error term in time t and time t-1. 
Given an estimate of rho, one can do a Cochrane-Orcutt transformation, which is one of 
the methods that is used to transform the data for removing autocorrelation components, 
and then do the within transformation to remove the hospital specific fixed-effects as is 
usually done in the fixed effect model (Wooldridge, 2006; Stata manual, 2007: pp. 
423).
26
 However, the disadvantage of this approach is that one loses one year of data in 
the transformation process, and thus, decreases the degrees of freedom. This study will do 
a sensitivity analysis to check if the coefficient estimates regarding the relationship 
between net Medicaid DSH and uncompensated care provision change substantially when 
                                                          
 
25
 This study will use a new Stata commend xtserial, which implements the Wooldridge test for 
serial correlation in panel data (Woolridge, 2002, p.483). 
  
 
26
 This study used Stata SE 10.0 version command xtregar to correct autocorrelation in fixed 
effect models.  
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correcting for this serial correlation. Finally, since some California hospitals experienced 
ownership changes (i.e., hospital closure or ownership conversion) during the study 
years, this study also conducts a sensitivity analysis to check if the results are sensitive to 
the presence of such hospitals. The result section that follows focuses primarily on the 
fixed effect models corrected for heteroskedasticity and intra-county variability.  
Quality of Care Model 
The basic empirical specification for the hospital quality of care model is 
presented in reduced form equations (3).  
  
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7         
jk
it it it it it
it it it t i it
QC netDSH Z M H
FP CNTY DISTRIC Yr
    
     
    
     
                              
where i= an individual hospital; t=year;  j=0 for Medicaid/uninsured and 1 for privately 
insured patients; k=1 to 7 for the 7 distinct PSI measures; and jkitQC represents quality of 
care for Medicaid/ uninsured patients and privately insured j patients, which are 
measured as k patient adverse events, for a hospital i in the year t. netDSHit is net 
Medicaid DSH payment, which is measured as gross Medicaid DSH minus 
intergovernmental transfers of public hospitals; Zit is state or local governmental financial 
support for indigent care; Mit is a vector of market characteristics; Hit is a vector of 
hospital characteristics; Yr represents a vector of year dummy variables; FPit is a dummy 
variable for for-profit hospitals; CNTYit is a dummy variable for county hospitals; 
DISTRICit is a dummy variable for district hospitals; λi is a hospital specific error 
component; and εit is a random error term for the quality of care model. This equation is 
used to examine the third set of hypotheses. 
(3) 
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 Hospital quality of care are measured by six individual patient safety indicators 
(PSIs) and one PSI composite measure separately for Medicaid/uninsured and privately 
insured, with a total of fourteen regressions estimated. PSIs are used to measure patient 
adverse events. Therefore, given the third hypothesis, the coefficient signs of netDSH 
(i.e., γ1) in the PSIs regressions are expected to be negative and significant for both 
Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients, if quality of care is a public good. 
Specifically, if quality of care is public good, when confronted with reductions of 
Medicaid DSH payments, hospitals will reduce the quality of care they provide to both 
Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients so that the incidence of patient adverse 
events may go up. On the other hand, if quality of care is a private good, hospitals may 
reduce their quality of care provided to Medicaid/uninsured patients, but may not change 
or may improve the quality of care provided to privately insured patients. In this case, 
this study would expect a negative and significant sign to netDSH (i.e., γ1) in the PSIs 
regressions for the Medicaid/uninsured patients and a positive and significant or an 
insignificant coefficient for the privately insured patients. 
 As indicates in Tables 9 and 10, this study estimates all quality of care models 
with pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), random effect (RE), fixed effect (FE) and first-
differencing (FD) specification and conducted model specification tests to identify which 
statistical method is preferred. The results are not entirely conclusive for both 
Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured quality of care models. In one case OLS is 
preferred; RE is preferred in other three cases; and FE is preferred in another three cases. 
After comparing several model specification tests from the PSIs regressions, the results  
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Table 9. Results for Comparisons of PSIs Model Specification Tests for 
Medicaid/Uninsured: Identifies Preferred Model for Each Test 
  PSI models for Medicaid/Uninsured  
 Specification Tests PSI02 PSI06 PSI07 PSI09 PSI12 PSI15 PSI 
composite 
OLS: FE F-test for no fixed effects OLS FE FE FE FE FE FE 
OLS: RE Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier test 
OLS RE RE RE RE RE RE 
 FD:FE Serial correlation tests FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
 RE:FE Hausman Test FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
Preferred Model  OLS RE FE RE FE RE FE 
Note: OLS: Pooled Ordinal Least Square  
          FE: Fixed Effect Model  
          FD: First Differencing Model  
          RE: Random Effect Model 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Results for Comparisons of PSIs Model Specification Tests for Privately 
Insured: Identifies Preferred Model for Each Test 
  PSI models for Privately Insured 
 Specification Tests PSI02 PSI06 PSI07 PSI09 PSI12 PSI15 PSI 
composite 
OLS: FE F-test for no fixed effects FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
OLS: RE Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier test 
OLS RE RE RE RE RE RE 
 FD:FE Serial correlation tests FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
 RE:FE Hausman Test RE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
Preferred Model OLS RE FE RE FE RE FE 
Note: OLS: Pooled Ordinal Least Square  
          FE: Fixed Effect Model  
          FD: First Differencing Model  
          RE: Random Effect Model 
 
indicates inconsistent patterns of preferred model specifications for Medicaid/uninsured 
and privately insured PSIs measures. Since random effect specification is superior and 
more efficient than pooled OLS model specification, random effect model appears 
relatively more frequently as the preferred model than FE method given the specification 
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test results. To be consistent, random effect model specification method is selected to 
analyze all quality of care models in this study.  
Quality of care models in this study raise several econometric issues, including 
individual hospital heterogeneity, multiple comparisons among different quality 
equations, and the fact that hospital ownership was observed changing during the course 
of the study thus impacting the sample. First, because this study uses hospital-specific 
data, heterogeneity may be a problem. The presence of heteroskedasticity, while not 
affecting bias or consistency in coefficient estimations, influences the efficiency of 
standard errors. To account for unequal error variances between individual hospitals in 
the quality of care model, this study uses heteroskedasticity-robust standard error 
adjustment in the random effect (RE) model. Second, for quality of care models, there are 
six pairs of individual PSIs regressions with different types of patient adverse events for 
Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients. In order to know whether the effects 
of net Medicaid DSH estimates from different individual PSI regressions are jointly and 
significantly different from zero, a chow test is conducted to deal with this concern. The 
Chow test is an econometric test and is often used in program evaluation to examine 
whether coefficient estimates in multiple linear regressions have an equivalent impact on 
different population subgroups (Chow, 1960; Woodridge, 2006). Six individual PSIs data 
are pooled together and then are analyzed by using random effect models with 
heteroskedasticity robust standard error adjustment.
27
. After that, joint Wald tests are to 
                                                          
 
27
 Since the composite PSI already combined different individual PSIs as one measure, the joint 
test of chow test is test simultaneously significant for other six individual PSIs (i.e., PSI02, PSI06, PSI07, 
PSI09, PSI12, and PSI15) for the net Medicaid DSH variables for Medicaid/uninsured and privately 
insured separately.  
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examine the effect of net Medicaid DSH payments on both Medicaid/uninsured and 
privately insured separately. Finally, since several California hospitals experienced 
ownership changes (i.e., hospital closure or ownership conversion) during the study 
period, a sensitivity analysis is conducted to check if there is any difference resulting 
from including or excluding these hospitals in the analysis. In the result section, this 
study will report results from random effect models for six individual PSIs and one 
composite PSI measure for Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured in separate tables.  
Summary 
This chapter covers the research design, data sources, variable measurements, 
empirical specifications and analytical strategies used in this study. A research design of 
pre and post quasi-experimental with control and treatment groups is used to examine the 
research questions of interest. Unbalanced longitudinal data for California hospitals from 
1996 to 2003 are utilzed to implement the reseach design. For the uncompensated care 
models, this study mainly uses a fixed effect specification adjusted for heteroskedasticity-
robust and intra cluster corrected standard errors. For the quality of care models, this 
study uses random effect models with heteroskedasticity-robust standard error 
adjustments to take into account unobserved hospital specific factors. The findings of this 
study are presented in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, the findings are discussed along with their 
implications, limitations, and applications for the future research. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
 
 
 Chapter 5 discusses study findings after applying research methodologies 
discussed in Chapter 4. Two major sections are presented, one for the uncompensated 
care model and the second for the quality of care model. In each section, results for 
descriptive analysis, regression models and sensitivity analysis will be reported.  
Uncompensated Care Model 
Results of Descriptive Analysis 
 Table 11 provides descriptive data on uncompensated care for two hospital groups 
(DSH hospitals and non-DSH hospitals) both as a whole and by ownership types. DSH 
hospitals are defined as those hospitals that received Medicaid DSH payments. The 2003 
data are adjusted for inflation using the 1996 consumer price index for medical care. 
Looking first at DSH and non-DSH hospitals’ overall annual uncompensated care costs 
and also the percent of uncompensated care costs to total operating expenses, DSH 
hospitals provide about twice the uncompensated care as measured by costs as compared 
to non-DSH hospitals. For the DSH hospitals overall, annual costs increase 19.8% to 
$4.43 million in 2003 and the percent of expense devoted to uncompensated care also 
increases from 4.64% to 4.88% of total hospital operating expenses. Non-DSH hospitals 
overall, on the other hand, increase annual uncompensated care costs from $1.71 million 
in 1996 to $2.35 million in 2003, but slightly decrease the percent of total hospital 
expense devoted to uncompensated costs by 2003. 
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Table 11. Average Uncompensated Care Expenses per Hospital by Hospital DSH and 
Ownership Types  
 Annual Uncompensated Care Costs       
(in million) 
a 
 
 
% of Uncompensated Care to Total 
Operating Expenses 
Hospital Category 1996 
($) 
2003 
($) 
% Change  1996  
(%) 
2003  
(%) 
Difference 
in % 
DSH Hospitals 
c
    
  
  
 
   Overall  $3.69 $4.43 19.8%  4.64% 4.88% +0.24 
   Not-for-profit hospital 5.00 6.18 23.8%  4.88 5.11 +0.23 
   For-profit hospital 0.85 1.82 113.7%  3.34 4.61 +1.27 
   District hospitals 0.52 0.58 11.7%  5.59 4.18 -1.41 
   County hospitals 5.71 8.95 56.8%  4.96 5.49 +0.53 
Non-DSH Hospitals   
  
  
 
   Overall  $1.71 $2.35 37.0%  2.96 2.87 -0.10 
   Not-for-Profit hospital 2.08 2.78 33.9%  2.63 2.59 -0.03 
   For-Profit Hospital 0.90 1.38 53.2%  2.71 3.04 +0.33 
   District Hospital 1.72 1.98 14.8%  4.56 3.83 -0.73 
   County Hospital 
b
 1.94 -   8.89 -  
 
Note:  
       
 
a
  All dollar values presented here are adjusted for inflation to 1996 dollars by the consumer price index for 
medical care. 
 
b
  Only two study county hospitals were non-DSH hospitals in 1996; And, all study county hospitals were 
DSH hospitals in 2003.  
c    
DSH hospitals are defined as those hospitals that received Medicaid DSH payments. In the study sample, 
the total number of DSH hospitals in 1996 is 79 and 104 in 2003; the total number of non-DSH hospitals 
in 1996 is 261 and 200 in 2003. 
 
 Table 11 also reports changes in uncompensated care for study hospitals with 
different ownership types between 1996 and 2003. These data suggest that not-for-profit 
and county hospitals for the DSH and non-DSH categories generally provide higher 
amount of uncompensated care as measured by costs than other types of hospitals. 
Moreover, DSH and non-DSH district hospitals have higher percent of uncompensated 
care costs to total operating expenses than other hospital types in 1996, though this 
percent declines for these hospitals by 2003. In general, both DSH and non-DSH for-
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profit hospitals have a growth in the amount of uncompensated care as measured by costs 
and by the percent of uncompensated care costs to total operating expenses.  
 Table 12 provides descriptive statistics on key variables in the analysis. These 
data represented means and standard deviation across multiple years from 1996 to 2003 
for two hospital groups (i.e., DSH hospitals and non-DSH hospitals). The means for 
uncompensated care costs per year and percent of uncompensated care costs to total 
operating expenses are consistent with the data presented in Table 12. The amount of 
several variables (i.e., uncompensated care costs, net Medicaid DSH payment, Medicare 
DSH payments and State and local governmental financial subsidies) reflects real dollar 
amounts in millions that hospitals received in each year, adjusted for inflation to 1996 
dollar using the consumer price index for medical care. In relation to the net Medicaid 
DSH payment measures, the mean and standard deviation of this variable show a wide 
range of values. Hospitals that receive higher amount of Medicaid DSH payments are 
more often large safety net and teaching hospitals.  
Results of Fixed Effect Models 
 Table 13 reports the sets of fixed effect results for uncompensated care models. 
Corresponding to the econometric models discussed in Chapter 4, this study reports 
model (1) without ownership and net Medicaid DSH interaction variables and model (2) 
that includes ownership and net Medicaid DSH payment interactions. Both the analysis 
of the uncompensated care costs in millions and the percent of uncompensated care costs 
to total operating expenses are presented. The coefficient estimates for all explanatory 
variables from the model (2) are consistent with the coefficient estimates from the 
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Table 12. Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables: All hospitals and Al Study Years 
  DSH  
Hospitals  
 Non-DSH 
Hospitals 
 Overall 
Hospitals 
  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Uncompensated Care Provision         
 Uncompensated care costs per year (in 
millions) 
a 4.39 6.23  1.92 2.45  2.63 4.08 
 Percent of uncompensated care costs to total 
operating expense (%) 
5.06 3.20  2.90 2.19  3.52 2.70 
Governmental Financial Supports         
 Net Medicaid DSH payment  (in millions) 
a
 4.97 16.49  0.00 0.00  1.43 9.12 
 Medicare DSH payments (in millions) 
a
 3.42 3.65  1.74 2.82  1.97 12.65 
 State and local governmental financial 
subsidies  (in millions) 
a
 
6.60 22.95  0.10 0.41  2.22 3.17 
Market Characteristics (at county level)         
 Ratio of Medicaid eligibles to total population  17.81 5.67  15.93 5.72  16.47 5.77 
 
Ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to 
total population 
7.42 5.24  5.87 5.10  6.32 5.19 
 
Ratio of private HMO enrollees to total 
population at MSA level 
42.65 18.26  41.09 20.09  41.53 19.59 
 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.23 0.22  0.31 0.26  0.29 0.25 
 Presence of public hospitals in county (%) 20.60 22.80  17.82 19.91  18.62 20.82 
 Presence of teaching hospitals in county (%) 31.73 20.05  27.08 22.15  28.42 21.66 
 Median household income (in 1000s) 36.51 7.28  38.17 7.92  37.69 7.78 
 Unemployment rate (%) 7.11 3.68  6.60 3.30  6.75 3.42 
 Poverty rate (%) 1.95 5.87  2.35 6.07  2.24 6.01 
Hospital Characteristics         
 Full time and part time RN to staffed bed 1.20 0.58  1.38 0.63  1.33 0.62 
 Log of the number of hospital staffed beds 5.04 0.82  4.90 0.86  4.94 0.85 
 Proportion system affiliated 0.56 0.50  0.67 0.47  0.64 0.48 
 Proportion major teaching hospital  0.09 0.28  0.04 0.19  0.05 0.22 
 Proportion minor teaching hospital  0.20 0.40  0.07 0.25  0.11 0.31 
 Hospital Medicare share (%) 35.05 16.47  46.05 13.84  42.89 15.46 
 Proportion not-for-profit hospital 0.36 0.48  0.61 0.49  0.54 0.50 
 Proportion for-profit hospital 0.30 0.46  0.26 0.44  0.27 0.44 
 Proportion county hospital 0.22 0.41  0.00 0.07  0.07 0.25 
 Proportion district hospital 0.12 0.32  0.13 0.34  0.13 0.33 
          
 N ( Study Hospital Observations, 1996-2003 )  732   1815   2547  
          
Note:          
DSH hospitals are defined as those hospitals that received Medicaid DSH payments.  
 
a
 All dollar values presented here are adjusted for inflation to 1996 dollars by the consumer price index for 
medical care. 
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Table 13. Fixed Effect Regression Models 
 Uncompensated care 
costs  (in millions) 
 Percent of 
uncompensated care costs 
to total operating 
expenses (%) 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
Variables without 
ownership 
interactions 
with  
ownership 
interactions 
 without 
ownership 
interactions 
with  
ownership 
interactions 
Net Medicaid DSH payment  (in millions) 0.0294** 0.0343*  0.0120*** 0.0223*** 
(0.0131) (0.0205)  (0.0034) (0.0073) 
Medicare DSH payments (in millions) 0.1718*** 0.1714***  0.0542 0.0502 
 (0.0299) (0.0290)  (0.0394) (0.0375) 
State and local governmental supports  (in 
millions) 
0.0388 0.0388  -0.0053 -0.0050 
(0.0606) (0.0605)  (0.0184) (0.0182) 
Ratio of Medicaid eligibles to total population -0.0523** -0.0525**  0.0211 0.0214 
(0.0235) (0.0230)  (0.0462) (0.0468) 
Ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to 
total population 
0.0021 0.0025  0.0035 0.0036 
(0.0180) (0.0176)  (0.0271) (0.0263) 
HMO penetration at MSA level (%)  -0.0105 -0.0106  -0.0029 -0.0031 
(0.0074) (0.0074)  (0.0111) (0.0110) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index -0.4411 -0.4542  -1.3153* -1.3293* 
(0.6642) (0.6631)  (0.6944) (0.6953) 
Presence of public hospitals in county (%) 0.0039 0.0040  -0.0096 -0.0095 
 (0.0101) (0.0101)  (0.0092) (0.0091) 
Presence of teaching hospitals in county (%) -0.0041 -0.0041  0.0066 0.0069 
 (0.0078) (0.0078)  (0.0098) (0.0098) 
Median household income (in 1000s) 0.1059 0.1061  0.0474 0.0485 
 (0.0642) (0.0639)  (0.0354) (0.0354) 
Unemployment rate (%) 0.1955 0.1951  -0.0551 -0.0566 
 (0.1485) (0.1498)  (0.0866) (0.0872) 
Poverty rate (%) 0.0095 0.0094  -0.0019 -0.0013 
 (0.0170) (0.0171)  (0.0208) (0.0211) 
Full time and part time RN to bed 0.2946*** 0.2933***  0.1538 0.1487 
 (0.1083) (0.1085)  (0.0938) (0.0941) 
Log of the number of hospital staff beds 0.6589*** 0.6647***  -0.0594 -0.0691 
 (0.1778) (0.1790)  (0.3542) (0.3550) 
System affiliated -0.0374 -0.0391  -0.3206** -0.3351** 
 (0.0997) (0.0984)  (0.1465) (0.1477) 
Major teaching hospital  4.2134** 4.2187**  1.1483 1.1667 
 (1.7287) (1.7166)  (0.7203) (0.7193) 
Minor teaching hospital  0.0327 0.0299  0.0276 0.0113 
 (0.4372) (0.4466)  (0.3255) (0.3190) 
Hospital Medicare share (%) 0.0044 0.0044  0.0003 0.0001 
 (0.0062) (0.0063)  (0.0062) (0.0062) 
Hospital Medicare share (%) at post BBA 
period 
-0.0090 -0.0089  -0.0007 -0.0005 
(0.0104) (0.0106)  (0.0075) (0.0076) 
Interaction term of for-profit hospital and net 
Medicaid DSH 
 -0.0103   0.0397 
 (0.0360)   (0.0311) 
Interaction term of county hospital and net 
Medicaid DSH 
 -0.0055   -0.0125 
 (0.0277)   (0.0094) 
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Table 13 (continued) 
 Uncompensated care 
costs  (in millions) 
 Percent of 
uncompensated care costs 
to total operating 
expenses (%) 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
Variables without 
ownership 
interactions 
with  
ownership 
interactions 
 without 
ownership 
interactions 
with  
ownership 
interactions 
Interaction term of district hospital and net 
Medicaid DSH 
 -0.8393***   -1.0127 
 (0.2691)   (0.9219) 
Year 1997 0.2643 0.2634  -0.0357 -0.0341 
 (0.3742) (0.3748)  (0.3697) (0.3749) 
Year 1998 0.8083 0.8046  0.1259 0.1108 
 (0.7211) (0.7201)  (0.5550) (0.5558) 
Year 1999 0.8793 0.8742  0.0882 0.0707 
 (0.8254) (0.8266)  (0.5730) (0.5747) 
Year 2000 1.2279 1.2260  0.1889 0.1733 
 (0.8278) (0.8280)  (0.5947) (0.5999) 
Year 2001 1.5222* 1.5240*  0.1768 0.1693 
 (0.8996) (0.9022)  (0.5810) (0.5842) 
Year 2002 1.4464* 1.4446*  0.1360 0.1280 
 (0.8636) (0.8619)  (0.5604) (0.5605) 
Year 2003 1.5873* 1.5868*  0.3051 0.3080 
 (0.8880) (0.8856)  (0.5577) (0.5577) 
Constant -6.4446 -6.4641  2.2244 2.2482 
 (4.2092) (4.2198)  (2.4478) (2.4431) 
      
Observations  2540 2540  2540 2540 
R-square 0.0876 0.0879  0.0186 0.0200 
Number of Hospital 376 376  376 376 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<=0.01, ** p<=0.05, * p<=0.10      
  
model (1). Given the study hypotheses discussed in Chapter 3 and the model specification 
discussed in Chapter 4, the discussion below will focus on the fixed effect models that 
include ownership interaction variables, model (2), in the Table 13.  
 The analysis of the explanatory variables associated with uncompensated care is 
as follows. Looking first at the net Medicaid DSH payment variable which reflects the 
impact of Medicaid DSH payments upon the behavior of not-for-profit hospitals, this 
study finds a positive and marginally significant association (p=0.10) between net 
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Medicaid DSH payment and uncompensated care costs and a positive and highly 
significant association (p<0.01) between net Medicaid DSH payment and the percent of 
uncompensated care costs to total operating expenses. This result suggests that not-for-
profit hospitals may reduce their uncompensated care provision given the reductions of 
Medicaid DSH payment they encountered during study years after controlling for 
ownership and net Medicaid DSH payment interactions with not-for-profit hospital as 
reference group. Other things being equal, the marginal effect of the net Medicaid DSH 
payment indicates that an increase of one million dollars (in 1996 dollars) increases 
uncompensated care costs by 0.0343 million dollars, and increases the percent of 
uncompensated costs to total operating expenses in not-for-profit hospitals by 0.0223 
percentage points in the not-for-profit hospitals. The findings for net Medicaid DSH 
payments support the hypothesis H1 in this study.  
 In terms of other governmental financial subsidies, the positive coefficient for the 
Medicare DSH payments (p<0.01) in the analysis of uncompensated care costs suggests 
that hospitals provide more uncompensated care in response to an increase in Medicare 
DSH payments during the study period. On the other hand, the results do not show a 
significant relation between Medicare DSH payments and the percentage of 
uncompensated care costs to total operating expenses. With respect to market 
characteristics, the results suggest that expanding the ratio of Medicaid eligibles to total 
population in a market would significantly reduce hospital uncompensated care costs 
(p<0.05), but the expansion of the ratio of Medicaid eligibles to total population does not 
have a significant effect on the percent of uncompensated care costs to total operating 
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expenses. Contrary to expectations, the findings indicate that hospitals located in more 
competitive markets had a higher percent of operating costs devoted to uncompensated 
care (p<0.1). This result reflects the descriptive result presented in the Table 12 that DSH 
hospitals, which are hospitals that provided a higher amount of uncompensated care, are 
often located in markets with relatively lower market concentration (and thus higher 
hospital competition) than non-DSH hospitals.  
 With respect to other hospital characteristics associated with the provision of 
uncompensated care, the results indicate that hospitals that have more capacity (i.e., 
higher registered nurse to bed ratio, large bed size) would provide more uncompensated 
care costs (p<0.01) but that capacity had no effect on the percent of uncompensated care 
costs to total operating expenses. The result of the effect of hospital bed size on the 
uncompensated care provision is consistent with Bazzoli et al. (2006). Hospital system 
affiliation leads to lower uncompensated care costs as a percent of total operating 
expenses (p<0.05) but no significant effect on the hospital uncompensated care costs. 
Hospitals that became major teaching hospitals significantly increased their annual 
uncompensated care costs (p<0.05) but not the percent of uncompensated care costs to 
total operating expenses.  
 Given hypothesis 2 in this study, the coefficient estimate for the total effect of the 
net DSH payment for for-profit hospitals on their uncompensated care costs is 0.024 
(which is equivalent to 0.0343-0.0103) with a standard error equals to 0.0312 and a p-
value equals to 0.446. In addition, the coefficient estimate for the total effect of for-profit 
hospitals on their percent of expenses devoted on uncompensated care is 0.062 (which is 
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equivalent to 0.0223+0.0397) with a standard error equals to 0.026 and a p-value equals 
to 0.024. These results indicate that for-profit hospitals may not evidently change their 
uncompensated care costs when faced with declining DSH payments. Instead, they may 
decrease significantly in the percent of uncompensated care costs to total operating 
expenses in response to a reduction in Medicaid DSH payments. However, compared to 
not-for-profit hospitals, the overall findings for the interaction of for-profit hospitals and 
net Medicaid DSH payment do not support hypothesis H2 that for-profit hospitals make 
smaller cuts in response to Medicaid DSH reductions. The results also indicate that 
compared to not-for-profit hospitals, district hospitals have smaller changes for their 
uncompensated care costs (p<0.01) in response to the reduction of net Medicaid DSH 
payments, but have no differential response when measured by the percent of total 
operating expenses devoted in uncompensated care.  
 Additionally, the findings for annual year dummy variables indicate that, 
compared to the provision of uncompensated care in 1996, hospitals significantly 
increase uncompensated care costs in 2001, 2002 and 2003 (p<0.1) but not the percent of 
uncompensated care costs to total operating expenses.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
 Table 14 presents the results of several sensitivity analyses and compared the 
coefficient estimates of the effect of Medicaid DSH payment on hospital provision of 
uncompensated care with the original fixed effect model. Model (1) reports the 
coefficient estimates of the net Medicaid DSH payment in the original fixed effect 
models as reported in Table 14. Model (2) reports the coefficient estimates of net  
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Table 14. Sensitivity Analysis for Alternative Model Specifications in Uncompensated Care 
Models 
 Uncompensated care costs  (in millions)  Percent of uncompensated care costs to total 
operating expense (%) 
Model 
Specifications 
(1) 
a 
(2) 
b 
(3) 
c 
(4) 
d 
 (1) 
a 
(2) 
b 
(3) 
c 
(4) 
d 
Net Medicaid 
DSH payment   
(in millions) 
0.0343* 0.0337 0.0327*   0.0223*** 0.0193*** 0.0130  
(0.0131) (0.0206) (0.018)   (0.0073) (0.0056) (0.0179)  
Gross 
Medicaid 
DSH payment  
 (in millions) 
   0.0355*     0.0203**
* 
   (0.0178)     (0.0059) 
Gross DSH 
Intergovernm
ental Transfer  
(in millions) 
  -0.0061     -0.0083 
   (0.0210)     (0.0071) 
          
R-square 0.0879 0.0882 0.0539 0.0928  0.0200 0.0165 0.0217 0.0199 
N  2540 2335 2164 2540  2540 2335 2164 2540 
 
Note:  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
a  
Model (1) is the original fixed effect model using net Medicaid DSH as dependent variable. 
b 
Model (2) is model (1) excluding hospitals that experienced ownership changes or closure during study period. 
c 
Model (3) is fixed effect model adjusting autocorrelation and used net Medicaid DSH as dependent variable.   
d 
Model (4) is fixed effect model using gross Medicaid DSH and gross DSH intergovernmental transfer variable. 
All models were estimated using Stata software package SE 10.0 version. 
*** p<=0.01, ** p<=0.05, * p<=0.1 
 
Medicaid DSH payment from a fixed effect model like that of Model (1) but excluding 
hospitals that experienced ownership conversion or closure during the study years. Model 
(3) reports the coefficient estimates of net Medicaid DSH payment of the fixed effect 
model with the autocorrelation adjustment as discussed in Chapter 4. Model (4) reports 
the coefficient estimates of gross Medicaid DSH payment and gross DSH 
intergovernmental transfer, which are used to construct net Medicaid DSH payment in 
the fixed effect models.  
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 Looking first at the analysis of uncompensated care costs, the coefficient 
estimates do not change substantially across different alternative model specifications. 
The coefficient estimates of net Medicaid DSH payment in Model (1) is 0.0343 (p=0.10), 
0.0337 in Model (2), and 0.0327 (p<0.1) in Model (3). The coefficient estimates of gross 
Medicaid DSH payment is 0.0355 (p<0.1) and gross DSH intergovernmental transfer is -
0.0061. The number of hospital year observations in Model (1) and Model (4) is 2,540. 
After excluding hospital observations that experienced ownership changes during study 
years, the sample size falls to 2,335 for Model (2). In Model (3), the number of 
observations from the fixed effect model with autocorrelation adjustments, as described 
in the Chapter 4, dropped from 2,540 to 2,164. Smaller sample sizes obviously reduce the 
degrees of freedom and make it more difficult to find significant results. The value of R 
square for the different alternative model specifications is also reported in Table 14. 
Likewise, as one can see the results of these sensitivity analyses for the percent of 
uncompensated care costs to total operating expenses are similar to the results for the 
uncompensated care costs.  
Quality of Care Model 
Results of Descriptive Analysis 
 Table 15 reports the total number of Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured 
patient discharges at risk when constructing the selected PSIs from the study hospitals 
during the study period from 1996 to 2003. The total number of patients at risk ranges 
from about 0.72 to 3.1 million. Table 15 also presents the total number of study hospital-
year observations for each PSI measure included in this study.  
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Table 15. Study Sample of Risk-Adjusted Patient Safety Indicators and Study Hospitals 
 All Study Hospitals 
Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) 
Total Number of 
Patient discharges at 
Risk, 1996-2003  
 Total Study Hospital-
Year Observation, 
1996-2003 
PSI Medicaid/Uninsured    
 PSI 02: Death in low mortality DRGs 2,363,792  2,294 
 PSI 06: Iatrogenic pneumothorax 2,480,894  2,460 
 PSI 07: Selected infections due to medical care 3,097,461  2,432 
 PSI 09: Postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma 728,878  2,207 
 PSI 12: Postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep 
vein thrombosis  
732,945  2,208 
 PSI 15: Accidental puncture or laceration 2,575,934  2,460 
     
PSI Privately Insured    
 PSI 02: Death in low mortality DRGs 2,225,225  2,272 
 PSI 06: Iatrogenic pneumothorax 2,641,067  2,413 
 PSI 07: Selected infections due to medical care 2,923,431  2,389 
 PSI 09: Postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma 1,311,490  2,203 
 PSI 12: Postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep 
vein thrombosis  
1,317,164  2,215 
 PSI 15: Accidental puncture or laceration 2,763,312  2,426 
     
 
 Table 16 reports descriptive data on each study PSIs for Medicaid/uninsured and 
privately insured for hospitals in two hospital groups (i.e., DSH hospitals and non-DSH 
hospitals). DSH hospitals are defined as those hospitals that received Medicaid DSH 
payments. The individual PSIs (i.e., PSI02, PSI06, PSI07, PSI09, PSI12, and PSI15) are 
presented here as percentages for Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured for the 
hospital, while the composite PSI (i.e., PSI Composite score) was a composite score for 
Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured for the hospital. Higher numbers indicate 
higher incidence of patient adverse events, namely worse quality outcome.  
 Similar to Table 12, Table 17 presents descriptive statistics on key variables in the 
analysis for quality of care model. These data represent means and standard deviation for  
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Table 16. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables for Quality of Care Models 
 DSH Hospitals   Non-DSH Hospitals  Overall Hospitals 
Patient Safety Indicators (PSI) 
1996 2003 Difference
a
   1996 2003 Difference
a
   1996 2003 Difference
a
  
PSI- Medicaid/Uninsured            
 PSI 02: Death in low mortality DRGs (%) 0.010 0.018 0.009  0.012 0.017 0.005  0.012 0.018 0.006 
 PSI 06: Iatrogenic pneumothorax (%) 0.045 0.023 -0.022  0.049 0.038 -0.011  0.048 0.033 -0.015 
 PSI 07: Selected infections due to medical care (%) 0.075 0.098 0.024  0.097 0.119 0.022  0.092 0.112 0.020 
 PSI 09: Postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma (%) 0.077 0.208 0.130  0.046 0.177 0.131  0.053 0.187 0.135 
 PSI 12: Postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep vein 
thrombosis (%) 
0.297 0.403 0.106  0.216 0.379 0.163  0.233 0.387 0.154 
 PSI 15: Accidental puncture or laceration (%) 0.166 0.147 -0.019  0.241 0.224 -0.016  0.223 0.198 -0.025 
 PSI Composite score 0.930 0.905 -2.74%
 
 0.973 0.977 0.47%  0.963 0.953 -1.08% 
PSI-Privately Insured            
 PSI 02: Death in low mortality DRGs (%) 0.020 0.015 -0.005  0.028 0.018 -0.009  0.026 0.017 -0.009 
 PSI 06: Iatrogenic pneumothorax (%) 0.079 0.007 -0.071  0.048 0.040 -0.008  0.055 0.029 -0.026 
 PSI 07: Selected infections due to medical care (%) 0.117 0.064 -0.053  0.093 0.100 0.007  0.098 0.088 -0.010 
 PSI 09: Postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma (%) 0.046 0.219 0.173  0.062 0.215 0.153  0.059 0.216 0.157 
 PSI 12: Postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep vein 
thrombosis (%) 
0.454 0.558 0.103  0.237 0.299 0.063  0.280 0.377 0.097 
 PSI 15: Accidental puncture or laceration (%) 0.338 0.260 -0.078  0.409 0.469 0.059  0.394 0.402 0.008 
 PSI Composite score 1.061 0.971 -8.49%  1.067 1.068 0.05%  1.066 1.036 -2.79% 
             
 
Note:  
           
a 
 For PSI02-PSI15, difference presented here is the difference in %; for PSI composite score, difference presented here is percentage change.  
 
 
 
107 
 
 
 
Table 17. Descriptive Statistics of Study Explanatory Variables for Quality of Care 
Models 
Explanatory Variables 
DSH  
Hospital 
 
Non-DSH 
Hospital 
 
 
Overall  
Hospital 
  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Governmental Financial Supports         
 Net Medicaid DSH payment  (in millions) 
a 
4.97 16.49  0.00 0.00  1.43 9.12 
 Medicare DSH payments (in millions) 
a 
3.42 3.65  1.74 2.82  1.97 12.65 
 State and local governmental supports  (in 
millions) 
a
 
6.60 22.95  0.10 0.41  2.22 3.17 
Market Characteristics (at county level)         
 Ratio of Medicaid eligibles to total 
population 
17.81 5.67  15.93 5.72  16.47 5.77 
 Ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to 
total population 
7.42 5.24  5.87 5.10  6.32 5.19 
 HMO penetration (%) at MSA level 42.65 18.26  41.09 20.09  41.53 19.59 
 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.23 0.22  0.31 0.26  0.29 0.25 
 Presence of for-profit hospitals in county (%) 0.18 0.15  0.17 0.17  0.17 0.16 
 Median household income (in 1000s) 36.51 7.28  38.17 7.92  37.69 7.78 
 Unemployment rate (%) 7.11 3.68  6.60 3.30  6.75 3.42 
 Poverty rate (%) 1.95 5.87  2.35 6.07  2.24 6.01 
Hospital Characteristics         
 Full time and part time RN to bed 1.20 0.58  1.38 0.63  1.33 0.62 
 Log of the number of hospital staff beds 5.04 0.82  4.90 0.86  4.94 0.85 
 Proportion system affiliated 0.56 0.50  0.67 0.47  0.64 0.48 
 Proportion major teaching hospital  0.09 0.28  0.04 0.19  0.05 0.22 
 Proportion minor teaching hospital  0.20 0.40  0.07 0.25  0.11 0.31 
 Hospital Medicare share (%) 35.05 16.47  46.05 13.84  42.89 15.46 
 Proportion hospitals located at urban area  0.90 0.30  0.88 0.33  0.88 0.32 
 Proportion hospitals that provide high-tech 
services 
0.25 0.44  0.28 0.45  0.27 0.44 
 Hospital all payer casemix index 0.94 0.22  1.06 0.28  1.03 0.27 
 Proportion not-for-profit hospital 0.36 0.48  0.61 0.49  0.54 0.50 
 Proportion for-profit hospital 0.30 0.46  0.26 0.44  0.27 0.44 
 Proportion county hospital 0.22 0.41  0.00 0.07  0.07 0.25 
 Proportion district hospital 0.12 0.32  0.13 0.34  0.13 0.33 
Note:          
DSH hospitals are defined as those hospitals that received Medicaid DSH payments.  
a  
 All dollar values presented here are adjusted for inflation to 1996 dollars by the consumer price index for 
medical care. 
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multiple years from 1996 to 2003 for two hospital groups (i.e., DSH hospital and non-
DSH hospital). The values of several variables (i.e., uncompensated care costs, net 
Medicaid DSH payment, Medicare DSH payments and State and local governmental 
financial subsidies) reflects real dollar amounts in millions that hospitals received in each 
year, adjusted for inflation to 1996 dollars using the consumer price index for medical 
care. 
Results of Random Effect Models 
 Tables 18 and 19 present the results of random effects models for the six PSIs and 
one PSI composite measure for Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients. To 
recap the theoretical hypotheses discussed in Chapter 3, this study expects that reductions 
in Medicaid DSH payment could result in a decrease in hospital quality of care for 
Medicaid/uninsured patients. If quality of care is public good, there will be a similar 
decrease in quality of care for privately insured patients. On the other hand, if quality of 
care is private good, this study expects that reductions in Medicaid DSH payment may 
result in an improvement or in no change in the quality of care for privately insured 
patients. Given the primary interests of this study and the hypotheses discussed 
previously, the results in Tables 18 and 19 should be reviewed simultaneously.  
 Overall, the results indicate a negative association between net Medicaid DSH 
payments and individual and composite PSIs for Medicaid/uninsured patients and a 
mixed effect of net Medicaid DSH payments for privately insured patients. Looking first 
at the estimated impact of net Medicaid DSH payments on the quality of care for 
Medicaid/uninsured patients, the findings while consistently negative are not particularly 
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Table 18. Random Effect Model Results for PSIs Measures for Medicaid/Uninsured 
  Medicaid/ Uninsured Patients 
VARIABLES 
 
PSI 
Composite 
measure 
 
PSI 02 
Death in 
low 
mortality 
DRGs 
 
PSI 06 
Iatrogenic 
pneumothorax 
 
PSI 07 
Selected 
infections 
due to 
medical 
care 
 
PSI 09 
Postoperative 
hemorrhage 
or hematoma 
 
PSI 12 
Postoperative 
pulmonary 
embolism or 
deep vein 
thrombosis 
 
 
PSI 15 
Accidental 
puncture 
or 
laceration 
        
Net Medicaid DSH payment  (in millions) -0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0002* -0.0005* -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0005* 
 (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0003) 
Medicare DSH payments (in millions) 0.0011 -0.0000 0.0004 -0.0017 0.0034 -0.0005 -0.0007 
 (0.0026) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0049) (0.0028) 
State and local governmental supports  (in millions) -0.0021*** -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0010*** -0.0006 -0.0011* -0.0008** 
 (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0003) 
Ratio of Medicaid eligibles to total population -0.0008 0.0017 -0.0006 0.0029 -0.0028 -0.0017 -0.0026 
 (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0056) (0.0033) 
Ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to total 
population 
-0.0011 -0.0011* -0.0004 -0.0028* 0.0007 0.0008 -0.0004 
(0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0023) 
HMO penetration at MSA level (%)  -0.0009* 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0009 0.0022* -0.0020** 
 (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0008) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.0741** -0.0257* -0.0022 0.0777* -0.1229** -0.0962 0.0678 
 (0.0307) (0.0147) (0.0185) (0.0415) (0.0555) (0.0869) (0.0594) 
Presence of for-profit hospitals in county (%) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0014** 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0006) 
Median household income (in 1000s) 0.0003 0.0012 0.0001 0.0009 0.0010 -0.0032 0.0019 
 (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0032) (0.0024) 
Unemployment rate (%) -0.0007 0.0010 0.0004 -0.0015 0.0024 -0.0046 0.0022 
 (0.0025) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0048) (0.0061) (0.0047) 
Poverty rate (%) -0.0038** -0.0014* -0.0004 -0.0018 -0.0046* 0.0069 -0.0061* 
 (0.0018) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0044) (0.0031) 
Hospital located in the urban area 0.0111 -0.0172 0.0100 -0.0039 -0.0141 -0.1064* -0.0030 
 (0.0277) (0.0115) (0.0237) (0.0310) (0.0512) (0.0567) (0.0493) 
Full time and part time RN to hospital staffed beds -0.0097 -0.0020 0.0010 0.0024 -0.0228* 0.0359 0.0334** 
 (0.0078) (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0080) (0.0132) (0.0260) (0.0146) 
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Table 18 (continued) 
  Medicaid/ Uninsured Patients 
VARIABLES 
 
PSI 
Composite 
measure 
 
PSI 02 
Death in 
low 
mortality 
DRGs 
 
PSI 06 
Iatrogenic 
pneumothorax 
 
PSI 07 
Selected 
infections 
due to 
medical 
care 
 
 
PSI 09 
Postoperative 
hemorrhage 
or hematoma 
 
PSI 12 
Postoperative 
pulmonary 
embolism or 
deep vein 
thrombosis 
 
PSI 15 
Accidental 
puncture 
or 
laceration 
        
Log of the number of hospital staffed beds 0.0013 -0.0026 0.0010 0.0184* 0.0032 0.0820*** 0.0265 
 (0.0096) (0.0045) (0.0076) (0.0104) (0.0200) (0.0269) (0.0175) 
System affiliated 0.0100 -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0117 0.0264 0.0081 0.0289* 
 (0.0108) (0.0061) (0.0081) (0.0100) (0.0204) (0.0368) (0.0172) 
Major teaching hospital  0.2730*** 0.0089 0.0232** 0.1057*** 0.0610* 0.1842*** 0.0864** 
 (0.0507) (0.0083) (0.0112) (0.0279) (0.0343) (0.0561) (0.0342) 
Minor teaching hospital  0.0084 0.0074 0.0012 0.0143 -0.0148 0.0261 0.0237 
 (0.0178) (0.0071) (0.0073) (0.0148) (0.0197) (0.0335) (0.0269) 
Provide high-tech services -0.0093 -0.0016 0.0059 -0.0195 -0.0327* -0.0409 0.0194 
 (0.0123) (0.0063) (0.0059) (0.0129) (0.0176) (0.0316) (0.0179) 
Hospital all payer casemix index 0.0960*** 0.0360*** 0.0075 0.1046*** 0.0340 0.1006** 0.0407 
 (0.0183) (0.0131) (0.0102) (0.0259) (0.0384) (0.0499) (0.0290) 
Hospital Medicare share (%) -0.0005 -0.0004*** 0.0003 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0006 0.0000 
 (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Hospital Medicare share (%) at post BBA period 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0014 -0.0009 -0.0006 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0012) 
For-profit hospital 0.0142 0.0034 0.0136 0.0124 -0.0220 0.0321 0.0177 
 (0.0131) (0.0073) (0.0105) (0.0144) (0.0217) (0.0416) (0.0214) 
County Hospital -0.0850*** -0.0050 0.0003 0.0222 -0.0108 -0.0679 -0.0515 
 (0.0295) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0318) (0.0382) (0.0554) (0.0333) 
District Hospital -0.0135 0.0060 0.0019 -0.0040 0.0229 -0.0240 -0.0088 
 (0.0168) (0.0106) (0.0185) (0.0143) (0.0427) (0.0605) (0.0332) 
Year 1997 -0.0568* -0.0217 -0.0021 -0.0282 0.0518 0.1345* -0.0969 
 (0.0319) (0.0145) (0.0228) (0.0337) (0.0465) (0.0719) (0.0600) 
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Table 18 (continued) 
  Medicaid/ Uninsured Patients 
VARIABLES 
 
PSI 
Composite 
measure 
 
PSI 02 
Death in 
low 
mortality 
DRGs 
 
PSI 06 
Iatrogenic 
pneumothorax 
 
PSI 07 
Selected 
infections 
due to 
medical 
care 
 
PSI 09 
Postoperative 
hemorrhage 
or hematoma 
 
PSI 12 
Postoperative 
pulmonary 
embolism or 
deep vein 
thrombosis 
 
 
PSI 15 
Accidental 
puncture 
or 
laceration 
        
Year 1998 -0.0613 -0.0135 0.0008 -0.0123 0.1160* 0.1822* -0.0860 
 (0.0395) (0.0221) (0.0250) (0.0410) (0.0675) (0.0961) (0.0654) 
Year 1999 -0.0619 -0.0283 -0.0008 -0.0176 0.1484** 0.1842* -0.0544 
 (0.0388) (0.0198) (0.0249) (0.0400) (0.0669) (0.0978) (0.0652) 
Year 2000 -0.0738* -0.0286 0.0083 -0.0188 0.1288* 0.2391** -0.0680 
 (0.0391) (0.0201) (0.0262) (0.0430) (0.0701) (0.1066) (0.0650) 
Year 2001 -0.1043*** -0.0190 -0.0207 -0.0341 0.0898 0.2328** -0.0944 
 (0.0391) (0.0192) (0.0252) (0.0410) (0.0679) (0.1021) (0.0653) 
Year 2002 -0.0774** -0.0211 -0.0015 0.0059 0.1283* 0.2957*** -0.0591 
 (0.0391) (0.0179) (0.0254) (0.0423) (0.0743) (0.1058) (0.0688) 
Year 2003 -0.0833** -0.0283 -0.0088 -0.0044 0.1304* 0.2619** -0.0980 
 (0.0391) (0.0176) (0.0254) (0.0388) (0.0689) (0.1028) (0.0651) 
Constant 0.9581*** -0.0397 0.0267 -0.2001* 0.1648 -0.2023 0.0953 
 (0.0984) (0.0510) (0.0645) (0.1071) (0.1556) (0.2358) (0.1796) 
        
Observations 2418 2291 2457 2429 2204 2205 2457 
Number of Hospitals 363 348 367 363 338 338 367 
Robust standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<=0.01, ** p<=0.05, * p<=0.1        
PSI indicates patient safety indicator.        
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Table 19. Random Effect Model Results for PSIs Measures for Privately Insured 
  Privately Insured Patients 
VARIABLES  
PSI 
Composite 
measure 
 
PSI 02 
Death in 
low 
mortality 
DRGs 
 
PSI 06 
Iatrogenic 
pneumothorax 
 
PSI 07 
Selected 
infections 
due to 
medical 
care 
 
PSI 09 
Postoperative 
hemorrhage 
or hematoma 
 
PSI 12 
Postoperative 
pulmonary 
embolism or 
deep vein 
thrombosis 
 
PSI 15 
Accidental 
puncture or 
laceration 
        
Net Medicaid DSH payment  (in millions) -0.0001 -0.0007* 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0010** -0.0042* -0.0004 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0023) (0.0005) 
Medicare DSH payments (in millions) 0.0012 0.0005 -0.0004 0.0002 0.0030 0.0021 -0.0020 
 (0.0035) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0027) (0.0050) (0.0040) 
State and local governmental supports  (in millions) -0.0007 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0012** -0.0022 -0.0012* 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0007) 
Ratio of Medicaid eligibles to total population -0.0004 0.0018 -0.0007 0.0027 -0.0047 0.0076 -0.0036 
 (0.0023) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0037) (0.0048) (0.0048) 
Ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to total 
population 
-0.0046*** 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0023** -0.0037 -0.0025 -0.0054** 
(0.0017) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0026) 
HMO penetration at MSA level (%)  -0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0012 0.0016 -0.0004 
 (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.0127 0.0321 -0.0192 -0.0246 -0.0670 -0.1046 -0.0260 
 (0.0386) (0.0317) (0.0191) (0.0222) (0.0578) (0.0713) (0.0820) 
Presence of for-profit hospitals in county (%) -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0005 -0.0009 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
Median household income (in 1000s) 0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0009 -0.0003 0.0027 0.0067** 
 (0.0018) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0029) 
Unemployment rate (%) 0.0027 -0.0032** 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0082 -0.0079 0.0162** 
 (0.0034) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0074) 
Poverty level (%) -0.0058** -0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0042** -0.0001 0.0068 -0.0100*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0052) (0.0037) 
Hospital located in the urban area -0.0021 0.0110 -0.0230 -0.0059 -0.0304 -0.0715 -0.0694 
 (0.0362) (0.0237) (0.0185) (0.0195) (0.0585) (0.0666) (0.0799) 
Full time and part time RN to hospital staffed beds 0.0119 -0.0086 0.0043 0.0089 -0.0051 -0.0027 0.0558** 
 (0.0111) (0.0062) (0.0039) (0.0067) (0.0160) (0.0196) (0.0236) 
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Table 19 (continued) 
  Privately Insured Patients 
VARIABLES  
PSI 
Composite 
measure 
 
PSI 02 
Death in 
low 
mortality 
DRGs 
 
PSI 06 
Iatrogenic 
pneumothorax 
 
PSI 07 
Selected 
infections 
due to 
medical 
care 
 
PSI 09 
Postoperative 
hemorrhage 
or hematoma 
 
PSI 12 
Postoperative 
pulmonary 
embolism or 
deep vein 
thrombosis 
 
 
PSI 15 
Accidental 
puncture or 
laceration 
        
Log of the number of hospital staffed beds 0.0398*** -0.0039 0.0110** 0.0004 -0.0031 0.0271 0.0614* 
 (0.0131) (0.0055) (0.0052) (0.0086) (0.0242) (0.0278) (0.0337) 
System affiliated 0.0132 0.0012 -0.0010 0.0094 0.0336 0.0465 0.0519* 
 (0.0134) (0.0101) (0.0049) (0.0095) (0.0242) (0.0329) (0.0267) 
Major teaching hospital  0.1451** 0.0155 0.0268** 0.0599*** 0.0635* 0.1208 0.0082 
 (0.0642) (0.0174) (0.0119) (0.0231) (0.0379) (0.0847) (0.0467) 
Minor teaching hospital  0.0219 0.0132 -0.0026 0.0304** -0.0062 0.0796** -0.0018 
 (0.0241) (0.0194) (0.0055) (0.0122) (0.0202) (0.0389) (0.0301) 
Provide high-tech services 0.0155 0.0055 -0.0022 -0.0143* 0.0053 0.0070 0.0232 
 (0.0145) (0.0059) (0.0047) (0.0084) (0.0191) (0.0227) (0.0205) 
Hospital all payer casemix index 0.0914*** -0.0039 0.0277*** 0.0829*** 0.0164 0.1440*** 0.0522 
 (0.0240) (0.0166) (0.0066) (0.0188) (0.0319) (0.0473) (0.0424) 
Hospital Medicare share (%) -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0006 0.0006 0.0019* -0.0001 -0.0012 
 (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0014) 
Hospital Medicare share (%) at post BBA period 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0010 -0.0021 0.0008 
 (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0014) 
For-profit hospital 0.0248 -0.0084 0.0020 -0.0170 -0.0076 0.0047 0.0672* 
 (0.0176) (0.0088) (0.0055) (0.0115) (0.0254) (0.0340) (0.0344) 
County Hospital -0.1187*** 0.0125 -0.0259* -0.0172 0.0018 0.1667 -0.2643*** 
 (0.0336) (0.0269) (0.0149) (0.0224) (0.0511) (0.1142) (0.0576) 
District Hospital 0.0012 -0.0031 0.0007 -0.0197* 0.0299 -0.0019 -0.0125 
 (0.0214) (0.0130) (0.0083) (0.0113) (0.0424) (0.0492) (0.0493) 
Year 1997 -0.0920** -0.0268 -0.0359 -0.0637* 0.1586*** 0.1058 -0.1738*** 
 (0.0420) (0.0292) (0.0261) (0.0347) (0.0420) (0.0713) (0.0662) 
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Table 19 (continued) 
  Privately Insured Patients 
VARIABLES  
PSI 
Composite 
measure 
 
PSI 02 
Death in 
low 
mortality 
DRGs 
 
PSI 06 
Iatrogenic 
pneumothorax 
 
PSI 07 
Selected 
infections 
due to 
medical 
care 
 
PSI 09 
Postoperative 
hemorrhage 
or hematoma 
 
PSI 12 
Postoperative 
pulmonary 
embolism or 
deep vein 
thrombosis 
 
PSI 15 
Accidental 
puncture or 
laceration 
        
Year 1998 -0.1303*** -0.0025 -0.0692 -0.0776* 0.2046*** 0.2266* -0.2166** 
 (0.0490) (0.0233) (0.0468) (0.0421) (0.0647) (0.1208) (0.0991) 
Year 1999 -0.1186** -0.0053 -0.0785* -0.0619 0.1815*** 0.1813 -0.1737* 
 (0.0497) (0.0227) (0.0466) (0.0425) (0.0640) (0.1199) (0.0996) 
Year 2000 -0.1180** -0.0023 -0.0820* -0.0579 0.2022*** 0.1824 -0.1891* 
 (0.0489) (0.0237) (0.0460) (0.0428) (0.0653) (0.1189) (0.1005) 
Year 2001 -0.1270*** -0.0046 -0.0771* -0.0837** 0.1853*** 0.1913 -0.0841 
 (0.0490) (0.0237) (0.0465) (0.0427) (0.0659) (0.1192) (0.0973) 
Year 2002 -0.1363*** -0.0108 -0.0882* -0.0569 0.2033*** 0.2455** -0.1734* 
 (0.0488) (0.0213) (0.0460) (0.0421) (0.0664) (0.1201) (0.1015) 
Year 2003 -0.1208** -0.0039 -0.0799* -0.0603 0.2285*** 0.2908** -0.1556 
 (0.0490) (0.0218) (0.0456) (0.0423) (0.0679) (0.1253) (0.1046) 
Constant 0.8163*** 0.0265 0.0670 -0.0285 -0.0025 -0.3092 -0.0531 
 (0.1176) (0.0621) (0.0874) (0.0699) (0.1648) (0.2197) (0.2702) 
        
Observations 2367 2259 2410 2386 2200 2204 2414 
Number of Hospitals 356 343 363 360 334 334 364 
Robust standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<=0.01, ** p<=0.05, * p<=0.1        
PSI indicates patient safety indicator.        
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statistically significant. Specifically, the results indicate that net Medicaid DSH payments 
may marginally affect three studied PSI measures, including the percentage of patients 
having iatrogenic pneumothorax adverse event (PSI 06) (p<0.1), the percentage of 
patients having selected infections due to medical care (PSI 07) (p<0.1) and the 
percentage of patients having accidental puncture or laceration (PSI 15) (p=0.1), but the 
magnitudes of the effects are very small, ranging from a 0.0002 to a 0.0005 percentage 
point increase per one million dollar decrease in net Medicaid DSH payment. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, since there are many different types of patient adverse events, 
Chow tests is conducted to test the null hypothesis that the effects of net Medicaid DSH 
payments on all patient outcomes for Medicaid/uninsured patients are jointly zero. The 
joint tests from individual PSIs (PSI02, PSI06, PSI07, PSI09, PSI12, and PSI15) yield a 
chi-square value of 13.29 and a p-value equal to 0.0386. This joint test result suggests 
that the net Medicaid DSH payments among the individual PSIs are significantly 
associated with patient care, as estimated effect is uniformly of the same coefficient sign 
this is interpreted to mean that increased Medicaid DSH payments increased quality of 
care for Medicaid/uninsured patients.  
 With respect to the coefficient estimations of net Medicaid DSH payments for 
privately insured patients, the results indicate that the directions of the impacts are mixed 
but all those that are significant have a negative association between net Medicaid DSH 
payment and patient safety for privately insured. Specifically, the findings indicate net 
Medicaid DSH payments may marginally affect three studied PSI measures including the 
percentage of patient death in low mortality DRGs (PSI02) (p<0.1), the percentage of 
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patients having postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma (PSI09) (p<0.05), and the 
percentage of patients having postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep vein 
thrombosis (PSI12) (p<0.1), but the magnitude of effects are also very small, being in the 
range from a 0.0007 to  a 0.001 percentage point increase per one million dollar decrease 
in net Medicaid DSH payment. Similarly, this study conducts a Chow test to test whether 
these coefficients as a group are jointly equal to zero. The results yield a chi-square test 
statistic equal to 14.30 with a p-value equal to 0.0264. The findings from this joint test 
indicate that net Medicaid DSH payments may have weak impacts on individual PSIs for 
the privately insured.  
 Although the results from joint tests indicate there is an association between net 
Medicaid DSH payments and patient adverse events for both Medicaid/uninsured and 
privately insured, the magnitude of the effects are very small. Moreover, because the 
effects are not all evident across different PSI measures, the findings do not strongly 
support the study hypothesis H3a or H3b.  
 In terms of PSI results for Medicaid/uninsured patients, consistent patterns of 
effect are also not all evident for the explanatory variables across different PSI measures. 
For example, higher values of PSI composite scores are associated with hospitals that: 
receive fewer state and local governmental financial subsidies; are located in a market 
with fewer populations below poverty level; are major teaching hospitals; or have a more 
severely ill patient population. Greater rate of in-hospital deaths for low-mortality DRGs 
(PSI02) is associated with hospitals that: are located in a market with lower ratio of 
Medicaid managed care enrollees to total population; are located in a market with fewer 
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populations below poverty level; or have a more severely ill patient population. Higher 
rate of the incidence of iatrogenic pneumothorax (PSI06) is only associated with hospitals 
that are major teaching hospitals. Greater rate of the incidence of selected infections due 
to medical care (PSI07) is associated with hospitals that: receive fewer state and local 
governmental financial subsidies; are located in a market with lower ratio of Medicaid 
managed care enrollees to total population; had more staffed beds; are major teaching 
hospitals; or have a more severely ill patient population. Higher rate of the incidence of 
postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma (PSI09) is associated with hospitals that: are 
located in a market with fewer populations below poverty level; or are major teaching 
hospitals. Greater rate of the incidence of postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep 
vein thrombosis (PSI12) is associated with hospitals that: receive fewer state and local 
governmental financial subsidies; have more staffed beds; are major teaching hospitals; 
or have a more severely ill patient population. Higher rate of incidence of accidental 
puncture or laceration (PSI15) is associated with hospitals that: receive fewer state and 
local governmental financial subsidies; are located in a market with fewer populations 
below poverty level; or are major teaching hospitals. Other explanatory variables have 
limited effects and also lacked consistent patterns across different PSIs measures for 
Medicaid/uninsured patients.  
 With respect to the PSI results for privately insured patients, the results suggest 
that higher values of PSI composite score are associated with hospitals that: are located in 
a market with lower ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to total population; are 
located in a market with fewer populations below poverty level; have more staffed beds; 
 
 
118 
 
 
 
are major teaching hospitals; or have a more severely ill patient population. In addition, 
compared to not-for-profit hospitals, county hospitals have lower patient adverse events 
as measured by PSI composite score. Higher rate of the incidence of iatrogenic 
pneumothorax (PSI06) is associated with hospitals that: have more staffed beds; are 
major teaching hospitals; or have a more severely ill patient population. In addition, 
compared to not-for-profit hospitals, county hospitals also have lower rate of the 
incidence of iatrogenic pneumothorax. Greater rate of the incidence of selected infections 
due to medical care (PSI07) is associated with hospitals that: are located in a market with 
lower ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to total population; are located in a 
market with fewer populations below poverty level; are major or minor teaching 
hospitals; or have a more severely ill patient population. Higher rate of the incidence of 
postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma (PSI09) is associated with hospitals that: receive 
fewer state and local governmental financial subsidies; or are major teaching hospitals. 
Greater rate of the incidence of postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep vein 
thrombosis (PSI12) is associated with hospitals that: are minor teaching hospitals; or have 
more severely ill patient populations. Higher rate of incidence of accidental puncture or 
laceration (PSI15) is associated with hospitals that: receive fewer state and local 
governmental financial subsidies; are located in a market with lower ratio of Medicaid 
managed care enrollees to total population; are located in a market with fewer population 
below poverty level; or have more staffed beds. Other explanatory variables have limited 
effects and also lacked consistent patterns across different PSIs measures for privately 
insured patients. 
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Sensitivity Analysis 
As Table 20 presents, several sensitivity analyses are conducted and compared the 
coefficient estimations of the effect of Medicaid DSH payment on hospital patient safety 
indicators with the original random effect models. Model (1) reports the coefficient 
estimates for the net Medicaid DSH payment variable in the original random effect 
models as reported in Table 18 and Table 19. Model (2) reports the coefficient estimate 
for the net Medicaid DSH payment variable after excluding hospitals that have ever 
experienced ownership conversion or closure during study years. The results of this 
sensitivity analysis indicate that the coefficient estimates of the effect of net Medicaid 
DSH payment on hospital patient safety/ quality of care are robust to the presence of all 
hospital observations. 
Summary of Key Study Findings 
 In this chapter, the study findings for uncompensated care model and quality of 
care model are presented. Given the research questions and theoretical hypotheses 
discussed in the Chapter 3, one could see the results primarily focused on investigating 
the association between net Medicaid DSH payments and hospital outcomes (i.e., hospital 
uncompensated care provision and patient safety/ quality indicators).  With respect to the 
results from the uncompensated care model, the study findings support hypothesis H1, 
which suggested that not-for-profit hospitals may reduce their uncompensated care 
provision given the reductions of Medicaid DSH payment they encountered during study 
years. Other things being equal, the marginal effect of the net Medicaid DSH payment 
indicates that an increase of one million dollars (in 1996 dollars) increased
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Table 20. Results for Sensitivity Analysis in Quality of Care Model 
 Medicaid/Uninsured  Privately Insured 
Dependent 
variable\Key 
Independent Variable 
Net Medicaid DSH  
payment  (in millions) 
 Net Medicaid DSH payment  
(in millions) 
 Net Medicaid DSH  
payment  (in millions) 
 Net Medicaid DSH  
payment  (in millions) 
 (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
 N Coefficient SE  N Coefficient SE  N Coefficient SE  N Coefficient SE 
PSI Composite 
measure 2418 -0.0009 (0.0006)  2223 -0.0010* (0.0006)  2367 -0.0001 (0.0004)  2189 -0.0001 (0.0004) 
PSI 02 Death in low 
mortality DRGs 2291 -0.0001 (0.0001)  2116 -0.0001 (0.0001)  2259 -0.0007* (0.0004)  2094 -0.0005* (0.0003) 
PSI 06 Iatrogenic 
pneumothorax 2457 -0.0002* (0.0001)  2258 -0.0002** (0.0001)  2410 0.0005 (0.0003)  2228 0.0004 (0.0003) 
PSI 07 Selected 
infections due to 
medical care 
2429 -0.0005* (0.0003)  2231 -0.0006* (0.0003)  2386 0.0004 (0.0006)  2202 0.0004 (0.0006) 
PSI 09 Postoperative 
hemorrhage or 
hematoma 
2204 -0.0005 (0.0004)  2035 -0.0005 (0.0004)  2200 -0.001** (0.0005)  2040 -0.0013*** (0.0005) 
PSI 12 Postoperative 
pulmonary embolism 
or deep vein 
thrombosis 
2205 -0.0003 (0.0006)  2036 -0.0001 (0.0006)  2204 -0.0042* (0.0023)  2044 -0.004** (0.0020) 
PSI 15 Accidental 
puncture or laceration 2457 -0.0005* (0.0003)  2258 -0.0006** (0.0003)  2414 -0.0004 (0.0005)  2231 -0.0004 (0.0005) 
Note: Model (1) represents the model including hospital observations that experienced ownership change or closure during study years. 
          Model (2) represents the models excluding hospital observations that experienced ownership change or closure during study years. 
          PSI indicates patient safety indicator. N represents hospital-year observations. 
             Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
             *** p<=0.01, ** p<=0.05, * p<=0.1 
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uncompensated care costs by 0.0343 million dollars and increased by 0.0223 percentage 
points the fraction of uncompensated costs to total operating expenses.   
 In addition, these results indicated, compared to not-for-profit hospitals, for-profit 
hospitals may not evidently have smaller cuts in their uncompensated care costs as well 
as the percent of total operating expense devoted in the uncompensated care costs when 
faced with declining DSH payments. The overall findings for the interaction of for-profit 
hospitals and net Medicaid DSH payment do not support hypothesis H2. 
 Given the anticipated hypotheses for the effect of the reduction of net Medicaid 
DSH payments on patient safety, although the results indicated there may be a weak 
association between net Medicaid DSH payments and some study measures for patient 
adverse events for both Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured, the magnitude of the 
effects are very small and in some cases mixed. Moreover, because the effects are not all 
evident across all PSI measures, the findings are inconclusive as regards study 
hypotheses H3a and H3b. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION  
 
 
 
In response to the growing number of the uninsured in the U.S., general 
approaches that state and federal governments take to address the problems are either to 
reduce the number of uninsured individuals by expanding public insurance coverage or to 
subsidize the cost of uncompensated care for health care providers (Weissman, 2005). 
Medicaid DSH payments are one of the major funds that support health care providers, in 
particular safety net hospitals, and help to offset their costs for providing care to low-
income patients. The public and policy makers have often expressed concerns that safety 
net hospitals may reduce the medical care they provide to low-income patients when 
faced with Medicaid DSH budget cuts.  
 This study examines the impact of changes in Medicaid DSH payments resulting 
from the BBA health policy reform on hospital outcomes, while controlling for factors 
such as other governmental financial subsidies, hospital and market characteristics. Two 
hospital outcomes are examined: the provision of uncompensated care and quality of care 
for Medicaid and uninsured patients. These two dimensions are important and need to be 
monitored by policy makers and researchers in any health policy reform related to 
medical care for the uninsured population. In Chapter 5, this study presented detailed 
results for the uncompensated care model and quality of care model. Here the results are 
summarized, the key findings interpreted, and implications discussed. Study limitations
and suggestions for future study are reviewed at the end of this chapter.
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Summary  
Uncompensated Care Model 
 This study applied organizational economic theory of not-for-profit hospital 
behavior and theoretical extensions from Newhouse (1970), Hoerger (1991), Frank and 
Salkever (1991) and other researchers as a framework to examine the association between 
the provision of uncompensated care and Medicaid DSH payments. Fixed effect models 
are used as the major statistical technique to assess the research questions. Data for 
California hospitals from 1996 to 2003 are examined. The study findings suggest that 
not-for-profit hospitals reduce their provision of uncompensated care in response to 
reductions in Medicaid DSH payments. Specifically, the marginal effect of the net 
Medicaid DSH payment indicates that an increase of one million dollars (in 1996 dollars) 
increases uncompensated care costs by $34,300 dollars, and increases by 0.0223 
percentage points the percent of uncompensated costs to total operating expenses in not-
for-profit hospitals.   
 The study results, however, do not support the hypotheses that for-profit hospitals 
reduce uncompensated care by a smaller degree than not-for-profit hospitals for a 
comparable DSH decline, as economic theory and previous study suggested (Banks et al., 
1997). It may because this study only studies one state and a particular Medicaid DSH 
payment change. Future research is needed to examine whether public payment 
generosity affect for-profit hospital uncompensated care provision from theoretical 
perspectives. 
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  In addition to the key findings for net Medicaid DSH payments, this study also 
finds several interesting results from the control variables. In terms of other governmental 
financial subsidies, the study results suggest that reductions in Medicare DSH payments 
negatively affected hospital uncompensated care provision and that the effect may be 
larger than that for net Medicaid DSH payments. The results indicate that a $1 million 
reduction in Medicare DSH payment (in 1996 dollars) is associated with a $171,400 
dollar decline in hospital uncompensated care costs. The reason for the magnitude of 
effects different between the changes in Medicare DSH payment and Medicaid DSH 
payments on hospital uncompensated care may be because there are about 70% of study 
hospitals receiving Medicare DSH payments but only about 30% of study hospitals 
receiving Medicaid DSH payments. The effects will diminish statistically given the 
relative small number of hospitals receive the payments. The study results also indicate 
that one percentage point increase in the ratio of the Medicaid eligibles to total population 
in a county would decrease uncompensated care costs by $52,500 dollars (in 1996 
dollars). Moreover, the study findings suggest that hospitals with more capacity (i.e., 
more nurses per staffed beds, more staffed beds) and hospitals that became major 
teaching hospitals have more capacity and ability to provide uncompensated care.  
Quality of Care Model 
 This study applied organizational economic theory of not-for-profit hospital 
behavior and theoretical extensions from Newhouse (1970), Hoerger (1991), Spence 
(1975) and Dranove &White (1998) as frameworks to examine the association between 
hospital quality of care and Medicaid DSH payments. Random effect models are used as 
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the major statistical technique to assess the research questions. Data for California 
hospitals from 1996 to 2003 are examined. The overall study findings do not provide 
strong evidence to support an association between net Medicaid DSH payments and 
patient adverse events for both Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured. The magnitude 
of the effects are very small and only a few PSI measures have significant DSH effects 
with most of these being only marginally significant (p<=0.1).  
  In addition to the key findings of net Medicaid DSH payments, this study also 
finds several interesting findings from the control variables. For example, the study 
findings suggest a consistent inverse association between patient safety/quality and state 
and local governmental financial subsidies. This relation may arise because hospitals 
used these non-patient care revenues (i.e., state and county tax appropriation, district 
assessment revenue, and donations and subsidies for indigent care) to improve hospital 
infrastructure, for example, by investing in up-to-date equipment to improve technology 
efficiency or by replacing semi-private rooms to single private room to lower the chance 
of the spread of infection, and in turn to maintain the quality of care (Bazzoli et al., 
2008). Additionally, the study results indicate that hospitals located in a market with a 
higher ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to total population generally have better 
patient safety/quality. This may be because California State required managed care plans 
and health providers to meet certain standards (Holahan, Zuckerman, Evans, & 
Rangarajan, 1998). California State expanded Medi-Cal managed care during these study 
years. Medi-Cal managed care was implemented on a county-by-county basis through a 
combination of voluntary and mandatory managed care plans. In order to assure quality 
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of care, California State established mechanisms to monitor managed care plan 
performance and quality of care as well as access to care for Medi-Cal beneficiaries 
(Bindman, Chattopadhyay, Osmond, Huen, & Bacchetti, 2005; Holahan et al., 1998). 
One study examined the impact of Medi-Cal managed care on the hospitalization rates 
due to ambulatory care sensitive conditions and found Medi-Cal managed care is 
associated with a large reduction in the hospitalization rate, compared to Medicaid fee-
for-service (Bindman et al., 2005). Consistent with Bindman et al. (2005) study, the 
results from this study suggest that Medi-Cal managed care is associated with a lower 
incidence of hospital adverse events for both Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured 
patients. Moreover, the study findings suggest that hospitals with more staffed beds, 
major teaching hospitals, and hospitals that had a more severely ill patient population 
have higher incidence rates of patient adverse events.  
Limitations of this Study 
 As with any study, this research has limitations that must be acknowledged. First, 
due to the lack of comparable data on key study variables across other states, this study 
only examined hospitals in California. The results may not be generalizable to other 
states. Second, this study conducts a pre-and-post design that covered the study period 
between 1996 and 2003 in order to capture the specific impact of Medicaid DSH payment 
cuts resulting from the BBA on hospital outcomes. However, other policy reforms (i.e., 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, which was effective in 1995) that 
capped the expansion of Medicaid DSH expenditures in early 1990s may have had some 
residual historical effects on hospital outcomes for the study years (i.e., 1996 and 1997) 
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covered in this study. This historical threat may affect the internal validity of this study 
results. Third, the data used to construct quality measures (i.e., PSIs) were based on the 
administrative data, which may not capture all patients’ detailed risk factors. In addition, 
this study uses only patient safety indicators to measure hospital quality of care. There 
are other types of quality measures that can be used in this kind of study, such as patient 
mortality, length of stay, or hospital readmissions. Despite its shortcomings, the study 
results do provide some important implications for health policy and practice.  
Implications of the Findings 
Implications for Health Policy  
 With respect to the current U.S. health care reform, one of the approaches that 
Congress and the Obama administration will use to finance health coverage involves 
Medicaid DSH and Medicare DSH payments.
28
 The basic idea is to reallocate these funds 
that currently go to safety net providers for providing uncompensated care to instead 
finance comprehensive health care reform (Berenson et al., 2009; McKethan, Nguyen, 
Sasse, & Kocot, 2009). To find an optimal solution for covering more Americans over 
the next ten to twenty years, policy makers need to consider many factors simultaneously 
because when one factor changes, others might be affected subsequently.  
 This study provides empirical results regarding the magnitudes of the association 
between the changes of hospital uncompensated care provisions and other policy factors 
(i.e., Medicaid and Medicare DSH payments, and the ratio of Medicaid eligibles to total 
                                                          
 
28
 More detailed information on the health reform law can be found at: 
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/housesenatebill_final.pdf. Among the reform items, the ways to 
finance health reform plan are listed in the last two pages. (Access Date: 01March.2010). 
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population). If Medicaid covers more low-income uninsured after universal health 
reform, hospitals may no longer need to provide free care and thus the hospital provision 
of uncompensated care will decline. Hospitals, in turn, receive guaranteed payment 
revenue from payers like Medicaid for caring for low-income patients. In this regard, it 
would make sense for proposed health reform policy to redirect the Medicaid and 
Medicare DSH payments that originally fund hospitals to provide such care to low-
income patients and to cover the universal health insurance coverage.  
 However, a concern may arise during the transition to health reform as Hsieh, 
Clement, & Bazzoli (2010) discussed in their paper, “… If there is a regulatory mandate 
requiring individuals to obtain health insurance, it will not immediately solve the issue of 
the uninsured and hospital uncompensated care.” Traditionally, safety net hospitals play 
important roles in providing high-cost and potentially unprofitable services and care for a 
disproportionate share of the low-income population. Therefore, they mostly rely on the 
Medicaid and Medicare DSH to offset the unreimbursed costs of these services. If safety 
net funds that originally are used to support safety net providers decrease immediately, 
safety net providers may be adversely affected because they will still need to take care of 
low-income patients who are not insured and do not have sufficient financial support for 
health care during the transition period to universal coverage. If that is the case, policy 
makers need to carefully address the size of budget cutbacks to safety net funds because 
these cuts may harm the financial condition of safety net providers and their continuing 
ability to treat low-income, uninsured individuals during the transition.  
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 In addition, reductions in safety net funding may affect not only the provision of 
hospital uncompensated care but also other hospital outcomes (i.e., quality of care). 
Although this study does not find substantial evidence suggesting that reductions in 
Medicaid DSH payment after the BBA had a negative impact on hospital quality of care 
for either Medicaid/uninsured or privately insured patients, future research is necessary to 
continuously monitor hospital quality of care when healthcare reform is implemented. 
Policy makers may need to collect better patient safety and quality indicators in order to 
have a better sense of the effect of hospital finances on the quality of care provided to 
patients. 
 Another issue may also arise in relation to community benefit requirements of 
not-for-profit hospitals after comprehensive healthcare reform is implemented(Bazzoli, 
Clement, & Hsieh, 2010). Currently, the revised IRS 990 tax-exempt form requires 
hospitals to report the dollar amount of community benefit provided (namely, charity 
care, uncompensated care and Medicaid shortfalls). After comprehensive healthcare 
reform, hospitals may no longer have much charity care or uncompensated care, but may 
provide more care to Medicaid patients, policy makers may need to rethink what 
activities constitute community benefits in relation to tax exempt status of not-for-profit 
hospitals once health reform is implemented. 
Implications for Practice  
 A major uncertainty confronting hospitals currently is the types of changes that 
will result from upcoming comprehensive healthcare reform. If safety net funds from 
Medicaid and Medicare DSH are reallocated to fund comprehensive health coverage, 
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organizations originally receiving state and federal subsidies for uncompensated care may 
no longer receive this assistance. Hospital managers and administrators, in particular 
those associated with safety net providers, need to understand their environment and 
estimate the possible reductions in safety net funding they may experience. For example, 
hospital managers need to continue to collect and analyze information on the amount of 
uncompensated care they provide, how many state and federal subsidies they receive for 
supporting such care and what the historical Medicaid payment rate for Medicaid patients 
has been. Using such data, hospital managers may anticipate possible scenarios and 
conduct sensitivity analyses regarding the simultaneous impacts of reduced Medicaid and 
Medicare DSH as well as expanded Medicaid coverage for the uninsured on hospital 
financial performance. It will be helpful for hospitals to adjust and reallocate available 
resources when they have a better idea of potential future scenarios. 
 In addition, although the study results do not strongly support that reductions in 
Medicaid DSH payment after the BBA had a negative impact on hospital quality of care 
for either Medicaid/uninsured or privately insured patients, hospital managers still need 
to continuously monitor hospital quality of care.      
Suggestions for Future Study 
 As discussed previously, this study examines only California hospitals to assess 
the impact of Medicaid DSH payment changes resulting from the BBA policy changes on 
the provision of hospital uncompensated care and quality of care. If Medicare and 
Medicaid DSH payment will be reallocated to fund comprehensive healthcare reform, 
future studies are needed, including: 
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(1) To examine what effects of the reduction in safety net financial subsidies will have on 
safety net hospitals’ financial conditions in the short-run and in the long-run after 
comprehensive health reform is implemented;  
(2) To examine what effects of the reductions in safety net financial subsidies will have 
on safety net hospitals’ quality of care in the short-run and in the long-run after 
comprehensive health reform is implemented; 
(3) Given the results of qualify of care models, the patient safety indicators may not be 
sensitive to capture the quality of care for low-income population. Future research are 
needed to examine quality indicators that are more sensitive to care received by 
Medicaid and uninsured patients, such as births or birth complication.  
Conclusions 
 Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment is one of the major 
funding sources that hospitals used to offset part of their uncompensated care costs since 
early 1990s. This payment scheme has been revised in many prior health reforms such as 
the Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of 1991, 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. 
Medicaid DSH payments may be eliminated in the future if funding is redirected towards 
support of health care reform provisions. In other words, if there is universal coverage in 
the U.S., the main purpose of these payments may no longer be necessary. Nevertheless, 
during the transition from the old to new system, it is necessary to study the effects of the 
transition and so that the best health policy decisions can be made.  
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